From 0ce18f4aec9887a10bb25b3852ea6accef156573 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "steinkirch.eth" <1130416+mvonsteinkirch@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 06:21:34 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] Delete MEV-at-KeeperDAO.md --- MEV_projects/rook/docs/MEV-at-KeeperDAO.md | 47 ---------------------- 1 file changed, 47 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 MEV_projects/rook/docs/MEV-at-KeeperDAO.md diff --git a/MEV_projects/rook/docs/MEV-at-KeeperDAO.md b/MEV_projects/rook/docs/MEV-at-KeeperDAO.md deleted file mode 100644 index f7a55bd..0000000 --- a/MEV_projects/rook/docs/MEV-at-KeeperDAO.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -## MEV at KeeperDAO - -
- -* MEV refers to profit that can be extracted from a transaction from the transaction originator needing priority or control over the ordering of that transacion in a block (*the arbitrage has 45 WETH of MEV*). -* [As may of 2021, around $3-4mil of MEV is being captured daily](https://explore.flashbots.net/). -* MEV exists on any blockchain and layers where there is a party responsible for transaction ordering (eg. validators, rollup providers). -* Extracted MEV = Successful MEV transactions + Successful MEV transactions gas fees + Failed MEV transactions gas fees -* Common MEV strategies are front-running, back-running, and sandwiching. -* MEV should accrue to the originator of the transaction, or of the transactions or protocols that create the MEV in the first place. -* Using KeeperDAO's **coordination layer**, we can capture and recycle the MEV before it can be extracted. - -
- -### Arbitrage opportunity - -* Results from a difference in prices between the same asset, listed on different DEXes. -* A transaction that makes the right swaps along the right arbitrage route will end up with profit. - - -### Keepers - -* Bots observe Ethereum, and other blockchains, to faciliate sorts of transactions, such as arbitrage, liquidations, auctions. -* Automated agents that survey the state of the blockchain and compute all the different possibilitie in order to identifty transactions that can create profit. -* Once Keepers have identified a valuable transaction, they will broadcast that to the network. Other keepers can copy and broadcast the same transaction with themselves as the originators. -* MEV arises from the problem of "how can a keeper ensure that they are the one who gets a transaction settled first? -* Keepers compete with each other in a zero-sum game, transforming Ethereum into a highly zero-sum game. -* Inside KeeperDAO, keepers don't need to compete - but coordinate and capture on-chain profits efficiently. DeFi users, protocols, market makers can bring their activity to KeeperDAO and gain a portion of the profits as a reward. - - - -
- -### ➡️ MEV poses risks not only to the user but also to the consensus layer itself. The reorganisation of blocks, the reordering of transactions, and — even momentarily — the censorship of transactions can have profound impacts on the blockchain and breaks the assumptions of many applications. - -### ➡️ Because block producers are able to prioritize transactions with higher gas fees, a bidding war between bots (who either try to arbitrage or front-run) can occur. This hurts ordinary users and DeFi platforms, because these bidding wars drive up gas fees (Priority Gas Auctions) and cause slippage and failed transactions - - - -
- -#### Gas golfing - -* use addresss that start with a long string og zeroes (take less space, less gas, to store) -* leaving small ERC20 token balances in constracts since it cost more gas to initialize a storage slot then to update a storage slot - -