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@ -3,10 +3,13 @@
---- Begin TOC ----
- [Introduction](#introduction)
- [General Premise](#general-premise)
- [Philosophy](#philosophy)
- [Identifiers](#identifiers)
- [Hardware Selection](#hardware-selection)
- [Operating System](#operatingsystem)
- [Operating System](#operating-system)
- [Disable Logging](#disable-logging)
- [MAC Randomization](#mac-randomization)
- [Traffic Manipulation](#traffic-manipulation)
- [Packet Filter](#packet-filter)
- [Proxy](#proxy)
@ -23,12 +26,16 @@
- [Randomness](#randomness)
- [Keys](#keys)
- [Cryptographic Software](#cryptographic-software)
- [Signature-Based Identification](#signature-based-identification)
- [Encrypting Drives and Files](#encrypting-drives-and-files)
- [Offline Password Managers](#offline-password-managers)
- [Obscurity](#obscurity)
- [Justification](#justification)
- [Code Implementation](#code-implementation)
- [Blending](#blending)
- [Minimize Architecture](#minimize-architecture)
- [Automated Shutdown Procedures](#automated-shutdown-procedures)
- [Dead Man's Switch](#dead-man's-switch)
- [Play on Resources](#play-on-resources)
- [Radio Transmitters](#radio-transmitters)
- [EMF Shielding](#emf-shielding)
@ -40,7 +47,6 @@
- [Cryptocurrency](#cryptocurrency)
- [Account Security](#account-security)
- [Defensive Mechanisms](#defensive-mechanisms)
- [Offline Password Managers](#offline-password-managers)
- [Physical Precautions](#physical-precautions)
- [Use Cases](#use-cases)
- [Anonymous Activism](#anonymous-activism)
@ -54,6 +60,15 @@
## Introduction
The digital age has ushered in a dystopia, at least for those unwilling to circumvent or stretch the bounds of the law. There is a significant gap in literature in regards to circumvention, largely due to this being an underground activity. It is pseudo-illegal; authors would be afraid that creations today will come back to haunt them. Exposing anti-forensic procedures will erode some of their operational security (OPSEC) in the process. This being said, not all of my tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) will be sand-grain granular. However, I hope the ideas described can be applied to help disguise yourself in the sandswept dunes.
### General Premise
Several concepts will be reiterated throughout this work as security is a process that acts in layers (think about the layers of an onion that is commonly alluded to). Here is a layout of the general concepts that will be explained in further detail throughout this work:
- Operate on a zero-trust model
- Treat all signals as hostile
- Reduce the use of proprietary (closed-source) software
- Prioritize Communications Security (COMSEC)
- Operate with minimal architecture
## Philosophy
There is now a concerted effort with the primary goal as follows: control the flow of information to expand the current power structure. If one controls the information, they control the perception, and subsequently the questions being asked. If those in power have you asking the wrong questions, you no longer are a threat to the system. If the language can be altered to prevent various forms of dissent from occuring, this manipulation will take the form of Orwellian double-speak. Double-speak is used to control our symbolic creation of thought. For example, freedom is slavery, ignorance is strength. As the Nazi propagandist, Joseph Goebbels, recorded in his diaries, "It would not be impossible to prove with sufficient repetition and a psychological understanding of the people concerned that a square is in fact a circle. They are mere words, and words can be molded until they clothe ideas and disguise." If we lack the capacity to understand what concepts such as freedom are, how could an individual defend the foreign concept? As Camus once said, "It is the job of the thinking people not to be on the side of the executioner," hence the conception of this book. The goal is to preserve freedom and autonomy by means of disrupting investigation.
@ -79,15 +94,17 @@ The digital side of forensics has taken off in recent years. This is multi-facet
What is to come throughout this book consists of not only methods of strong cryptographic implementations, automated tasking, and obscurity, but underlying concepts for increasing the time expended on investigations.
If you make a large enough splash against the system, they will come after you with all of their resources. If you dive deep enough, you can at least reach the bottom and muddy the waters. Successful operations often depend on how long you can hold your breathe.
## Identifiers
Before diving deep into the concepts, I must layout some of the identifiers that stand to deanonymize systems. Users must understand what they are trying to defend before they lay a target on their back.
There are identifiers that pertain to hardware, software, and networking. Hardware identifiers that can be used to fingerprint a system include (and are not limited to) the computer model, CPU information, motherboard information via the system BIOS, USB interaction with the system DBUS, type and amount of RAM, connected HDD/SSD drives. Software identifiers are vast and include any software that attempts to beacon home to services with telemetry to create a profile on the user. Network-based identifiers include the IPv4 address, IPv6 address (if enabled), Domain Name Resolution (DNS) communication, and MAC address (can be randomized). Any, if not all of these identifiers can be used to fingerprint or deanonymize a host.
## Hardware Selection
This section has been prioritized as hardware is at the core of your operations. A supply chain attack resulting in embedded hardware or inherently vulnerable hardware can compromise your operation before it has even begun.
Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions in the realm of hardware. There are many rabbit holes one can take in regards to the avoidance of negative ring architecture (layers below the operating system), selecting processors that gut/avoid the use of MinixOS and Intel's management engine (ME), inherent vulnerabilities to the processor, chipsets that require proprietary blobs, and ultimately procuring hardware that isn't subject to side-loading attacks (this can weaken device encryption).
Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions in the realm of hardware. There are many rabbit holes one can take in regards to the avoidance of negative ring architecture (layers below the operating system), selecting processors that gut/avoid the use of MinixOS and Intel's management engine (ME), inherent vulnerabilities to the processor, chipsets that require proprietary blobs, and ultimately procuring hardware that isn't subject to side-loading attacks (can weaken device encryption).
Central processing units (CPU) have a narrowed list of options. For the vast majority of desktops and laptops, the competitors are Intel and AMD. Both of these CPUs have the potential for root level backdoors that are undetectable by your OS. Some privacy-oriented organizations, such as Purism and System76, claim to neutralize Intel's ME (See Purism's technical write-up [^2]. If you are going to select a system with an Intel CPU and detest this critical design, you are limited to a few options. You can shill out the money to System76 (disables ME) and Purism (neutralizes ME by gutting critical components), or you can flash the computer's motherboard with a Raspberry Pi by running the me_cleaner program[^3] (if supported processor/architecture) and installing coreboot[^4] in replace of the BIOS. The novice runs the risk of ruining their device, coupled with the fact that the setup was likely completed for legacy hardware that has unpatched vulnerabilities. This process is not a trivial task and will cause headaches for those who simply want the system to work. If you are not willing to shill out the money to one of these organizations that disables the ME and are not technologically savvy, consider using a CPU by AMD while noting that this is far from a silver bullet.
Taking a step back from the two CPU monoliths, Broadcom provides CPUs for smaller devices such as Raspberry Pis
##### Lots to add with broadcomm
Central processing units (CPU) have a narrowed list of options. For the vast majority of desktops and laptops, the competitors are Intel and AMD. Both of these CPUs have the potential for root level backdoors that are undetectable by your OS. Some privacy-oriented organizations, such as Purism and System76, claim to neutralize Intel's ME (See Purism's technical write-up[^2]). If you are going to select a system with an Intel CPU and detest this critical design, you are limited to a few options. You can shill out the money to System76 (disables ME) and Purism (neutralizes ME by gutting critical components), or you can flash the computer's motherboard with a Raspberry Pi by running the me_cleaner program[^3] (if supported processor/architecture) and installing coreboot[^4] in replace of the BIOS. The novice runs the risk of ruining their device, coupled with the fact that the setup was likely completed for legacy hardware that has unpatched vulnerabilities. This process is not a trivial task and will cause headaches for those who simply want the system to work. If you are not willing to shill out the money to one of these organizations that disables the ME and are not technologically savvy, consider using a CPU by AMD while noting that this is far from a silver bullet.
## Operating System
Researching the right operating system (OS) for your specific operation can be a monstrous task. If Operations Security (OPSEC) is of utmost importance, then operating systems that generate excess logs and call home with telemetry and error reporting should be ruled out.
@ -120,7 +137,18 @@ systemctl disable systemd-journald.service
Note: These commands will not work on systems running lightweight service managers such as OpenRC, runit, or S6.
