Logging addition + citation / miscellaneous edits
This commit is contained in:
arcanedev
parent
cc988b8c14
commit
b0e8430bcf
174
README.md
174
README.md
|
|
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ GNU/Linux based phones, such as Pine64's Pine Phone[^12] or Purism's Librem 5,[^
|
|||
## Disable Logging
|
||||
Disabling logs at the source is the best solution to ensure excess logs are not being stored. Daemons or processes can automate the process of log collection. This has its useful functions for both debugging and security (auditing), however it is detrimental to the idea of information retention. It is strongly advised to periodically shred the log files if not disabling the logging daemons entirely.
|
||||
Some pro
|
||||
Some developers have created simple bash and python scripts that remove and disable the logging daemons such as CoverMyAss.[^https://github.com/sundowndev/covermyass] Scripts aren't necessarily needed, however they could automate a manual process and identify logging components of your system that you did not know were present.
|
||||
Some developers have created simple bash and python scripts that remove and disable the logging daemons such as CoverMyAss.[^14] Scripts aren't necessarily needed, however they could automate a manual process and identify logging components of your system that you did not know were present.
|
||||
|
||||
Here is a quick example of disabling logging daemons on GNU/Linux with the SystemD service manager:
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ This command would use GNU coreutils shred function to wipe over the designated
|
|||
The NSA has in the past developed malicious firmware for HDDs that can create secret copies of user-written data. SSDs which make use of wear-leveling cannot have information securely erased by the user. However, SSDs with wear leveling also pose a significant annoyance, and even create difficulty for, forensic investigators. Such annoyance cannot be considered a security guarantee. In short, wear-leveling, garbage collection, and trim operations are largely outside of the user's control, therefore "secure" deletion should not be assumed to be possible. Regarding SSDs, trim operations should always be enabled as it stands to make files unreadable using "Deterministic Read After Trim" or "Deterministic Zeroes After Trim." Consider trim as an unreliable backup mitigation to FDE.
|
||||
|
||||
## MAC Randomization
|
||||
Media access control (MAC) addresses are unique identifiers for network interface controllers/cards (NIC). These identifiers exist at Layer 2 of the OSI model.[^14] As one could expect, unique identifiers can be problematic. Proprietary router firmware such as Netgear and other vendors can attempt to correlate static MACs to individuals. Your MAC could also be correlated between different routers and subsequently different router SSIDs. Wardriving is a method by which organizations will scan for SSIDs around different areas to collect MAC addresses and SSIDs.
|
||||
Media access control (MAC) addresses are unique identifiers for network interface controllers/cards (NIC). These identifiers exist at Layer 2 of the OSI model.[^15] As one could expect, unique identifiers can be problematic. Proprietary router firmware such as Netgear and other vendors can attempt to correlate static MACs to individuals. Your MAC could also be correlated between different routers and subsequently different router SSIDs. Wardriving is a method by which organizations will scan for SSIDs around different areas to collect MAC addresses and SSIDs.
|
||||
|
||||
All anti-forensic operating systems spoof or randomize the MAC address by default. A GNU/Linux utility called `macchanger` can alter and randomize the MAC address.
|
||||
Set MAC to one by the same vendor: `macchanger -a <interface (i.e. eth0)>`
|
||||
|
|
@ -178,43 +178,43 @@ If you are more concerned with a traffic leakage, leak prevention of traffic (me
|
|||
As it stands today, there are three avenues for anonymization and encryption of internet packets: VPN, TOR, and Mixnets.
|
||||
|
||||
Each avenue possesses pitfalls. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) can provide privacy from the local internet service providers (ISP). Internet traffic will be encrypted based on designated configurations and protocols. OpenVPN is subject to various attacks.
