Update README.md

keeperDAO/README.md

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+
+
+---
+
+## Core Products
+
 <br>
 
+### The Hiding Game
 
-#### Projects of interest
+* Gasless limit order system that sources liquidity from all means supported by KeeperDAO Keepers.
+* If a user's order creates a MEV opportunity, the user will be reward with a share of the MEV profits in the form of ROOK.
+
+### The Hiding Vault
+
+A generalized liquidation-mitigation lending and borrowing NFT product. 
+* The first platform supported by Hiding Vaults is Compound Finance. 
+* Using a Hiding Vault mitigates both the risks and the impacts of the liquidation of users using Compound Finance. 
+* If a user's position is liquidated, the user will be reimbursed with a share of the liquidation profits in the form of ROOK.
+
+### Liquidity Pools
+
+* KeeperDAO offer five single-asset LP that yield ROOK tokens (ETH, WETH, USDC, renBTC, and DAI): users earn ROOK rewards based on the number  of ROOK rewards allocated to the pool each quarter.
+
+
+<br>
+
+--- 
+
+## MEV
+
+<br>
+
+### How the blockchain works
+* Each block in the blockchain contains a list of transactions in a particular order, enconding a sequence of updates to the blockchain sate (world state).
+* Anyone can broadcast a transaction to the network, which means that the transaction is public. A broadcast is a request. In order for that request to be carried out, someone must place the transaction in a block and add the block to the blockchain.
+* Anyone can listen for transactions being broadcast and gather them into a list. In order to a turn a list into a block, it needs to be validated. Validation creats a mathematical (cryptographic) proof that the state changes are consistent.
+* In a proof-of-work blockchain, block producers are miners. In a proof-of-stake blockchain, they are validators.
+* The act of converting a transaction into a block is called *settlement*. The process of block production is called *settlement layer* or *consensus layer*.
+
+### Arbritage opportunity
+
+* Results from a difference in prices between the same asset, listed on different DEXes.
+* A transaction that makes the right swaps along the right arbritage route will end up with profit.
+
+
+### Keepers
+
+* Bots that observe Ethereum, and other blockchains, to faciliate sorts of transactions, such as arbitrage, liquidations, auctions.
+* Automated agents that survey the state of the blockchain and compute all the different possibilitie in order to identifty transactions that can create profit.
+* Once Keepers have identified a valuable transaction, they will broadcast that to the network. Other keepers can copy and broadcast the same transaction with themselves as the originators.
+* MEV arises from the problem of "how can a keeper ensure that they are the one who gets a transaction settled first?
+* Keepers compete with each other in a zero-sum game, transforming Ethereum into a highly zero-sum game.
+* Inside KeeperDAO, keepers don't need to compete - but coordinate and capture on-chain profits efficiently. DeFi users, protocols, market makers can bring their activity to KeeperDAO and gain a portion of the profits as a reward.
+
+
+### Maximal extractable value
+
+* Refers to profit that can be extracted from a transaction from the transaction originator needing priority or control over the ordering of that transacion in a block (*the arbitrage has 45 WETH of MEV*).
+* [As may of 2021, around $3-4mil of MEV is being captured daily](https://explore.flashbots.net/).
+* MEV exists on any blockchain and layers where there is a party responsible for transaction ordering (eg. validators, rollup providers).
+* Extracted MEV = Successful MEV transactions + Successful MEV transactions gas fees + Failed MEV transactions gas fees
+
+<br>
+
+### ➡️ While it seems simple, MEV poses risks not only to the user but also to the consensus layer itself. The reorganisation of blocks, the reordering of transactions, and — even momentarily — the censorship of transactions can have profound impacts on the blockchain and breaks the assumptions of many applications.
+
+### ➡️ Because block producers are able to prioritize transactions with higher gas fees, a bidding war between bots (who either try to arbitrage or front-run) can occur. This hurts ordinary users and DeFi platforms, because these bidding wars drive up gas fees (Priority Gas Auctions) and cause slippage and failed transactions
+
+
+### MEV strategies
+
+* Common MEV strategies are front-running, back-running, and sandwiching.
+* MEV should accrue to the originator of the transaction, or of the transactions or protocols that create the MEV in the first place.
+* Using KeeperDAO's **coordination layer**, we can capture and recycle the MEV before it can be extracted.
+
+
+
+
+<br>
+
+----
+
+<br>
+
+## Projects of interest
 
 * [KeeperDAO analytics](https://github.com/keeperdao/analytics)
 * [Keeper Improvement Proposals (KIPs)](https://github.com/keeperdao/kips)
@@ -44,7 +126,7 @@ We’re backed by some of the most reputed investors in web3: Three Arrows Capit
 
 <br>
 
-#### Documents of interest
+## Documents of interest
 
 
 * [docs page](https://docs.keeperdao.com/reference/)