While it is wise to reduce your logging footprint locally on your device, full disk encryption (FDE) is a sufficient anti-forensic mitigation for logging. If the attacker obtains access to your device as it is running (either physical or remote via a security compromise), logging is most likely the least of your concerns.
## MAC Randomization
Media access control (MAC) addresses are unique identifiers for network interface controllers/cards (NIC). These identifiers exist at Layer 2 of the OSI model[^12]. As one could expect, unique identifiers can be problematic. Proprietary router firmware such as Netgear and other vendors can attempt to correlate static MACs to individuals. Your MAC could also be correlated between different routers and subsequently different router SSIDs. Wardriving is a method by which organizations will scan for SSIDs around different areas to collect MAC addresses and SSIDs.
All anti-forensic operating systems randomize the MAC address by default. A GNU/Linux utility called `macchanger` can alter and randomize the MAC address.
Set MAC to one by the same vendor: `macchanger -a <interface (i.e. eth0)>`
Set a random vendor MAC of any kind: `macchanger -A <interface (i.e. eth0)>`
Using the `-r` flag will set a fully random MAC. This isn't necessarily a problem, but it will stand to make an anomaly out of you. Mimic known vendors to help blend in the crowd.
GrapheneOS, and other non-stock OSs have begun to randomize MAC address upon connection to different wireless networks.
To check whether this setting is enabled, go to `Settings > Wi-Fi > Settings Gear > Advanced > Privacy > Use fully randomized MAC (default)`
## Traffic Manipulation
### Packet Filter
While physical forensics is a primary concern of investigations, network forensics can provide fruit-bearing evidence to investigators. Therefore it is vital to restrict and regulate what traffic is passed on.
@ -136,19 +164,19 @@ If you are more concerned with a traffic leakage, leak prevention of traffic (me
As it stands today, there are three avenues for anonymization and encryption of internet packets: VPN, TOR, and Mixnets.
Each avenue possesses pitfalls. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) can provide privacy from the local internet service providers (ISP). Internet traffic will be encrypted based on designated configurations and protocols. OpenVPN is subject to various attacks.
Wireguard is currently the most secure. Unfortunately, it has faced little scrutiny. Often security defects are uncovered with the right amount of time. Disregarding its adolescence, the Wireguard protocol has been formally verified. Also, the reduced complexity of the protocol makes it easier to properly implement than OpenVPN. Easier implementation reduces room for error that could lead to compromise. The primary issue with VPNs today lies with the inherent trust given to the provider. If you decide a VPN is desired for your operation(s), you should be searching for a provider that has strict privacy laws, a no logging policy, and jurisdiction being outside of the known growing number of eyes (collaborative government intelligence community). This intelligence community went from 5 eyes to 9 eyes to 14 eyes. I suspect the number will continue its pattern of growth as discussed in the Philosophy section of the book. VPNs are rarely suitable against powerful (government or corporate) attackers; VPNs cannot grant anonymity. [^12]
Wireguard is currently the most secure. Unfortunately, it has faced little scrutiny. Often security defects are uncovered with the right amount of time. Disregarding its adolescence, the Wireguard protocol has been formally verified. Also, the reduced complexity of the protocol makes it easier to properly implement than OpenVPN. Easier implementation reduces room for error that could lead to compromise. The primary issue with VPNs today lies with the inherent trust given to the provider. If you decide a VPN is desired for your operation(s), you should be searching for a provider that has strict privacy laws, a no logging policy, and jurisdiction being outside of the known growing number of eyes (collaborative government intelligence community). This intelligence community went from 5 eyes to 9 eyes to 14 eyes. I suspect the number will continue its pattern of growth as discussed in the Philosophy section of the book. VPNs are rarely suitable against powerful (government or corporate) attackers; VPNs cannot grant anonymity. [^13]
The Onion Router (TOR) has faced the most scrutiny of all protocols and provides the most anonymity. While facing the most scrutiny from various individuals and governments, TOR has many overarching issues yet to be addressed. Someone with a God's eye view of the telecommunications traffic could deanonymize users by sending out certain sized packets to different destinations. This is something to keep in mind while hosting infrastructure, however the standard user sending out typical sized packets from web requests has little concern of this deanonymization tactic. TOR does not add timing obfuscations or decoy traffic to hinder traffic pattern analysis which can be used to deanonymize users.
Both of these channels have some pitfalls, so why not combine them for layered security? There have been numerous articles published by Whonix [^13] and TAILS [^14] developers along with other Information Security professionals highlighting the ineffectiveness of the VPN / TOR combination. The synopsis of their articles is that at best it doesn't help you, at worst, it hurts you. I find it useful if I am trying to mask the fact that I am using TOR from the ISP. Bridges can also be used for this purpose, but they are likely easier to identify by the Intelligence Community (IC). While on public WiFi, I recommend solely using TOR.
Both of these channels have some pitfalls, so why not combine them for layered security? There have been numerous articles published by Whonix [^14] and TAILS [^15] developers along with other Information Security professionals highlighting the ineffectiveness of the VPN / TOR combination. The synopsis of their articles is that at best it doesn't help you, at worst, it hurts you. I find it useful if I am trying to mask the fact that I am using TOR from the ISP. Bridges can also be used for this purpose, but they are likely easier to identify by the Intelligence Community (IC). While on public WiFi, I recommend solely using TOR.
I2P or the Invisible Internet Project spawned in 2003. This is an encrypted private network layer designed to mask user identity. I2P is not the same concept as TOR, although some concepts cross over. I2P users cannot officially communicate with clearnet sites like TOR users can; all I2P traffic stays internal to the I2P network. Without having the exit of traffic via exit nodes or outproxies to the internet, this reduces usability and enhances privacy. I2P can prove useful at limiting the information captured by global passive adversaries. I should note that some mixnets have called I2P legacy technology claiming that it opens up users to a number of attacks that can isolate, misdirect, and deanonymize users. Therefore I2P should not be solely relied on. If one is adament about using I2P, there are configurations that facilitate the use of I2P via TOR.
Mixnets have the goal of anonymizing packets through uniformity. The design is to obscure and craft packets of the same size despite the amount of data being transmitted. Often times mixnets have technology that address timing based attacks, provide decoy or cover traffic, and implement uniformity of packets, however the pitfalls tend to be lack of scrutiny and adoption. Anonymity loves company, and most mixnets lack that component, especially in their early conceptions. Due to the lack of scrutiny with early conception and lack of adoption, I cannot provide any recommendations.
In regards to implementation, there are a variety of options. Host-based virtualization with pre-configured systems like Whonix can be used. This routes all of the Whonix workstation's traffic through the Whonix gateway to prevent leakage. A bootable TAILS USB is also preconfigured to allow only TOR traffic, excluding the exempt or whitelisted insecure browser designed for getting your device through WiFi portals. Open-source operating systems, such as OpenWRT, on a travel router can force certain subnets to use a VPN configuration or route via TOR.
As previously stated in the Traffic Leakage section, software-based routing should not be relied on. If it is to be implemented, it should be viewed as adding an additional layer of security. There are applications such as Orbot which allows the use of the TOR network, a variety of VPN applications (which are primarily wrappers for OpenVPN), and there are scripts that configure local packet filters to "torrify" all traffic. While I have no basis in saying all software-based leak prevention mechanisms are prone to failure, historically leak prevention has been inadequate. Even Whonix reports that they "cannot do the impossible and magically prevent every kind of protocol leak and identifier disclosure." [^15] Hardware routing adds more architecture into the mix, but it provides the bulletproof assurance that there is no leakage of traffic. For critical operations, consider hardware mechanisms. For the privacy-centric individual, software-based kill switches should be more than sufficient.
As previously stated in the Traffic Leakage section, software-based routing should not be relied on. If it is to be implemented, it should be viewed as adding an additional layer of security. There are applications such as Orbot[^16] which allows the use of the TOR network, a variety of VPN applications (which are primarily wrappers for OpenVPN), and there are scripts that configure local packet filters to "torrify" all traffic. While I have no basis in saying all software-based leak prevention mechanisms are prone to failure, historically leak prevention has been inadequate. Even Whonix reports that they "cannot do the impossible and magically prevent every kind of protocol leak and identifier disclosure." [^17] Hardware routing adds more architecture into the mix, but it provides the bulletproof assurance that there is no leakage of traffic. For critical operations, consider hardware mechanisms. For the privacy-centric individual, software-based kill switches should be more than sufficient.