|
||||
Wireguard is currently the most secure. Unfortunately, it has faced little scrutiny. Often security defects are uncovered with the right amount of time. Disregarding its adolescence, the Wireguard protocol has been formally verified. Also, the reduced complexity of the protocol makes it easier to properly implement than OpenVPN. Easier implementation reduces room for error that could lead to compromise. The primary issue with VPNs today lies with the inherent trust given to the provider. If you decide a VPN is desired for your operation(s), you should be searching for a provider that has strict privacy laws, a no logging policy, and jurisdiction being outside of the known growing number of eyes (collaborative government intelligence community). This intelligence community went from 5 eyes to 9 eyes to 14 eyes. I suspect the number will continue its pattern of growth as discussed in the Philosophy section of the book. VPNs are rarely suitable against powerful (government or corporate) attackers; VPNs cannot grant anonymity.[^15]
|
||||
Wireguard is currently the most secure. Unfortunately, it has faced little scrutiny. Often security defects are uncovered with the right amount of time. Disregarding its adolescence, the Wireguard protocol has been formally verified. Also, the reduced complexity of the protocol makes it easier to properly implement than OpenVPN. Easier implementation reduces room for error that could lead to compromise. The primary issue with VPNs today lies with the inherent trust given to the provider. If you decide a VPN is desired for your operation(s), you should be searching for a provider that has strict privacy laws, a no logging policy, and jurisdiction being outside of the known growing number of eyes (collaborative government intelligence community). This intelligence community went from 5 eyes to 9 eyes to 14 eyes. I suspect the number will continue its pattern of growth as discussed in the Philosophy section of the book. VPNs are rarely suitable against powerful (government or corporate) attackers; VPNs cannot grant anonymity.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
The Onion Router (TOR) has faced the most scrutiny of all protocols and provides the most anonymity. While facing the most scrutiny from various individuals and governments, TOR has many overarching issues yet to be addressed. Someone with a God's eye view of the telecommunications traffic could deanonymize users by sending out certain sized packets to different destinations. This is something to keep in mind while hosting infrastructure, however the standard user sending out typical sized packets from web requests has little concern of this deanonymization tactic. TOR does not add timing obfuscations or decoy traffic to hinder traffic pattern analysis which can be used to deanonymize users.
|
||||
|
||||
Both of these channels have some pitfalls, so why not combine them for layered security? There have been numerous articles published by Whonix[^14] and TAILS[^15] developers along with other Information Security professionals highlighting the ineffectiveness of the VPN / TOR combination. The synopsis of their articles is that at best it doesn't help you, at worst, it hurts you. I find it useful if I am trying to mask the fact that I am using TOR from the ISP. Bridges can also be used for this purpose, but they are likely easier to identify by the Intelligence Community (IC). While on public WiFi, I recommend solely using TOR.
|
||||
Both of these channels have some pitfalls, so why not combine them for layered security? There have been numerous articles published by Whonix[^17] and TAILS[^18] developers along with other Information Security professionals highlighting the ineffectiveness of the VPN / TOR combination. The synopsis of their articles is that at best it doesn't help you, at worst, it hurts you. I find it useful if I am trying to mask the fact that I am using TOR from the ISP. Bridges can also be used for this purpose, but they are likely easier to identify by the Intelligence Community (IC). While on public WiFi, I recommend solely using TOR.
|
||||
|
||||
I2P[^16] or the Invisible Internet Project spawned in 2003. This is an encrypted private network layer designed to mask user identity. I2P is not the same concept as TOR, although some concepts cross over. I2P users cannot officially communicate with clearnet sites like TOR users can; all I2P traffic stays internal to the I2P network. Without having the exit of traffic via exit nodes or outproxies to the internet, this reduces usability and enhances privacy. I2P can prove useful at limiting the information captured by global passive adversaries. I should note that some mixnets have called I2P legacy technology claiming that it opens up users to a number of attacks that can isolate, misdirect, and deanonymize users. Therefore I2P should not be solely relied on. If one is adament about using I2P, there are configurations that facilitate the use of I2P via TOR.
|
||||
I2P[^19] or the Invisible Internet Project spawned in 2003. This is an encrypted private network layer designed to mask user identity. I2P is not the same concept as TOR, although some concepts cross over. I2P users cannot officially communicate with clearnet sites like TOR users can; all I2P traffic stays internal to the I2P network. Without having the exit of traffic via exit nodes or outproxies to the internet, this reduces usability and enhances privacy. I2P can prove useful at limiting the information captured by global passive adversaries. I should note that some mixnets have called I2P legacy technology claiming that it opens up users to a number of attacks that can isolate, misdirect, and deanonymize users. Therefore I2P should not be solely relied on. If one is adament about using I2P, there are configurations that facilitate the use of I2P via TOR.
|
||||
|
||||
Mixnets have the goal of anonymizing packets through uniformity. The design is to obscure and craft packets of the same size despite the amount of data being transmitted. Often times mixnets have technology that address time-based attacks, provide decoy or cover traffic, and implement uniformity of packets, however the pitfalls tend to be lack of scrutiny and adoption. Anonymity loves company, and most mixnets lack that component, especially in their early conceptions. Due to the lack of scrutiny with early conception and lack of adoption, I cannot provide any recommendations. Even if one is to involve themselves with the use of a mixnet, they should be on guard. Intelligence agencies are not ones to shy away from a good honeypot. While not a perfect example as this wasn't a mixnet, the FBI ran an operation with an operating system called ArcaneOS and a built-in messaging platform called anom[.]io[^https://urlscan.io/result/f7b4c5ae-3864-4b3f-be0e-ad10e39276bc/#summary] designed for organized crime. Anom was an application that opened as a calculator which had the user enter a pin to reach the hidden messenger. All communications were intercepted. The morale of the story is that the slightest amount of skepticism into the website communications, hosting platform, or the closed-source application could've prevented the downfall of multiple criminal enterprises globally. The same skepticism should be applied to any organization unwilling to address their shortcomings and model their potential attack vectors. Many are willing to route your traffic, and node-based cryptocurrency projects with a model that resembles that of a ponzi-scheme could always be a source of both black budget funds and traffic analysis for the letter agencies. I have no fingers to point or organizations to accuse. However, it is far from a half-cocked conspiracy that intelligence agencies would engage in this type of activity.
