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-## MEV
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-* Refers to profit that can be extracted from a transaction from the transaction originator needing priority or control over the ordering of that transacion in a block (*the arbitrage has 45 WETH of MEV*).
-* [As may of 2021, around $3-4mil of MEV is being captured daily](https://explore.flashbots.net/).
-* MEV exists on any blockchain and layers where there is a party responsible for transaction ordering (eg. validators, rollup providers).
-* Extracted MEV = Successful MEV transactions + Successful MEV transactions gas fees + Failed MEV transactions gas fees
-* Common MEV strategies are front-running, back-running, and sandwiching.
-* MEV should accrue to the originator of the transaction, or of the transactions or protocols that create the MEV in the first place.
-* Using KeeperDAO's **coordination layer**, we can capture and recycle the MEV before it can be extracted.
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-### Arbitrage opportunity
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-* Results from a difference in prices between the same asset, listed on different DEXes.
-* A transaction that makes the right swaps along the right arbritage route will end up with profit.
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-### Keepers
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-* Bots observe Ethereum, and other blockchains, to faciliate sorts of transactions, such as arbitrage, liquidations, auctions.
-* Automated agents that survey the state of the blockchain and compute all the different possibilitie in order to identifty transactions that can create profit.
-* Once Keepers have identified a valuable transaction, they will broadcast that to the network. Other keepers can copy and broadcast the same transaction with themselves as the originators.
-* MEV arises from the problem of "how can a keeper ensure that they are the one who gets a transaction settled first?
-* Keepers compete with each other in a zero-sum game, transforming Ethereum into a highly zero-sum game.
-* Inside KeeperDAO, keepers don't need to compete - but coordinate and capture on-chain profits efficiently. DeFi users, protocols, market makers can bring their activity to KeeperDAO and gain a portion of the profits as a reward.
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-### ➡️ MEV poses risks not only to the user but also to the consensus layer itself. The reorganisation of blocks, the reordering of transactions, and — even momentarily — the censorship of transactions can have profound impacts on the blockchain and breaks the assumptions of many applications.
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-### ➡️ Because block producers are able to prioritize transactions with higher gas fees, a bidding war between bots (who either try to arbitrage or front-run) can occur. This hurts ordinary users and DeFi platforms, because these bidding wars drive up gas fees (Priority Gas Auctions) and cause slippage and failed transactions
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-#### Gas golfing
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-* use addresss that start with a long string og zeroes (take less space, less gas, to store)
-* leaving small ERC-20 token balances in constracts since it cost more gas to initialize a storage slot then to update a storage slot
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## Projects of interest