## Clean Caches
There are various caches containing sensitive information on both mobile devices and GNU/Linux systems. Linux systems have the tendency to push most logs to the /var/log/ directory. This is a simple deletion process.
@ -162,24 +190,24 @@ This command would use GNU coreutils shred function to wipe over the designated
Note: this is an example command; I am not recommending 32 overwrites.
Secure deletion should not be assumed to be possible. The NSA has in the past developed malicious firmware for HDDs that can create secret copies of user-written data.
SSDs which make use of wear-leveling (look into SSD wear-leveling) cannot have information securely erased by the user. However, SSDs with wear leveling also pose a significant annoyance, and even create difficulty for, forensic investigators (look into SSD garbage collection). Such annoyance cannot be considered a security guarantee.
The NSA has in the past developed malicious firmware for HDDs that can create secret copies of user-written data. SSDs which make use of wear-leveling cannot have information securely erased by the user. However, SSDs with wear leveling also pose a significant annoyance, and even create difficulty for, forensic investigators. Such annoyance cannot be considered a security guarantee. In short, wear-leveling, garbage collection, and trim operations are largely outside of the user's control, therefore "secure" deletion should not be assumed to be possible. Regarding SSDs, trim operations should always be enabled as it stands to make files unreadable using "Deterministic Read After Trim" or "Deterministic Zeroes After Trim." Consider trim as an unreliable backup mitigation to FDE.
## Browsing
### Browser Configuration
Ungoogled variants of Chromium [^16] are advised. The security model actually exists unlike Gecko-based browser derivatives (i.e. Firefox).
It is no secret that governments deliver malware based on anomalous internet activity, alternately put, flagged activity. While the common forms of investigations are typically conducted via physical device seizure, security mechanisms should be taken into account to stunt "passive" investigations. Browsers can be configured to disable the installation of extensions, device storage usage, setting alterations, theme changes, cookie restrictions, and cache deletions. Browser security and anti-fingerprinting do not always align. For instance, the TOR Browser is not unique based on fingerprinting. Tor Browser with JavaScript disabled is generally a secure setup. Most browser-based vulnerabilities require JavaScript or some other browser-run code (fonts, WebGL, etc). Tor Browser on security setting "Safest" reduces this attack surface significantly. While Chromium browsers may have upped the ante in terms of security, they do not have any built-in anti-fingerprinting features. Some projects have taken the initiative to provide anti-fingerprinting configurations such as Bromite[^17] or Brave Browser[^18].
It is no secret that governments deliver malware based on anomalous internet activity, alternately put, flagged activity. While the common forms of investigations are typically conducted via physical device seizure, security mechanisms should be taken into account to stunt "passive" investigations. Browsers can be configured to disable the installation of extensions, device storage usage, setting alterations, theme changes, cookie restrictions, and cache deletions. The most important facets of private internet browsing include the browser security model, fingerprinting mitigations, and reliance on JavaScript.
For the security model, ungoogled variants of Chromium [^18] are advised. The security model exists unlike Gecko-based browser derivatives (i.e. Firefox).
Browser security and anti-fingerprinting do not always align. For instance, the TOR Browser is not unique based on fingerprinting. Tor Browser with JavaScript disabled is generally a secure setup despite being based on Gecko. Most browser-based vulnerabilities require JavaScript or some other browser-run code (fonts, WebGL, etc). Tor Browser on security setting "Safest" reduces this attack surface significantly. While Chromium browsers may have upped the ante in terms of security, many do not have any built-in anti-fingerprinting mechanisms. Some projects have taken the initiative to provide anti-fingerprinting configurations such as Bromite[^19] or Brave Browser[^20]. Using a privacy-tweaked configuration of Brave Browser is ideal. (See browser hardening configurations from Anonymous Planet[^21])
### Search Engine Selection
#### DuckDuckGo
DuckDuckGo (DDG) [^19] has long been used as an alternative to Google. It is worth mentioning that DDG is TOR Projects default selection. This has granted them significant notoriety and trust. There are some underlying problems with DDG such as being based in the US, and they are not completely open-source. Without having reviewable source code, there is no way of validating their seemingly well-intentioned privacy mission statement. However, source code review becomes a moot point when you consider the fact that you are using their centralized services. Odds are that the providers of the service do not make the entirety of their systems publicly reviewable/auditable. Arbitrary code or excess applications could exist on their servers.
DuckDuckGo (DDG)[^22] has long been used as an alternative to Google. It is worth mentioning that DDG is TOR Projects default selection. This has granted them significant notoriety and trust. There are some underlying problems with DDG such as being based in the US, and they are not completely open-source. Without having reviewable source code, there is no way of validating their seemingly well-intentioned privacy mission statement. However, source code review becomes a moot point when you consider the fact that you are using their centralized services. Odds are that the providers of the service do not make the entirety of their systems publicly reviewable/auditable. Arbitrary code or excess applications could exist on their servers.
#### Searx
Searx instances [^20] are decentralized search engines that can be stood up by anyone. Decentralization with Searx doesn't remove the issue of inherent trust that must be placed in the instances, but it ensures that you have control in where you place your trust. This also enables people to stand up their own instances and configure them with better protections. Decentralization is preferred, however some of the instances are likely ran by intelligence agencies.
Searx instances[^23] are decentralized search engines that can be stood up by anyone. Decentralization with Searx doesn't remove the issue of inherent trust that must be placed in the instances, but it ensures that you have control in where you place your trust. This also enables people to stand up their own instances and configure them with better protections. Decentralization is preferred, however some of the instances are likely ran by intelligence agencies.
## Live Boot
Live media (USB or CD) can be booted from in a process called Live Boot. Data is prevented from being stored on the hard drive of your computer (so long as you do not attempt to decrypt your hard drive that is detected). Nothing lives in permenance from the live boot. This is a useful tool for the privacy conscious as there is little to no cleanup process of your actions. Some operating systems such as The Amnesiac Incognito Live System (TAILS)[^21] are forensicly conscious and wipe the data from the device's physical memory once the USB is removed or the system is shutdown. This is not always the case for live media. Be conscious of network activity living on in permenance. This is where the use of strong cryptography can come into play from Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations to the use of TOR. Live booting reduces the effectiveness of the Cold Boot attacks. Cold boot is heavily reliant upon data that is temporarily stored in Random Access Memory (RAM).
Live media (USB or CD) can be booted from in a process called Live Boot. Data is prevented from being stored on the hard drive of your computer (so long as you do not attempt to decrypt your hard drive that is detected). Nothing lives in permenance from the live boot. This is a useful tool for the privacy conscious as there is little to no cleanup process of your actions. Some operating systems such as The Amnesiac Incognito Live System (TAILS)[^24] are forensicly conscious and wipe the data from the device's physical memory once the USB is removed or the system is shutdown. This is not always the case for live media. Be conscious of network activity living on in permenance. This is where the use of strong cryptography can come into play from Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations to the use of TOR. Live booting reduces the effectiveness of the Cold Boot attacks. Cold boot is heavily reliant upon data that is temporarily stored in Random Access Memory (RAM).
Note:
Cold boot attacks require a system to be under attacker control. DDR3 memory modules lose data within 3 seconds of losing power under normal circumstances. DDR4 loses data within 1 second (more like a fraction of a second) after losing power under normal conditions.
@ -193,6 +221,20 @@ Systems can be started in non-persistent sessions with the use of `grub-live` an
## Physical Destruction
Physical destruction of critical operation data is advised. Institutional authorities such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) see no value in the wiping of critical data. If they believe data is at risk or a device under classification is to be removed from a closed area, all media drives must be completely degaussed. The lesson to be learned here is that if institutional authorities do not trust wiping and overwriting methods, be cautious in your operational threat model. If your life depends on the media being sanitized, save yourself the stress and physically destroy it. If your operation would have adverse consequences if you are caught, there is no room for sentiment.
