Merge pull request #344 from rockihack/windows-dacl

Prevent memory dumps on windows.
This commit is contained in:
Jonathan White 2017-03-02 17:34:53 -05:00 committed by GitHub
commit cdce9e27fb
2 changed files with 118 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Felix Geyer <debfx@fobos.de>
* Copyright (C) 2017 Lennart Glauer <mail@lennart-glauer.de>
*
* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@ -26,7 +27,8 @@
#include <QElapsedTimer>
#ifdef Q_OS_WIN
#include <windows.h> // for Sleep(), SetDllDirectoryA() and SetSearchPathMode()
#include <windows.h> // for Sleep(), SetDllDirectoryA(), SetSearchPathMode(), ...
#include <aclapi.h> // for SetSecurityInfo()
#endif
#ifdef Q_OS_UNIX
@ -226,6 +228,10 @@ void disableCoreDumps()
success = success && (ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0) == 0);
#endif
#ifdef Q_OS_WIN
success = success && createWindowsDACL();
#endif
if (!success) {
qWarning("Unable to disable core dumps.");
}
@ -240,4 +246,114 @@ void setupSearchPaths()
#endif
}
//
// This function grants the user associated with the process token minimal access rights and
// denies everything else on Windows. This includes PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION and
// PROCESS_VM_READ access rights that are required for MiniDumpWriteDump() or ReadProcessMemory().
// We do this using a discretionary access control list (DACL). Effectively this prevents
// crash dumps and disallows other processes from accessing our memory. This works as long
// as you do not have admin privileges, since then you are able to grant yourself the
// SeDebugPrivilege or SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege and circumvent the DACL.
//
bool createWindowsDACL()
{
bool bSuccess = false;
#ifdef Q_OS_WIN
// Process token and user
HANDLE hToken = nullptr;
PTOKEN_USER pTokenUser = nullptr;
DWORD cbBufferSize = 0;
// Access control list
PACL pACL = nullptr;
DWORD cbACL = 0;
// Open the access token associated with the calling process
if (!OpenProcessToken(
GetCurrentProcess(),
TOKEN_QUERY,
&hToken
)) {
goto Cleanup;
}
// Retrieve the token information in a TOKEN_USER structure
GetTokenInformation(
hToken,
TokenUser,
nullptr,
0,
&cbBufferSize
);
pTokenUser = static_cast<PTOKEN_USER>(HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, cbBufferSize));
if (pTokenUser == nullptr) {
goto Cleanup;
}
if (!GetTokenInformation(
hToken,
TokenUser,
pTokenUser,
cbBufferSize,
&cbBufferSize
)) {
goto Cleanup;
}
if (!IsValidSid(pTokenUser->User.Sid)) {
goto Cleanup;
}
// Calculate the amount of memory that must be allocated for the DACL
cbACL = sizeof(ACL)
+ sizeof(ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE) + GetLengthSid(pTokenUser->User.Sid);
// Create and initialize an ACL
pACL = static_cast<PACL>(HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, cbACL));
if (pACL == nullptr) {
goto Cleanup;
}
if (!InitializeAcl(pACL, cbACL, ACL_REVISION)) {
goto Cleanup;
}
// Add allowed access control entries, everything else is denied
if (!AddAccessAllowedAce(
pACL,
ACL_REVISION,
SYNCHRONIZE | PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | PROCESS_TERMINATE, // same as protected process
pTokenUser->User.Sid // pointer to the trustee's SID
)) {
goto Cleanup;
}
// Set discretionary access control list
bSuccess = ERROR_SUCCESS == SetSecurityInfo(
GetCurrentProcess(), // object handle
SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, // type of object
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION, // change only the objects DACL
nullptr, nullptr, // do not change owner or group
pACL, // DACL specified
nullptr // do not change SACL
);
Cleanup:
if (pACL != nullptr) {
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, pACL);
}
if (pTokenUser != nullptr) {
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, pTokenUser);
}
if (hToken != nullptr) {
CloseHandle(hToken);
}
#endif
return bSuccess;
}
} // namespace Tools

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@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ void sleep(int ms);
void wait(int ms);
void disableCoreDumps();
void setupSearchPaths();
bool createWindowsDACL();
template <typename RandomAccessIterator, typename T>
RandomAccessIterator binaryFind(RandomAccessIterator begin, RandomAccessIterator end, const T& value)