* Fixes#10400
- Support TOTP entries with bare secrets instead of otpauth urls for Bitwarden. Vice-versa for 1PUX.
- Support Bitwarden Argon2id encryption scheme
* Fixes#10380 - Support Bitwarden organization collections
This issue previously caused parent databases to be marked as modified on unlock. This was because of the new protections against byte-by-byte side channel attacks adds a randomized string to the database custom data. We should never be merging database custom data with keeshare or imports since we are merging groups only.
Also prevent overwrite of auto-generated custom data fields, Last Modified and Random Slug.
* Restrict access to changing DACL's after the process is started. This prevents the creator of the keepassxc.exe process from simply adding the permission to read memory back to the DACL list.
* Verified using System Informer.
* This removes the application setting to require typing the password in again even though it is visible.
* Removed automatic password repeat when the password is made visible on changing.
* Fixes#10455
* Fixes#10432
* Fixes#10415
Prevent setting critical key components to nullptr when database data is cleared. This can result in a crash due to race condition between threads.
Added a bunch of asserts to detect this problem and if guards to prevent actual crashes.
* Implemented database file hidden attribute preservation on Windows
Implemented database file hidden attribute preservation on Windows by modifying the save function to check the hidden attribute of the original database before saving and then reapply it post-saving if running on Windows so that users can easily store their database in a hidden file without having to re-hide it every time it's modified.
Updated the TestDatabase::testSaveAs() unit test to first verify after the initial save that the database file is not hidden before hiding it then saving again and verifying that it is now hidden.
Signed-off-by: Drwsburah <Drwsburah@yahoo.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonathan White <support@dmapps.us>
Attack - KeeShare attachments can be inferred because of attachment de-duplication.
Solution - Prevent de-duplication of normal database entry attachments with those entry attachments synchronized/associated with a KeeShare database. This is done using the KeeShare database UUID injected into the hash calculation of the attachment prior to de-dupe. The attachments themselves are not modified in any way.
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Attack - Side channel byte-by-byte inference due to compression de-duplication of data between a KeeShare database and it's parent.
Solution - Generate a random array between 64 and 512 bytes, convert to hex, and store in the database custom data.
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Attack vector assumptions:
1. Compression is enabled
2. The attacker has access to a KeeShare database actively syncing with the victim's database
3. The victim's database is unlocked and syncing
4. The attacker can see the exact size of the victim's database after saving, and syncing, the KeeShare database
Thank you to Andrés Fábrega from Cornell University for theorizing and informing us of this attack vector.
* Closes#7545 - Support 1Password 1PUX import format based on https://support.1password.com/1pux-format/
* Closes#8367 - Support Bitwarden JSON import format (both unencrypted and encrypted) based on https://bitwarden.com/help/encrypted-export/
* Fixes#9577 - OPVault import when fields have the same name or type
* Introduce the import wizard to handle all import tasks (CSV, KDBX1, OPVault, 1PUX, JSON)
* Clean up CSV parser code to make it much more efficient and easier to read
* Combine all importer tests (except CSV) into one test file