Destroying HDDs:
- Open the drive (with a screwdriver, usually Torx T8)
- Remove the platters (with a screwdriver, usually Torx T6)
- Rub the platters with powerful magnet
- Break and deform the platters
- Drill holes through the platters
- Separate and displace the remains
Destroying SSDs:
- Open the drive
- Break/Crush the board and memory cells
- Burn the remains
- Separate and scatter the debris
Note:
The DoD generally cites a drive wiping policy of 7 passes using random data. Each pass is peformed on the entire drive.
@ -200,12 +242,12 @@ Physical destruction of critical operation data is advised. Institutional author
## Cryptography
Cryptography is a monolith of a topic that is included with the anti-forensics threat model. If the cryptography cannot be broken, forensic investigations are stunted in their tracks. Cryptography can range from encryption of individual files or messages to Full Disk Encryption (FDE). As Simon Singh has said in The Code Book, "I must mention a problem that faces any author who tackles the subject of cryptography: the science of secrecy is largely a secret science."[^22]
Cryptography is a monolith of a topic that is included with the anti-forensics threat model. If the cryptography cannot be broken, forensic investigations are stunted in their tracks. Cryptography can range from encryption of individual files or messages to Full Disk Encryption (FDE). As Simon Singh has said in The Code Book, "I must mention a problem that faces any author who tackles the subject of cryptography: the science of secrecy is largely a secret science."[^25]
History goes back and forth favoring both codemakers and codebreakers through different eras. While there are algorithms that exist (and yet to be created) that could be unbreakable for the necessary classification time (at least outside the statute of limitations) against codebreakers. Such encryption could involve the use of multiple algorithms such as Serpent((Twofish)(AES)) with the hash algorithm of Whirlpool, Streebog-512, or SHA512. Do be warned that there are threats imposed from the use of cascading algorithms or the use of multiple algorithms with the same key.
All this being said, there is only one form of unbreakable encryption that will stand the test of time. This is a one-time pad (OTP) cipher. This encrypts the message based on completely randomized data. This cannot be digitally or mentally generated; this needs pure randomness to be bulletproof.
"The security of the onetime pad cipher is wholly due to the randomness of the key. The key injects randomness into the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext is random then it has no patterns, no structure, nothing the cryptanalyst can latch onto. In fact, it can be mathematically proved that it is impossible for a cryptanalyst to crack a message encrypted with a onetime pad cipher. In other words, the onetime pad cipher is not merely believed to be unbreakable, just as the Vigenère cipher was in the nineteenth century, it really is absolutely secure. The onetime pad offers a guarantee of secrecy: the Holy Grail of cryptography." - Simon Sughes, The Code Book[^22]
"The security of the onetime pad cipher is wholly due to the randomness of the key. The key injects randomness into the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext is random then it has no patterns, no structure, nothing the cryptanalyst can latch onto. In fact, it can be mathematically proved that it is impossible for a cryptanalyst to crack a message encrypted with a onetime pad cipher. In other words, the onetime pad cipher is not merely believed to be unbreakable, just as the Vigenère cipher was in the nineteenth century, it really is absolutely secure. The onetime pad offers a guarantee of secrecy: the Holy Grail of cryptography." - Simon Sughes, The Code Book[^25]
Note:
An OTP using a CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator) still maintains the security of the CSPRNG used, although isn't really an OTP anymore. Instead, it acts as a stream cipher.
@ -235,9 +277,60 @@ For the justified paranoid, keep a hardware-based key or a separate USB/MicroSD
Look into: OnlyKey, NitroKey, and SoloKey
### Cryptographic Software
While we would love to maintain idealism and believe that we could write something that would retain relevance in perpetuity, we understand that this is not the nature of the technological system. To successfully orchestrate safe operations, I must address software-based cryptographic solutions. To date, Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) and Veracrypt are the two most notable options.
While we would love to maintain idealism and believe that we could write something that would retain relevance in perpetuity, we understand that this is not the nature of the technological system. To successfully orchestrate safe operations, I must address software-based cryptographic solutions.
#### Signature-Based Identification
Chances are most operations will be conducted remotely, and there is a chance that the need to validate those whom you are communicating with will arise. There are some simple tools that can be leveraged to mathematically validate someone is who they say they are.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a timeless tool for message verification. One can create a key pair, and use this key pair to sign and encrypt/decrypt messages.
To start using PGP, one must generate a keypair:
```
gpg --full-generate-key
> Enter 1 for default value
> Enter 4096 for key bit size
> Set expiration
```
You will now be prompted to enter information. This can be as real or fabricated.
```
Real name: alias1
Email Address: frosty1@whichdoc.org
Comment:
```
Now you will type characters in the terminal to generate entropy (randomness) for the encryption. You will then be prompted to enter a passphrase.
Now you can use commands via terminal with gpg/gpg2, or you can use a tool with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) such as GNU Privacy Assistant (GPA)[^26] to sign, validate, and encrypt messages to your affiliates.
ex. Signing the file `plaintext.txt` via terminal
`gpg -s plaintext.txt`
For the party trying to validate the signature, they can issue the following command:
`gpg --check-signatures plaintext.txt.gpg`
Minisign[^27] is an incredibly simple tool developed in python for the purpose of signature validation. It is a more modern tool than PGP that is user-friendly.
Generate key pair: `minisign -G`
The public key can be distributed as needed, while the private key should remain strictly under user control for signing files.
`minisign -S [-x sigfile] [-s seckey] -m file [file ...]`
#### Encrypting Drives and Files
To date, Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) and Veracrypt[^28] are the two most notable options.
- LUKS: Primarily used for FDE
- Veracrypt: Primarily container-based encrypt for file storage and plausible deniability with hidden volumes
- PGP: Used for file-based encryption
Note: Veracrypt can be set to leverage cascading ciphers. Its cascading encryption uses mutually-independent keys.
#### Offline Password Managers
Security often comes down to the basics; Make your devices/accounts/services hard to crack. Feds & private forensics companies may be able to allocate ridiculous amounts of computing power against your services to see logs and compromise your accounts, but their brute forcing efforts can be rendered useless.
Consider offline variants of KeePass[^29] for secure password storage, then consider placing the KeePass database inside of a hidden veracrypt. Having a password with an absurd amount of characters such as `dHK&*/4pk_!i??5R=^K}~FU!kxF{fG}*&>oMdRt([);7?=v(e^,ch_n)r()]:&k$D@f4#G"Y\v_5-*i$E[+)"bT*@BF+{hkvn7[B]{qq'[~]3@+-Ju6C(@<]=TEM6a\h$c+:W[k$=;Jy[Un7&~NtvK*{Bn` is enough to stunt any brute force attempt. Cryptographic security can only be as strong as the key being used.
Note:
A 20-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 132.877 bits of security (compare to 128 bit symmetric encryption keys).
A 29-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 192.671 bits of security (compare to 192 bit symmetric encryption keys).
A 39-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 259.110 bits of security (compare to 256 bit symmetric encryption keys).
Security margins greater than 256 bits are unnecessary, even against quantum attacks (256 bits of security against classical attack = 128 bits of security against quantum attack)
Breaking 128 bits of security requires time approximately equal to 1000 times the life of the universe (measured from the big bang to the projected death of the universe)
Passwords larger than 39 characters are unnecessary (although rounding to 40 is reasonable)
### PIM (Personal Iterations Multiplier)
PIM is treated as a secret value that controls the number of iterations used by the header key derivation function. So long as PIM is treated as a secret parameter, this increases the complexity that an attacker would have to guess.
@ -270,22 +363,23 @@ Standard security mechanisms are inadequate for the purpose of anti-forensics. N
While living in the "end of trust," we must follow standard system hardening practices. These practices emphasize the reduction of software and hardware needed throughout the operation. There is no purpose of strong keys in cryptography if the underlying system operations have compromised you via keylogging and other variants of malware. You can create an intricate system of firewalls, intrusion prevention/detection systems (IPS/IDS), event log management to detect compromises, proxies, virtual private networks, TOR, I2P, but your must recognize the underlying fingerprint of these systems. Minimal architecture should not be limited to solely software and hardware, but also the signals being used; treat all signals as hostile. On mobile devices, consider the different Cellular protocols such as 3-5G variants and LTE. In times of unrest, the state has the power to disable and manipulate the protocols available for use. Most modern devices allow you to select settings such as LTE only or whitelist specific towers. You may go offline in times of unrest, but at least they aren't leveraging legacy protocols, potentially engaging in packet injection, and redirecting your device like a good puppet following dictates of its puppeteer.