|
||||
Mixnets have the goal of anonymizing packets through uniformity. The design is to obscure and craft packets of the same size despite the amount of data being transmitted. Often times mixnets have technology that address time-based attacks, provide decoy or cover traffic, and implement uniformity of packets, however the pitfalls tend to be lack of scrutiny and adoption. Anonymity loves company, and most mixnets lack that component, especially in their early conceptions. Due to the lack of scrutiny with early conception and lack of adoption, I cannot provide any recommendations. Even if one is to involve themselves with the use of a mixnet, they should be on guard. Intelligence agencies are not ones to shy away from a good honeypot. While not a perfect example as this wasn't a mixnet, the FBI ran an operation with an operating system called ArcaneOS and a built-in messaging platform called anom[.]io[^20] designed for organized crime. ANOM was an application that opened as a calculator which had the user enter a pin to reach the hidden messenger. All communications were intercepted. The morale of the story is that the slightest amount of skepticism into the website communications, hosting platform, or the closed-source application could've prevented the downfall of multiple criminal enterprises globally. The same skepticism should be applied to any organization unwilling to address their shortcomings and model their potential attack vectors. Many are willing to route your traffic, and node-based cryptocurrency projects with a model that resembles that of a ponzi-scheme could always be a source of both black budget funds and traffic analysis for letter agencies. I have no fingers to point or organizations to accuse. However, it is far from a half-cocked conspiracy that intelligence agencies would engage in this type of activity.
|
||||
|
||||
In regards to implementation, there are a variety of options. Host-based virtualization with pre-configured systems like Whonix can be used. This routes all of the Whonix workstation's traffic through the Whonix gateway to prevent leakage. A bootable TAILS USB is also preconfigured to allow only TOR traffic, excluding the exempt or whitelisted insecure browser designed for getting your device through WiFi portals. Open-source operating systems, such as OpenWRT, on a travel router can force certain subnets to use a VPN configuration or route via TOR.
|
||||
|
||||
As previously stated in the Traffic Leakage section, software-based routing should not be relied on. If it is to be implemented, it should be viewed as adding an additional layer of security. There are applications such as Orbot[^17] which allows the use of the TOR network, a variety of VPN applications (which are primarily wrappers for OpenVPN), and there are scripts that configure local packet filters to "torrify" all traffic. While I have no basis in saying all software-based leak prevention mechanisms are prone to failure, historically leak prevention has been inadequate. Even Whonix reports that they "cannot do the impossible and magically prevent every kind of protocol leak and identifier disclosure." [^18] Hardware routing adds more architecture into the mix, but it provides the bulletproof assurance that there is no leakage of traffic. For critical operations, consider hardware mechanisms. For the privacy-centric individual, software-based kill switches should be more than sufficient.
|
||||
As previously stated in the Traffic Leakage section, software-based routing should not be relied on. If it is to be implemented, it should be viewed as adding an additional layer of security. There are applications such as Orbot[^21] which allows the use of the TOR network, a variety of VPN applications (which are primarily wrappers for OpenVPN), and there are scripts that configure local packet filters to "torrify" all traffic. While I have no basis in saying all software-based leak prevention mechanisms are prone to failure, historically leak prevention has been inadequate. Even Whonix reports that they "cannot do the impossible and magically prevent every kind of protocol leak and identifier disclosure." [^22] Hardware routing adds more architecture into the mix, but it provides the bulletproof assurance that there is no leakage of traffic. For critical operations, consider hardware mechanisms. For the privacy-centric individual, software-based kill switches should be more than sufficient.
|
||||
|
||||
## Browsing
|
||||
### Browser Configuration
|
||||
It is no secret that governments deliver malware based on anomalous internet activity, alternately put, flagged activity. While the common forms of investigations are typically conducted via physical device seizure, security mechanisms should be taken into account to stunt "passive" investigations. Browsers can be configured to disable the installation of extensions, device storage usage, setting alterations, theme changes, cookie restrictions, and cache deletions. The most important facets of private internet browsing include the browser security model, fingerprinting mitigations, and reliance on JavaScript.
|
||||
For the security model, ungoogled variants of Chromium[^19] are advised. The security model exists unlike Gecko-based browser derivatives (i.e. Firefox).
