diff --git a/MEV_searchers/bots/stat-arbers.md b/MEV_searchers/bots/stat-arbers.md
index 66c6ae3..0c1b00b 100644
--- a/MEV_searchers/bots/stat-arbers.md
+++ b/MEV_searchers/bots/stat-arbers.md
@@ -2,17 +2,12 @@
 
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-### tl; dr for a strategy
+### tl; dr
 
 <br>
 
-* if CEX is greater than the price on chain (DEX), stat arbs can buy on the DEX and hedge on the CEX -> confident that the DEX price will drift towards the CEX price, but not confident that will happen to the CEX price
-* problem: settlement mismatch -> CEX trades are fast but blockchains aren't -> start arbs are unsure if the trade will land or competitors will beat them
-* from the time between trade submission and receipt of the next block, the trade (their exposure to the assets) is uncertain 
-* the greater the uncertainty, the more the profit estimate needs to be marked down
-* while volatility of the token is important, the longer the time period between blocks, the longer tx remains, and the longer it can go without being fully hedged
-* as block time increases, stat arb MEV profit estimates get marked down -> payments made by stat arbers to miners/validators or to users/traders decrease
-* conclusion: the battle between PFOF-style MEV could lead to increase block times for stat arbers, decreasing combined realized MEV
+* arb between different chains or markets (e.g. ethereum and binance)
+* for instance, if the cex price is greater than the price on-chain, stat arbs can buy on the dex and hedge on the cex. the problem is settlement mismatch: the longer the time period between blocks, the longer tx remains, and the longer it can go without being fully hedged (decreasing combined realized mev).