Limit the use of these Cellular protocols with the following setting alteration:
`Settings > Network & Internet > Mobile Network > Preferred Network Type > Select LTE Only`
`Settings > Network & Internet > Mobile Network > Preferred Network Type > Select LTE Only`
Every introduced system creates a larger fingerprint and attack vector, ultimately leading to more trust in more systems and services. The most anonymizing and secure operations require minimal architecture and physical security.
Note: Cellular radio modules lack randomization, rendering mobile devices inadequate for anti-forensics. This has been a pain point to many operations and has often been the sole cause of deanonymization.
## Automated Shutdown Procedures
Depending on your threat model, not all operations can be conducted from a coffee shop. There are an increasing amount of cameras, and facial recognition technology is already being deployed, along with license plate scanners at every street light. If operations are sensitive and must be conducted from the same location consistently, preparation should always lean towards the worst-case scenario.
While some of these proposed methods may be unconventional, these are unconventional times. Mechanisms can be put in place to ensure that your systems are sent shutdown signals that will lock them behind disk encryption. Shutdown signals are the most common, however we are not limited to the commands we issue. The use of radio transmitters to issue shutdowns have some level of intricacy that surpasses skills of the novice user.
#### Still provide remote ideas
A physical wired dead man's switch reduces attack surface and intricacy. After the dead man's switch aka killswitch is configured, we can move on to the commands to issue. If we wanted to securely wipe the random access memory before shutting down, we could issue the "sdmem -v" command to verbosely clean the RAM as the killswitch is activated. The killswitch can be activated from a system event. Any form of shell command that is compatible with the particular GNU/Linux system can be ran based on a specified system behavior. See resources at the end of this section [^23], [^24], and [^25] for USB dead man's switch. Panic buttons are another form of a killswitch that essentially remains active on your display and is ready to select at any moment. (Centry.py is a good example of a panic button[^26]).
There are USB devices known as "Mouse Jigglers" that are used by forensic teams after device seizure. These jigglers are serial devices plugged in to interface with the system to keep the screenlock from being invoked.
There are easy preventative software-based solutions such as USBCTL[^27] that can prevent these devices for operating, however this will likely be picked up on and human mouse jigglers can take their place.
Ideally a process can be utilized to detect such a device and invoke a shutdown process. A mitigation for the human mouse jigglers could be implementing forced authentication every half hour to an hour. If the credentials have not been entered, the user session could be terminated, memory could be cleared, or the shutdown command could even be invoked.
### Dead Man's Switch
A physical wired dead man's switch reduces attack surface and intricacy. After the dead man's switch aka killswitch is configured, we can move on to the commands to issue. If we wanted to securely wipe the random access memory before shutting down, we could issue the "sdmem -v" command to verbosely clean the RAM as the killswitch is activated. The killswitch can be activated from a system event. Any form of shell command that is compatible with the particular GNU/Linux system can be ran based on a specified system behavior. See resources at the end of this section [^30], [^31], and [^32] for USB dead man's switch. In a nutshell, this is configured to watch system USB events. When a change occurs, the switch commands are invoked. Panic buttons are another form of a killswitch that essentially remains active on your display and is ready to select at any moment. (Centry.py is a good example of a panic button[^33]). There are USB devices known as "Mouse Jigglers" that are used by forensic teams after device seizure. These jigglers are serial devices plugged in to interface with the system to keep the screenlock from being invoked.
There are easy preventative software-based solutions such as USBCTL[^34] that can prevent these devices for operating, however this will likely be picked up on and human mouse jigglers can take their place. Ideally a process can be utilized to detect such a device and invoke a shutdown process. A mitigation for the human mouse jigglers could be implementing forced authentication every half hour to an hour. If the credentials have not been entered, the user session could be terminated, memory could be cleared, or the shutdown command could even be invoked.
Remote switches are interesting devils, and their utility should be in high consideration if the size of the operation warrants it. Panic buttons such as Centry.py can be used to broadcast or propagate a panic signal to all nodes on the network.
## Play on Resources
Earlier, it was said that these groups have unlimited resources; this is not entirely true. The one resource which they lack is time. While they have infinite funds to allocate towards password and key cracking methods, so long as quantum physics strays behind computing, time is their main constraint. Taking methods from obscurity, the use of non-default encryption algorithms and hashing mechanisms for keys substantially increases the amount of time the analyst must expend on cracking. If the analyst cannot identify the hash function or cipher, they must try all possible options. Even if the correct password is obtained, this becomes useless without the proper cipher. For instance, Veracrypt uses over fifteen combinations of individual encryption algorithms and cascaded/stacked ciphers. Complement this with the five supported hash functions, and we are looking at 75 possible combinations of symmetric ciphers and one-way hash functions. As stated by ElcomSoft, "Trying all possible combinations is about 175 times slower compared to attacking a single combination of AES+SHA-512."[^28]
Earlier, it was said that these groups have unlimited resources; this is not entirely true. The one resource which they lack is time. While they have infinite funds to allocate towards password and key cracking methods, so long as quantum physics strays behind computing, time is their main constraint. Taking methods from obscurity, the use of non-default encryption algorithms and hashing mechanisms for keys substantially increases the amount of time the analyst must expend on cracking. If the analyst cannot identify the hash function or cipher, they must try all possible options. Even if the correct password is obtained, this becomes useless without the proper cipher. For instance, Veracrypt uses over fifteen combinations of individual encryption algorithms and cascaded/stacked ciphers. Complement this with the five supported hash functions, and we are looking at 75 possible combinations of symmetric ciphers and one-way hash functions. As stated by ElcomSoft, "Trying all possible combinations is about 175 times slower compared to attacking a single combination of AES+SHA-512."[^35]
Hypothetically, if the algorithm/hash combination is known by the attacker, here is where the cascading algorithms display their value:
"Whether they choose to encrypt with AES, Serpent, Twofish or any other single algorithm, the speed of the attack will remain the same. Attacks on cascaded encryption with two algorithms (e.g. AES(Twofish)) work at half the speed, while cascading three algorithms slows them down to around 1/3 the speed."
@ -307,7 +401,7 @@ When feasible, radio transmitters should be physically removed from devices. Fro
For an adversary who gains a foothold on your system(s) without the physically removed hardware, they could activate certain frequencies to create a persistent foothold and compromise your system even further.
For critical operations, reduce reliance on wireless radio transmissions. Consider the process of removing all radio transmitter chipsets, otherwise known as airgapping, to mitigate a medley of threats.
Methods of "jumping" airgaps have been found in the past.[^29] One must be sure to remove all hardware which could be used for communication. This includes Wi-Fi cards (often Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are within the same physical card), Bluetooth card (if you have a Bluetooth card separate from your Wi-Fi card), microphones (communications protocols have been devised to transmit data through ultrasonic audio). Many modern OSs still have the drivers to support these protocols, and the attacks surface therefore still exists), speakers (usable for data exfiltration using the same means), physical ports (USB, SD, headphone jack). Even power cords have been used as a means of compromise (on both laptop and desktop systems).
Methods of "jumping" airgaps have been found in the past.[^36] One must be sure to remove all hardware which could be used for communication. This includes Wi-Fi cards (often Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are within the same physical card), Bluetooth card (if you have a Bluetooth card separate from your Wi-Fi card), microphones (communications protocols have been devised to transmit data through ultrasonic audio). Many modern OSs still have the drivers to support these protocols, and the attacks surface therefore still exists), speakers (usable for data exfiltration using the same means), physical ports (USB, SD, headphone jack). Even power cords have been used as a means of compromise (on both laptop and desktop systems).
The traditional methods of interfacing with the internet stand to be the most secure. Systems using direct ethernet connection is optimal. While this is not a technical "airgap," this does prevent packet communications from being analyzed over the air.
@ -359,7 +453,7 @@ Perhaps it's a side project of some sort, or some harmless hobby. If there is no
Regarding the creation of online accounts and personas, don't use identifiable names. Your operations should be treated as a second life that should be appropriately segmented. While you may find some of your ideas to be profound/esoteric and want to reuse and redistribute across platforms - refrain. You're only creating a trail that could come back to bite you. Not only should you segment your usernames creative talents, but ensure that projects also become segmented. The more you divulge into separate projects, the less connection you want to have - unless of course they are related and you desire the marketing crossover.