|
||||
Browser security and anti-fingerprinting do not always align. For instance, the TOR Browser is not unique based on fingerprinting. Tor Browser with JavaScript disabled is generally a secure setup despite being based on Gecko. Most browser-based vulnerabilities require JavaScript or some other browser-run code (fonts, WebGL, etc). Tor Browser on security setting "Safest" reduces this attack surface significantly. While Chromium browsers may have upped the ante in terms of security, many do not have any built-in anti-fingerprinting mechanisms. Some projects have taken the initiative to provide anti-fingerprinting configurations such as Bromite[^20] or Brave Browser[^21]. Using a privacy-tweaked configuration of Brave Browser is the best option for those who are not technical. However, many of the problems that plague vanilla Chromium can be mitigated with the right appended flags for process execution.
|
||||
For the security model, ungoogled variants of Chromium[^23] are advised. The security model exists unlike Gecko-based browser derivatives (i.e. Firefox).
|
||||
Browser security and anti-fingerprinting do not always align. For instance, the TOR Browser is not unique based on fingerprinting. Tor Browser with JavaScript disabled is generally a secure setup despite being based on Gecko. Most browser-based vulnerabilities require JavaScript or some other browser-run code (fonts, WebGL, etc). Tor Browser on security setting "Safest" reduces this attack surface significantly. While Chromium browsers may have upped the ante in terms of security, many do not have any built-in anti-fingerprinting mechanisms. Some projects have taken the initiative to provide anti-fingerprinting configurations such as Bromite[^24] or Brave Browser[^25]. Using a privacy-tweaked configuration of Brave Browser is the best option for those who are not technical. However, many of the problems that plague vanilla Chromium can be mitigated with the right appended flags for process execution.
|
||||
To further elaborate, whenever Chromium is executed, it can be ran by typing the following into terminal:
|
||||
```
|
||||
/usr/bin/chromium %U --disable-reading-from-canvas --disable-3d-apis --disable-component-update --disable-background-networking --user-agent="" --no-default-browser-check --incognito --disable-breakpad --no-crash-upload --no-report-upload --disable-crash-reporter --disable-speech-synthesis-api --disable-speech-api --disable-cloud-policy-on-signin --disable-print-preview --disable-drive --disable-full-history-sync --disable-sync
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
These flags can also be appended directly to the `/usr/bin/Chromium` file so every execution forces the use of the flags. (See browser hardening configurations from Anonymous Planet[^22]).
|
||||
These flags can also be appended directly to the `/usr/bin/Chromium` file so every execution forces the use of the flags. (See browser hardening configurations from Anonymous Planet[^26]).
|
||||
|
||||
### Search Engine Selection
|
||||
#### DuckDuckGo
|
||||
DuckDuckGo (DDG)[^23] has long been used as an alternative to Google. It is worth mentioning that DDG is TOR Projects default selection. This has granted them significant notoriety and trust. There are some underlying problems with DDG such as being based in the US, and they are not completely open-source. Without having reviewable source code, there is no way of validating their seemingly well-intentioned privacy mission statement. However, source code review becomes a moot point when you consider the fact that you are using their centralized services. Odds are that the providers of the service do not make the entirety of their systems publicly reviewable/auditable. Arbitrary code or excess applications could exist on their servers.
|
||||
DuckDuckGo (DDG)[^27] has long been used as an alternative to Google. It is worth mentioning that DDG is TOR Projects default selection. This has granted them significant notoriety and trust. There are some underlying problems with DDG such as being based in the US, and they are not completely open-source. Without having reviewable source code, there is no way of validating their seemingly well-intentioned privacy mission statement. However, source code review becomes a moot point when you consider the fact that you are using their centralized services. Odds are that the providers of the service do not make the entirety of their systems publicly reviewable/auditable. Arbitrary code or excess applications could exist on their servers.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Searx
|
||||
Searx instances[^24] are decentralized search engines that can be stood up by anyone. Decentralization with Searx doesn't remove the issue of inherent trust that must be placed in the instances, but it ensures that you have control in where you place your trust. This also enables people to stand up their own instances and configure them with better protections. Decentralization is preferred, however some of the instances are likely ran by intelligence agencies.
|
||||
Searx instances[^28] are decentralized search engines that can be stood up by anyone. Decentralization with Searx doesn't remove the issue of inherent trust that must be placed in the instances, but it ensures that you have control in where you place your trust. This also enables people to stand up their own instances and configure them with better protections. Decentralization is preferred, however some of the instances are likely ran by intelligence agencies.
|
||||
|
||||
>Note: There are certainly more variants of search engines that I have not covered that are further from the beaten path. The landscape is often changing, and it is advised to practice due dilligence when researching alternate search engines.
