From 0c244ac4c669691d2ab8d920ada12ebbdcff2b3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bt3gl <1130416+bt3gl@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sun, 3 Apr 2022 07:22:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Update README.md --- keeperDAO/README.md | 55 +-------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/keeperDAO/README.md b/keeperDAO/README.md index 6b09045..f468796 100644 --- a/keeperDAO/README.md +++ b/keeperDAO/README.md @@ -36,60 +36,7 @@
---- - -## MEV - -
- -* Refers to profit that can be extracted from a transaction from the transaction originator needing priority or control over the ordering of that transacion in a block (*the arbitrage has 45 WETH of MEV*). -* [As may of 2021, around $3-4mil of MEV is being captured daily](https://explore.flashbots.net/). -* MEV exists on any blockchain and layers where there is a party responsible for transaction ordering (eg. validators, rollup providers). -* Extracted MEV = Successful MEV transactions + Successful MEV transactions gas fees + Failed MEV transactions gas fees -* Common MEV strategies are front-running, back-running, and sandwiching. -* MEV should accrue to the originator of the transaction, or of the transactions or protocols that create the MEV in the first place. -* Using KeeperDAO's **coordination layer**, we can capture and recycle the MEV before it can be extracted. - -
- -### Arbitrage opportunity - -* Results from a difference in prices between the same asset, listed on different DEXes. -* A transaction that makes the right swaps along the right arbritage route will end up with profit. - - -### Keepers - -* Bots observe Ethereum, and other blockchains, to faciliate sorts of transactions, such as arbitrage, liquidations, auctions. -* Automated agents that survey the state of the blockchain and compute all the different possibilitie in order to identifty transactions that can create profit. -* Once Keepers have identified a valuable transaction, they will broadcast that to the network. Other keepers can copy and broadcast the same transaction with themselves as the originators. -* MEV arises from the problem of "how can a keeper ensure that they are the one who gets a transaction settled first? -* Keepers compete with each other in a zero-sum game, transforming Ethereum into a highly zero-sum game. -* Inside KeeperDAO, keepers don't need to compete - but coordinate and capture on-chain profits efficiently. DeFi users, protocols, market makers can bring their activity to KeeperDAO and gain a portion of the profits as a reward. - - - -
- -### ➡️ MEV poses risks not only to the user but also to the consensus layer itself. The reorganisation of blocks, the reordering of transactions, and — even momentarily — the censorship of transactions can have profound impacts on the blockchain and breaks the assumptions of many applications. - -### ➡️ Because block producers are able to prioritize transactions with higher gas fees, a bidding war between bots (who either try to arbitrage or front-run) can occur. This hurts ordinary users and DeFi platforms, because these bidding wars drive up gas fees (Priority Gas Auctions) and cause slippage and failed transactions - - - -
- -#### Gas golfing - -* use addresss that start with a long string og zeroes (take less space, less gas, to store) -* leaving small ERC-20 token balances in constracts since it cost more gas to initialize a storage slot then to update a storage slot - - -
- ----- - -
+--- ## Projects of interest