The physical use of your device, from pinging telecommunications infrastructure to local area network (LAN) connections will rat you out. Geofencing requests have gained increasing popularity with American law enforcement. Google self-reported, "Year over year, Google has observed over a 1,500% increase in the number of geofence requests it received in 2018 compared to 2017; and to date, the rate has increased over 500% from 2018 to 2019." [^30]
The physical use of your device, from pinging telecommunications infrastructure to local area network (LAN) connections will rat you out. Geofencing requests have gained increasing popularity with American law enforcement. Google self-reported, "Year over year, Google has observed over a 1,500% increase in the number of geofence requests it received in 2018 compared to 2017; and to date, the rate has increased over 500% from 2018 to 2019." [^37]
After the physical side is dealt with, the digital side can start to be addressed. Just like scripts can be implemented to increase efficiency, they can also be used to aid and/or create alibis.
Consider the creation of python scripts to engage your devices to perform certain functions. For instance, create a wordlist that your browser searches for on demand (with a hint of randomness). Program your music player to play certain songs at certain times. The goal of these actions is to emulate real activity that could provide that alibi for you.
@ -367,7 +461,7 @@ Do note that often times a double-edged pendulum comes to swing. If an investiga
Do note that you will likely not come out unscathed from the psychological toll of withholding secrets. Not only do fabrications add unneeded complexity into your relationships by forcing you to drain energy keeping narratives intact, but they place you in a state of isolation from others. Make sure the endeavor is worth the burden.
"As we have seen, every personal secret has the effect of a sin or of guilt—whether or not it is, from the standpoint of popular morality, a wrongful secret. Now another form of concealment is the act of "withholding"—it being usually emotions that are withheld. As in the case of secrets, so here also we must make a reservation: self-restraint is healthful and beneficial; it is even a virtue. This is why we find self-discipline to have been one of man's earliest moral attainments. Among primitive peoples it has its place in the initiation ceremonies, chiefly in the forms of ascetic continence and the stoical endurance of pain and fear. Self-restraint, however, is here practised within the secret society as something undertaken in company with others. But if self-restraint is only a private matter, and perhaps devoid of any religious aspect, then it may be as harmful as the personal secret." - C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul[^31]
"As we have seen, every personal secret has the effect of a sin or of guilt—whether or not it is, from the standpoint of popular morality, a wrongful secret. Now another form of concealment is the act of "withholding"—it being usually emotions that are withheld. As in the case of secrets, so here also we must make a reservation: self-restraint is healthful and beneficial; it is even a virtue. This is why we find self-discipline to have been one of man's earliest moral attainments. Among primitive peoples it has its place in the initiation ceremonies, chiefly in the forms of ascetic continence and the stoical endurance of pain and fear. Self-restraint, however, is here practised within the secret society as something undertaken in company with others. But if self-restraint is only a private matter, and perhaps devoid of any religious aspect, then it may be as harmful as the personal secret." - C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul[^38]
## False Compromise
@ -391,50 +485,34 @@ Similar to how cryptography is a monolith of a concept to tackle, cryptography w
Zcash (ZEC) was ground-breaking in the implementation of a protocol known as Succint Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs (zk-SNARKs). The protocol enabled the use of what they refer to as shielded "sapling" addresses. This facilitates anonymous payment from one party to the other. The pitfall to Zcash is that it also allows the use of transparent addresses. The vast majority of Zcash is held in a completely transparent blockchain. When amounts are exchanged via the shielded private addresses, the scope is narrowed on those making the transactions. Money going in and out of the private sapling addresses becomes trivial to correlate.
Monero is often hailed as the privacy king of cryptocurrency. While it has commendable features with its RingCT protocol, the overarching theme is obscurity rather than traceless transactions.
"The fundamental problem of coin mixing methods though is that transaction data is not being hidden through encryption. RingCT is a system of disassociation where information is still visible in the blockchain. Mind that a vulnerability might be discovered at some point in the future which allows traceability since Monero’s blockchain provides a record of every transaction that has taken place."
This operates similar to a mixnet where it is difficult to discern the originating address from a transaction. One of Monero's developers publicly admits that "zk-SNARKs provides much stronger untraceability characteristics than Monero (but a much smaller privacyset and much higher systemic risks)." Intelligence agencies have placed their eyes on Monero for some time. The United States has even brought in a private firm called CipherTrace who claims to have built tools capable of tracing transactions.[^32] At the time of writing, these are unsubstantiated claims; there is no evidence to suggest that Monero has been deobfuscated.
"The fundamental problem of coin mixing methods though is that transaction data is not being hidden through encryption. RingCT is a system of disassociation where information is still visible in the blockchain. Mind that a vulnerability might be discovered at some point in the future which allows traceability since Monero’s blockchain provides a record of every transaction that has taken place."
This operates similar to a mixnet where it is difficult to discern the originating address from a transaction. One of Monero's developers publicly admits that "zk-SNARKs provides much stronger untraceability characteristics than Monero (but a much smaller privacyset and much higher systemic risks)." Intelligence agencies have placed their eyes on Monero for some time. The United States has even brought in a private firm called CipherTrace who claims to have built tools capable of tracing transactions.[^39] At the time of writing, these are unsubstantiated claims; there is no evidence to suggest that Monero has been deobfuscated.
Pirate Chain's ARRR addresses the fungibility problem of Zcash by removing the transparent address schema (t-tx) and forcing all transactions to use Sapling shielded transactions (z-tx). "By consistently utilizing zk-SNARKs technology, Pirate leaves no usable metadata of user’s transactions on its blockchain." This means that even if the blockchain was compromised down the line, the adversary would obtain little to no useful metadata. The transactions contain no visible amount to no visible address from no visible address. The underlying cryptography would have to be broken or the viewing/spending keys would have to be intercepted in order to peer into the transactions. For an adversary without key possession, the trace is baseless. "A little bit of math can accomplish what all the guns and barbed wire can’t: a little bit of math can keep a secret." - Edward Snowden
While I could write mounds of literature diving into the depths of cryptocurrency, I have brought forth only what is useful to the aims of anti-forensics. There is no real purpose in regurgitating quotations from various whitepapers and protocol designs. Any further research into the matter is up to you. If this has peaked your interest, consider diving into the various communities, protocol specifications, and whitepapers.
Further information pertaining to zk-SNARKs - [^33]
Monero (XMR) Whitepaper - [^34]
Pirate Chain Whitepaper - [^35]
Further information pertaining to zk-SNARKs - [^40]
Monero (XMR) Whitepaper - [^41]
Pirate Chain Whitepaper - [^42]
## Defensive Mechanisms
System security or hardening is vital for successful operations. Lack of hardening could result in your machines being cut through like hot butter. Center for Internet Security (CIS) [^36] and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) with Standard Technical Implementation Guides [^37] both have decent system hardening standards that are to be applied to all DoD contractor, government, and affiliated nodes. For Linux and Unix systems, Kernel Self-Protection Project (KSPP) [^38] is a great resource for kernel configuration settings. More information about these configurations and concepts can be found at https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/self-protection.html.
System security or hardening is vital for successful operations. Lack of hardening could result in your machines being cut through like hot butter. Center for Internet Security (CIS)[^43] and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) with Standard Technical Implementation Guides[^44] both have decent system hardening standards that are to be applied to all DoD contractor, government, and affiliated nodes. For Linux and Unix systems, Kernel Self-Protection Project (KSPP)[^45] is a great resource for kernel configuration settings. More information about these configurations and concepts can be found at https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/self-protection.html.
Hardening procedures fall in line with the concept of minimizing architecture and running processes on a system. This makes each system easier to audit with less noise/clutter, and reduces the attack surface for exploitation. Hardening should encompass patches, scans with most recent virus definitions, restrictive permissions, kernel hardening, purging unnecessary software, and disabling physical ports, unnecessary users, filesystems, firmware modules, compilers, and network protocols.
System hardening is far from a quick and easy process, unless you have preconfigured images for systems. For small operations lacking technical prowess, preconfigured operating systems such as TAILS or Whonix mentioned in the Operating System section assure the greatest security and the least hassle.