|
||||
|
||||
## Live Boot
|
||||
Live media (USB or CD) can be booted from in a process called Live Boot. Data is prevented from being stored on the hard drive of your computer (so long as you do not attempt to decrypt your hard drive that is detected). Nothing lives in permenance from the live boot. This is a useful tool for the privacy conscious as there is little to no cleanup process of your actions. Some operating systems such as The Amnesiac Incognito Live System (TAILS)[^25] are forensicly conscious and wipe the data from the device's physical memory once the USB is removed or the system is shutdown. This is not always the case for live media. Be conscious of network activity living on in permenance. This is where the use of strong cryptography can come into play from Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations to the use of TOR. Live booting reduces the effectiveness of the Cold Boot attacks. Cold boot is heavily reliant upon data that is temporarily stored in Random Access Memory (RAM).
|
||||
Live media (USB or CD) can be booted from in a process called Live Boot. Data is prevented from being stored on the hard drive of your computer (so long as you do not attempt to decrypt your hard drive that is detected). Nothing lives in permenance from the live boot. This is a useful tool for the privacy conscious as there is little to no cleanup process of your actions. Some operating systems such as The Amnesiac Incognito Live System (TAILS)[^29] are forensicly conscious and wipe the data from the device's physical memory once the USB is removed or the system is shutdown. This is not always the case for live media. Be conscious of network activity living on in permenance. This is where the use of strong cryptography can come into play from Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations to the use of TOR. Live booting reduces the effectiveness of the Cold Boot attacks. Cold boot is heavily reliant upon data that is temporarily stored in Random Access Memory (RAM).
|
||||
|
||||
>Note: Cold boot attacks require a system to be under attacker control. DDR3 memory modules lose data within 3 seconds of losing power under normal circumstances. DDR4 loses data within 1 second (more like a fraction of a second) after losing power under normal conditions.
|
||||
Sufficient mitigation against cold boot attacks is generally to simply remove memory before control of the system is released.
|
||||
|
|
@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ Destroying SSDs:
|
|||
- Open the drive
|
||||
- Break/Crush the board and memory cells
|
||||
- Burn the remains
|
||||
- Separate and scatter the debris[^22]
|
||||
- Separate and scatter the debris[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
>Note:
|
||||
The DoD generally cites a drive wiping policy of 7 passes using random data. Each pass is performed on the entire drive.
|
||||
|
|
@ -248,12 +248,12 @@ Destroying SSDs:
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
## Cryptography
|
||||
Cryptography is a monolith of a topic that is included with the anti-forensics threat model. If the cryptography cannot be broken, forensic investigations are stunted in their tracks. Cryptography can range from encryption of individual files or messages to Full Disk Encryption (FDE). As Simon Singh has said in The Code Book, "I must mention a problem that faces any author who tackles the subject of cryptography: the science of secrecy is largely a secret science."[^26]
|
||||
Cryptography is a monolith of a topic that is included with the anti-forensics threat model. If the cryptography cannot be broken, forensic investigations are stunted in their tracks. Cryptography can range from encryption of individual files or messages to Full Disk Encryption (FDE). As Simon Singh has said in The Code Book, "I must mention a problem that faces any author who tackles the subject of cryptography: the science of secrecy is largely a secret science."[^31]
|
||||
History goes back and forth favoring both codemakers and codebreakers through different eras. While there are algorithms that exist (and yet to be created) that could be unbreakable for the necessary classification time (at least outside the statute of limitations) against codebreakers. Such encryption could involve the use of multiple algorithms such as Serpent((Twofish)(AES)) with the hash algorithm of Whirlpool, Streebog-512, or SHA512. Do be warned that there are threats imposed from the use of cascading algorithms or the use of multiple algorithms with the same key.
|
||||
|
||||
All this being said, there is only one form of unbreakable encryption that will stand the test of time. This is a one-time pad (OTP) cipher. This encrypts the message based on completely randomized data. This cannot be digitally or mentally generated; this needs pure randomness to be bulletproof.
|
||||
|
||||
"The security of the onetime pad cipher is wholly due to the randomness of the key. The key injects randomness into the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext is random then it has no patterns, no structure, nothing the cryptanalyst can latch onto. In fact, it can be mathematically proved that it is impossible for a cryptanalyst to crack a message encrypted with a onetime pad cipher. In other words, the onetime pad cipher is not merely believed to be unbreakable, just as the Vigenère cipher was in the nineteenth century, it really is absolutely secure. The onetime pad offers a guarantee of secrecy: the Holy Grail of cryptography." - Simon Sughes, The Code Book[^26]
|
||||
"The security of the onetime pad cipher is wholly due to the randomness of the key. The key injects randomness into the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext is random then it has no patterns, no structure, nothing the cryptanalyst can latch onto. In fact, it can be mathematically proved that it is impossible for a cryptanalyst to crack a message encrypted with a onetime pad cipher. In other words, the onetime pad cipher is not merely believed to be unbreakable, just as the Vigenère cipher was in the nineteenth century, it really is absolutely secure. The onetime pad offers a guarantee of secrecy: the Holy Grail of cryptography." - Simon Sughes, The Code Book[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
>Note:
|
||||
An OTP using a CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator) still maintains the security of the CSPRNG used, although isn't really an OTP anymore. Instead, it acts as a stream cipher.
|
||||
|
|
@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ Randomness or entropy is the complement to cryptography, or rather a fundamental
|
|||
For systems with a TRNG, `cat /dev/random` will produce output continuously, appearing to behave the same as `cat /dev/urandom`.
|
||||
(on some systems with TRNGs, `cat /dev/random` will actually produce output faster than `cat /dev/urandom`).
|
||||
|
||||
For systems with TRNGs, the /dev/random and /dev/urandom devices provide no security difference from each other. However, /dev/urandom performs additional processing on the random data which could help mitigate certain hardware (mis)trust issues, specifically the risk of a backdoored TRNG (while there's no evidence TRNGs have ever been backdoored, this is a concern for some). To increase entropy on GNU/Linux systems, the packages `haveged` and `jitterentropy` can be used along with the boot parameter `random.trust_cpu=off` in the `/etc/default/grub` file. See Madaidan's Linux hardening guide for more details on increasing system entropy.[^27]
|
||||
For systems with TRNGs, the /dev/random and /dev/urandom devices provide no security difference from each other. However, /dev/urandom performs additional processing on the random data which could help mitigate certain hardware (mis)trust issues, specifically the risk of a backdoored TRNG (while there's no evidence TRNGs have ever been backdoored, this is a concern for some). To increase entropy on GNU/Linux systems, the packages `haveged` and `jitterentropy` can be used along with the boot parameter `random.trust_cpu=off` in the `/etc/default/grub` file. See Madaidan's Linux hardening guide for more details on increasing system entropy.[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
### Key Usage
|
||||
Properly implemented cryptographic usage of keys provides a substantial barrier to overcome for the assigned analyst. Key usage renders bruteforce password cracking ineffective. The randomness or entropy contained in the key allows for much stronger encryption than could be created by a simple or complex password (especially since the keys are typically password protected in implementation).
|
||||
|
|
@ -301,20 +301,20 @@ Comment:
|
|||
```
|
||||
Now you will type characters in the terminal to generate entropy (randomness) for the encryption. You will then be prompted to enter a passphrase.
|
||||
|
||||
Now you can use commands via terminal with gpg/gpg2, or you can use a tool with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) such as GNU Privacy Assistant (GPA)[^28] to sign, validate, and encrypt messages to your affiliates.
|
||||
Now you can use commands via terminal with gpg/gpg2, or you can use a tool with a Graphical User Interface (GUI) such as GNU Privacy Assistant (GPA)[^33] to sign, validate, and encrypt messages to your affiliates.
|
||||
ex. Signing the file `plaintext.txt` via terminal
|
||||
`gpg -s plaintext.txt`
|
||||
|
||||
For the party trying to validate the signature, they can issue the following command:
|
||||
`gpg --check-signatures plaintext.txt.gpg`
|
||||
|
||||
Minisign[^29] is an incredibly simple tool developed in python for the purpose of signature validation. It is a more modern tool than PGP that is user-friendly.
|
||||
Minisign[^34] is an incredibly simple tool developed in python for the purpose of signature validation. It is a more modern tool than PGP that is user-friendly.
|
||||
Generate key pair: `minisign -G`
|
||||
The public key can be distributed as needed, while the private key should remain strictly under user control for signing files.
|
||||
`minisign -S [-x sigfile] [-s seckey] -m file [file ...]`
|
||||
|
||||
#### Encrypting Drives and Files
|
||||
To date, Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) and Veracrypt[^30] are the two most notable options.
|
||||
To date, Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) and Veracrypt[^35] are the two most notable options.
|
||||
- LUKS: Primarily used for FDE
|
||||
- Veracrypt: Primarily container-based encrypt for file storage and plausible deniability with hidden volumes
|
||||
- PGP: Used for file-based encryption
|
||||
|
|
@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ To date, Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) and Veracrypt[^30] are the two most nota
|
|||
|
||||
#### Offline Password Managers
|
||||
Security often comes down to the basics; Make your devices/accounts/services hard to crack. Feds & private forensics companies may be able to allocate ridiculous amounts of computing power against your services to see logs and compromise your accounts, but their brute forcing efforts can be rendered useless.