If the goal is to run a more persistent lightweight OS with minimal functionality, I suggest running a variant of Arch Linux that does not use SystemD (Consider runit, OpenRC, or s6). If wide community support is needed, Arch with a hardened configuration will be your best bet. For the tech-savvy, hardened variants of Gentoo are ideal.
The more persistence desired for the operation increases the complexity of the hardening. Some projects have been introduced to rival Xen-based hypervisors with minimalist GNU/Linux systems. Some development towards Whonix Host[^46] was started but never seemed to come to fruition. PlagueOS[^47] is based on the Void musl build to with numerous hardening mechanisms. This is designed to act strictly as a locked down hypervisor with all system activities conducted inside of Kicksecure/Whonix VMs. The VMs also are restricted by AppArmor profiles and are ran inside a `bwrap`[^48] sandboxed container.
Note:
The listed hardening is incomplete and will not fit all operations and GNU/Linux systems. This is not meant to be a book on methods for defensive cybersecurity.
## Offline Password Managers
Security often comes down to the basics; Make your devices/accounts/services hard to crack. Feds & private forensics companies may be able to allocate ridiculous amounts of computing power against your services to see logs and compromise your accounts, but their brute forcing efforts can be rendered useless.
Consider offline variants of KeePass[^39] for secure password storage, then consider placing the KeePass database inside of a hidden veracrypt. Having a password with an absurd amount of characters such as `dHK&*/4pk_!i??5R=^K}~FU!kxF{fG}*&>oMdRt([);7?=v(e^,ch_n)r()]:&k$D@f4#G"Y\v_5-*i$E[+)"bT*@BF+{hkvn7[B]{qq'[~]3@+-Ju6C(@<]=TEM6a\h$c+:W[k$=;Jy[Un7&~NtvK*{Bn` is enough to stunt any brute force attempt. Cryptographic security can only be as strong as the key being used.
Note:
A 20-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 132.877 bits of security (compare to 128 bit symmetric encryption keys).
A 29-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 192.671 bits of security (compare to 192 bit symmetric encryption keys).
A 39-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 259.110 bits of security (compare to 256 bit symmetric encryption keys).
Security margins greater than 256 bits are unnecessary, even against quantum attacks (256 bits of security against classical attack = 128 bits of security against quantum attack)
Breaking 128 bits of security requires time approximately equal to 1000 times the life of the universe (measured from the big bang to the projected death of the universe)
Passwords larger than 39 characters are unnecessary (although rounding to 40 is reasonable)
## Physical Precautions
This wouldn't be a complete work on anti-forensics without some mention of physical precautions. While wireless transmitters are ill-advised, wireless technology can prove useful when larger proximity is needed. Directional antennas could allow you to stay hidden from cameras and remotely authenticate to a network.
With nuances added from the modern surveillance state, traffic cameras force your hand by revealing every intersection which you have passed through. There are a few methods to circumventing this privacy infringement. Darkened weather covers for your license plate (Warning: This method could result in a fine with the wrong officer) or a well-rigged bicycle rack could prevent cameras from picking up your plate number. Alternatively, if a destination is within a few miles of proximity you could either ride a bicycle (with a disguise), or decide to become a motorcyclist. With motocycles, the plate numbers are significantly smaller and could even be blocked by your feet on certain bikes. The helmet would stand to mask facial features, and the jacket would cover any identifiable features such as tattoos. Palantir has been involved in "predictive policing" leveraging footage obtained from traffic cameras to profile individuals.[^40]
With nuances added from the modern surveillance state, traffic cameras force your hand by revealing every intersection which you have passed through. There are a few methods to circumventing this privacy infringement. Darkened weather covers for your license plate (Warning: This method could result in a fine with the wrong officer) or a well-rigged bicycle rack could prevent cameras from picking up your plate number. Alternatively, if a destination is within a few miles of proximity you could either ride a bicycle (with a disguise), or decide to become a motorcyclist. With motocycles, the plate numbers are significantly smaller and could even be blocked by your feet on certain bikes. The helmet would stand to mask facial features, and the jacket would cover any identifiable features such as tattoos. Palantir has been involved in "predictive policing" leveraging footage obtained from traffic cameras to profile individuals.[^49]
It should go without saying that any tech devices that you purchase will have some identifier that could lead back to you. Make this a moot point and procure every device (even USBs) anonymously with cash. If you're out on a distant roadtrip, make some of your purchases. Wear a hat accompanied with some baggy clothes. Perform a slight change in your gait as you walk (uncomfortable shoes could help with this). Alternatively, pay that bum off the street to do your bidding.
@ -463,19 +541,19 @@ It's evident that poking powerful players could result in irreversable consequen
The OS selection should be oriented towards amnesia. TAILS could be leveraged with a USB, and the drive in the system could simply be a dummy (filled with insignificant data, vacation pictures, etc). The physical wireless chipset should be removed and replaced with a wireless dongle and attached only when needed. While I prefer hardware mitigations over software mitigations, you may not wish to fry the USB ports or desolder the SATA ports. The BIOS should be password-protected, and the USB ports at the very least can be disabled from the menu. If you will be operating from public locations, consider running a blank keyboard with a privacy screen covering the LED.
If a live USB with minimal processing power is not your niche, consider running a hardened base Linux, preferably using a Windows Manager (WM) over a full Desktop Environment (DE), to act as a hyper-visor that runs amnesiac virtual machines such as Whonix. If the option is taken to avoid live boot, the hardware selection becomes more important. First off, it would be in your best interest to use at least 16 GB of RAM. Secondly, consider using one SSD and one HDD. The HDD will be used to hold files, while the SSD is used for facilitating performance for the host OS. As previously stated, HDDs can be wiped by degaussing or overwriting physical sectors while this should be assumed an impossibility for an SSD. Each VM on the host should have a primary function; separate cases and even processes should have separate VMs. For the more technical, sandboxing applications can be used to add nested layers of security. Consider using a sandboxed profile for your virtualization software, whether it be KVM or VirtualBox. Inside the VM, use sandboxing to isolate your processes.
Fortunately, amnesiac solutions are growing. One can run TAILS with the HiddenVM project.[^50] HiddenVM is precompiled VirtualBox binaries to allow running virtual machines without an installation directly on TAILS. HiddenVM leverages the TAILS amnesiac system with Veracrypt's hidden partitions for plausible deniability. In this way, Whonix can be ran from TAILs and there will not be an overlapping use of TOR.
If a live USB with minimal processing power is not your niche, consider running a hardened base Linux, preferably using a Windows Manager (WM) over a full Desktop Environment (DE), to act as a hyper-visor that runs amnesiac virtual machines such as Whonix. If the option is taken to avoid live boot, the hardware selection becomes more important. First off, it would be in your best interest to use at least 16 GB of RAM. Secondly, consider using one SSD and one HDD. The HDD will be used to hold files, while the SSD is used for facilitating performance for the host OS. As previously stated, HDDs can be wiped by degaussing or overwriting physical sectors while this should be assumed an impossibility for an SSD. Each VM on the host should have a primary function; separate cases and even processes should have separate VMs. For the more technical, sandboxing applications can be used to add nested layers of security. Consider using a sandboxed profile for your virtualization software, whether it be KVM[^51] or VirtualBox[^52]. Inside the VM, use sandboxing to isolate your processes.
Note: Amnesiac computing is highly advised for journalist with state targets on their back. Most malware will not be able to persist through different sessions, and often they will have to interact with hostile platforms and networks.
If a mobile device is deemed a necessity, leverage GrapheneOS on a Google Pixel. Encrypt all communications through trusted services or peer-to-peer (P2P) applications like Briar. Route all device traffic through TOR with the use of Orbot. Keep the cameras blacked out with electrical or gorilla tape. The concept of treating all signals as hostile should be emphasized here as the hardware wireless chipset cannot be desoldered. Sensors and microphones can successfully be disabled, but the trend with smaller devices is that they run as a System on a Chip (SoC). In short, multiple functions necessary for the system to work are tied together in a single chip. Even if you managed not to fry the device from the desoldering process, you would have gutted the core mechanisms of the system, resulting in the newfound possession of a paperweight.
### Market Vendor
Let's assume the vendor is selling some sort of vice found on the DEA's list of schedule 1 narcotics.