|
||||
Consider offline variants of KeePass[^31] for secure password storage, then consider placing the KeePass database inside of a hidden veracrypt. Having a password with an absurd amount of characters such as `dHK&*/4pk_!i??5R=^K}~FU!kxF{fG}*&>oMdRt([);7?=v(e^,ch_n)r()]:&k$D@f4#G"Y\v_5-*i$E[+)"bT*@BF+{hkvn7[B]{qq'[~]3@+-Ju6C(@<]=TEM6a\h$c+:W[k$=;Jy[Un7&~NtvK*{Bn` is enough to stunt any brute force attempt. Cryptographic security can only be as strong as the key being used.
|
||||
Consider offline variants of KeePass[^36] for secure password storage, then consider placing the KeePass database inside of a hidden veracrypt. Having a password with an absurd amount of characters such as `dHK&*/4pk_!i??5R=^K}~FU!kxF{fG}*&>oMdRt([);7?=v(e^,ch_n)r()]:&k$D@f4#G"Y\v_5-*i$E[+)"bT*@BF+{hkvn7[B]{qq'[~]3@+-Ju6C(@<]=TEM6a\h$c+:W[k$=;Jy[Un7&~NtvK*{Bn` is enough to stunt any brute force attempt. Cryptographic security can only be as strong as the key being used.
|
||||
|
||||
>Note:
|
||||
A 20-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 132.877 bits of security (compare to 128 bit symmetric encryption keys).
|
||||
|
|
@ -374,13 +374,13 @@ Every introduced system creates a larger fingerprint and attack vector, ultimate
|
|||
Depending on your threat model, not all operations can be conducted from a coffee shop. There are an increasing amount of cameras, and facial recognition technology is already being deployed, along with license plate scanners at every street light. If operations are sensitive and must be conducted from the same location consistently, preparation should always lean towards the worst-case scenario.
|
||||
While some of these proposed methods may be unconventional, these are unconventional times. Mechanisms can be put in place to ensure that your systems are sent shutdown signals that will lock them behind disk encryption. Shutdown signals are the most common, however we are not limited to the commands we issue. The use of radio transmitters to issue shutdowns have some level of intricacy that surpasses skills of the novice user.
|
||||
### Dead Man's Switch
|
||||
A physical wired dead man's switch reduces attack surface and intricacy. After the dead man's switch aka killswitch is configured, we can move on to the commands to issue. If we wanted to securely wipe the random access memory before shutting down, we could issue the "sdmem -v" command to verbosely clean the RAM as the killswitch is activated. The killswitch can be activated from a system event. Any form of shell command that is compatible with the particular GNU/Linux system can be ran based on a specified system behavior. See resources at the end of this section [^32], [^33], and [^34] for USB dead man's switch. In a nutshell, this is configured to watch system USB events. When a change occurs, the switch commands are invoked. Panic buttons are another form of a killswitch that essentially remains active on your display and is ready to select at any moment. (Centry.py[^35] is a good example of a panic button). There are USB devices known as "Mouse Jigglers" that are used by forensic teams after device seizure. These jigglers are serial devices plugged in to interface with the system to keep the screenlock from being invoked.
|
||||
There are easy preventative software-based solutions such as USBCTL[^36] that can prevent these devices for operating, however this will likely be picked up on and human mouse jigglers can take their place. Ideally a process can be utilized to detect such a device and invoke a shutdown process. A mitigation for the human mouse jigglers could be implementing forced authentication every half hour to an hour. If the credentials have not been entered, the user session could be terminated, memory could be cleared, or the shutdown command could even be invoked.
|
||||
A physical wired dead man's switch reduces attack surface and intricacy. After the dead man's switch aka killswitch is configured, we can move on to the commands to issue. If we wanted to securely wipe the random access memory before shutting down, we could issue the "sdmem -v" command to verbosely clean the RAM as the killswitch is activated. The killswitch can be activated from a system event. Any form of shell command that is compatible with the particular GNU/Linux system can be ran based on a specified system behavior. See resources at the end of this section [^37], [^38], and [^39] for USB dead man's switch. In a nutshell, this is configured to watch system USB events. When a change occurs, the switch commands are invoked. Panic buttons are another form of a killswitch that essentially remains active on your display and is ready to select at any moment. (Centry.py[^40] is a good example of a panic button). There are USB devices known as "Mouse Jigglers" that are used by forensic teams after device seizure. These jigglers are serial devices plugged in to interface with the system to keep the screenlock from being invoked.
|
||||
There are easy preventative software-based solutions such as USBCTL[^41] that can prevent these devices for operating, however this will likely be picked up on and human mouse jigglers can take their place. Ideally a process can be utilized to detect such a device and invoke a shutdown process. A mitigation for the human mouse jigglers could be implementing forced authentication every half hour to an hour. If the credentials have not been entered, the user session could be terminated, memory could be cleared, or the shutdown command could even be invoked.
|
||||
|
||||
Remote switches are interesting devils, and their utility should be placed under high consideration if the size of the operation warrants it. Panic buttons such as Centry.py can be used to broadcast or propagate a panic signal to all nodes on the network.