Fortunately in this use-case, unlike that of the anonymous activist, OPSEC is welcomed with open arms. In fact, vendors are even rated with their stealth (both from shipping and processing) as one of the highest criteria in consideration, along with the markets being TOR friendly, leveraging PGP, and ensuring full functionality without Javascript.
Let's assume the vendor is selling some sort of vice found on the DEA's list of schedule 1 narcotics. Fortunately in this use-case, unlike that of the anonymous activist (or the journalist in some cases), OPSEC is welcomed with open arms. In fact, vendors are even rated with their stealth (both from shipping and processing) as one of the highest criteria in consideration, along with the markets being TOR friendly, leveraging PGP, and ensuring full functionality without Javascript. Given the ongoing nature of these operations, and that they are tailored towards privacy and security, a more persistent system will likely be the best fit.
VMs for isolated processes or hardened linux hypervisor with amnesiac OS
The same recommendation for the journalist with a persistent setup using VMs for isolated processes on a hardened hypervisor is ideal. A completely amnesiac system is less necessary when you are not forced to interact with hostile sites that can arbitrarily run code via the use of JavaScript. While I would give a nod to those that take such precaution and exist solely in volatile memory, it is likely unnecessary and more of a hassle than the degraded performance is worth.
## Conclusion
As stated earlier, relevancy in the tech industry is difficult to maintain in perpetuity. The proposed concepts applied with adequate discipline and mapping stand to render investigations ineffective at peering into operations. Most mistakes take place in the beginning and come back later to haunt an operation. The success stories are never highlighted. For instance, there are plenty of vendors across marketplaces that have gone under the radar for years. OPSEC properly excercised would not leave a trail for the intelligence community; thus obscure and cryptographic implementations like steganography or FDE would not have to be relied on. I hope to learn that some of this material aids dissidents and journalists to combat regimes rooted in authoritarianism, coupled with privacy-minded individuals who have the desire to be left alone. Freedom and privacy have never been permitted by the state, nor are they achieved through legislature, protests, petitions; they are reclaimed by blatant non-compliance, loopholes, and violence. Every man possesses the right of revolution, and every revolution is rooted in treason, non-conformity, and ultimately to escape from subservience.
For the dissidents:
@ -528,42 +606,55 @@ For the hollow men (federal agents or contractors) who stumbled upon my work by
## References
[^1]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/02/11/palantir-apologizes-for-wikileaks-attack-proposal-cuts-ties-with-hbgary/
[^2]: https://puri.sm/posts/deep-dive-into-intel-me-disablement/
[^2]: Purism technical writeup for IME - https://puri.sm/posts/deep-dive-into-intel-me-disablement/
[^3]: https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner
[^4]: https://www.coreboot.org
[^5]: https://artixlinux.org
[^6]: https://voidlinux.org
[^7]: https://alpinelinux.org/
[^4]: Coreboot - https://www.coreboot.org
[^5]: Artix Linux - https://artixlinux.org
[^6]: Void Linux - https://voidlinux.org
[^7]: Alpine Linux - https://alpinelinux.org/
[^8]: https://www.statista.com/chart/15207/smartphone-data-collection-by-google-and-apple/
[^9]: https://grapheneos.org
[^10]: https://www.pine64.org/pinephone/
[^11]: https://puri.sm/products/librem-5/
[^12]: https://protonvpn.com/blog/threat-model/
[^13]: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Connecting_to_Tor_before_a_VPN
[^14]: https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/vpn_support
[^15]: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection
[^16]: https://ungoogled-software.github.io/ungoogled-chromium-binaries/
[^17]: https://www.bromite.org
[^18]: https://brave.com
[^19]: https://duckduckgo.com
[^20]: https://searx.space/
[^21]: https://tails.boum.org
[^22]: Singh, S. (1999). The code book: the secret history of codes and codebreaking (Vol. 366). London: Fourth Estate.
[^23]: https://tech.michaelaltfield.net/2020/01/02/buskill-laptop-kill-cord-dead-man-switch/
[^24]: https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill/blob/master/usbkill/usbkill.py
[^25]: https://github.com/NateBrune/silk-guardian
[^26]: https://github.com/AnonymousPlanet/Centry
[^27]: https://github.com/anthraxx/usbctl
[^28]: https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2020/03/breaking-veracrypt-containers/
[^29]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.06884.pdf
[^30]: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6747427/2.pdf
[^31]: Jung, C. G. (2014). Modern man in search of a soul. Routledge.
[^32]: https://ciphertrace.com/ciphertrace-announces-worlds-first-monero-tracing-capabilities/
[^33]: https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks
[^34]: https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf
[^35]: https://pirate.black/files/whitepaper/The_Pirate_Code_V2.0.pdf
[^36]: https://www.cisecurity.org
[^37]: https://public.cyber.mil/stigs
[^38]: https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings
[^39]: https://keepassxc.org
[^40]: https://www.documentcloud.org/search/projectid:51061-Palantir-September-2020
[^9]: GrapheneOS - https://grapheneos.org
[^10]: Pine64 Pinephone - https://www.pine64.org/pinephone/
[^11]: Purism Librem 5 - https://puri.sm/products/librem-5/
[^12]: OSI Model - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model
[^13]: ProtonVPN threat model - https://protonvpn.com/blog/threat-model/
[^14]: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Connecting_to_Tor_before_a_VPN
[^15]: https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/vpn_support
[^16]: Orbot - https://guardianproject.info/apps/org.torproject.android/
[^17]: Whonix leak protection - https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection
[^18]: Ungoogled Chromium binaries - https://ungoogled-software.github.io/ungoogled-chromium-binaries/
[^19]: Bromite Browser - https://www.bromite.org
[^20]: Brave Browser - https://brave.com
[^21]: The Hitchhikers Guide to Anonymity (Browser Hardening) - https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#appendix-v1-hardening-your-browsers
[^22]: DuckDuckGo - https://duckduckgo.com
[^23]: Searx instances - https://searx.space/
[^24]: TAILS - https://tails.boum.org
[^25]: Singh, S. (1999). The code book: the secret history of codes and codebreaking (Vol. 366). London: Fourth Estate.
[^26]: GNU Privacy Assistant - gnupg.org/related_software/gpa/index.html
[^27]: Minisign - https://github.com/jedisct1/minisign/
[^28]: Veracrypt - https://www.veracrypt.fr/code/VeraCrypt/
[^29]: KeepassXC - https://keepassxc.org
[^30]: USB dead man's switch - https://tech.michaelaltfield.net/2020/01/02/buskill-laptop-kill-cord-dead-man-switch/
[^31]: USBKill - https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill/blob/master/usbkill/usbkill.py
[^32]: Silk Guardian - https://github.com/NateBrune/silk-guardian
[^33]: Centry Panic Button - https://github.com/AnonymousPlanet/Centry
[^34]: USBCTL - https://github.com/anthraxx/usbctl
[^35]: Elcomsoft Forensics - https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2020/03/breaking-veracrypt-containers/
[^36]: Jumping Airgaps - https://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.06884.pdf
[^37]: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6747427/2.pdf
[^38]: Jung, C. G. (2014). Modern man in search of a soul. Routledge.
[^39]: CipherTrace - https://ciphertrace.com/ciphertrace-announces-worlds-first-monero-tracing-capabilities/
[^40]: ZkSnarks - https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks
[^41]: Monero Whitepaper - https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf
[^42]: Pirate Chain Whitepaper - https://pirate.black/files/whitepaper/The_Pirate_Code_V2.0.pdf
[^43]: CIS - https://www.cisecurity.org
[^44]: DISA STIGs - https://public.cyber.mil/stigs
[^45]: KSPP - https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings
[^46]: Whonix Host - https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Whonix-Host
[^47]: PlagueOS- https://git.envs.net/whichdoc/plagueos
[^48]: BubbleWrap Sandbox - https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap
[^49]: FOIA request for Palantir operations -https://www.documentcloud.org/search/projectid:51061-Palantir-September-2020
[^50]: HiddenVM - https://github.com/aforensics/HiddenVM
[^51]: KVM - https://www.linux-kvm.org/
[^52]: Oracle VirtualBox - https://virtualbox.org