|
||||
|
||||
## Play on Resources
|
||||
Earlier, it was said that these groups have unlimited resources; this is not entirely true. The one resource which they lack is time. While they have infinite funds to allocate towards password and key cracking methods, so long as quantum physics strays behind computing, time is their main constraint. Taking methods from obscurity, the use of non-default encryption algorithms and hashing mechanisms for keys substantially increases the amount of time the analyst must expend on cracking. If the analyst cannot identify the hash function or cipher, they must try all possible options. Even if the correct password is obtained, this becomes useless without the proper cipher. For instance, Veracrypt uses over fifteen combinations of individual encryption algorithms and cascaded/stacked ciphers. Complement this with the five supported hash functions, and we are looking at 75 possible combinations of symmetric ciphers and one-way hash functions. As stated by ElcomSoft,[^37] "Trying all possible combinations is about 175 times slower compared to attacking a single combination of AES+SHA-512."
|
||||
Earlier, it was said that these groups have unlimited resources; this is not entirely true. The one resource which they lack is time. While they have infinite funds to allocate towards password and key cracking methods, so long as quantum physics strays behind computing, time is their main constraint. Taking methods from obscurity, the use of non-default encryption algorithms and hashing mechanisms for keys substantially increases the amount of time the analyst must expend on cracking. If the analyst cannot identify the hash function or cipher, they must try all possible options. Even if the correct password is obtained, this becomes useless without the proper cipher. For instance, Veracrypt uses over fifteen combinations of individual encryption algorithms and cascaded/stacked ciphers. Complement this with the five supported hash functions, and we are looking at 75 possible combinations of symmetric ciphers and one-way hash functions. As stated by ElcomSoft,[^42] "Trying all possible combinations is about 175 times slower compared to attacking a single combination of AES+SHA-512."
|
||||
Hypothetically, if the algorithm/hash combination is known by the attacker, here is where the cascading algorithms display their value:
|
||||
"Whether they choose to encrypt with AES, Serpent, Twofish or any other single algorithm, the speed of the attack will remain the same. Attacks on cascaded encryption with two algorithms (e.g. AES(Twofish)) work at half the speed, while cascading three algorithms slows them down to around 1/3 the speed."
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ When feasible, radio transmitters should be physically removed from devices. Fro
|
|||
For an adversary who gains a foothold on your system(s) without the physically removed hardware, they could activate certain frequencies to create a persistent foothold and compromise your system even further.
|
||||
For critical operations, reduce reliance on wireless radio transmissions. Consider the process of removing all radio transmitter chipsets, otherwise known as airgapping, to mitigate a medley of threats.
|
||||
|
||||
Methods of "jumping" airgaps have been found in the past.[^38] One must be sure to remove all hardware which could be used for communication. This includes Wi-Fi cards (often Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are within the same physical card), Bluetooth card (if you have a Bluetooth card separate from your Wi-Fi card), microphones (communications protocols have been devised to transmit data through ultrasonic audio). Many modern OSs still have the drivers to support these protocols, and the attacks surface therefore still exists), speakers (usable for data exfiltration using the same means), physical ports (USB, SD, headphone jack). Even power cords have been used as a means of compromise (on both laptop and desktop systems).
|
||||
Methods of "jumping" airgaps have been found in the past.[^43] One must be sure to remove all hardware which could be used for communication. This includes Wi-Fi cards (often Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are within the same physical card), Bluetooth card (if you have a Bluetooth card separate from your Wi-Fi card), microphones (communications protocols have been devised to transmit data through ultrasonic audio). Many modern OSs still have the drivers to support these protocols, and the attacks surface therefore still exists), speakers (usable for data exfiltration using the same means), physical ports (USB, SD, headphone jack). Even power cords have been used as a means of compromise (on both laptop and desktop systems).
|
||||
|
||||
The traditional methods of interfacing with the internet stand to be the most secure. Systems using direct ethernet connection is optimal. While this is not a technical "airgap," this does prevent packet communications from being analyzed over the air.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ Perhaps it's a side project of some sort, or some harmless hobby. If there is no
|
|||
|
||||
Regarding the creation of online accounts and personas, don't use identifiable names. Your operations should be treated as a second life that should be appropriately segmented. While you may find some of your ideas to be profound/esoteric and want to reuse and redistribute across platforms - refrain. You're only creating a trail that could come back to bite you. Not only should you segment your usernames creative talents, but ensure that projects also become segmented. The more you divulge into separate projects, the less connection you want to have - unless of course they are related and you desire the marketing crossover.
|
||||
|
||||
The physical use of your device, from pinging telecommunications infrastructure to local area network (LAN) connections will rat you out. Geofencing requests have gained increasing popularity with American law enforcement. Google self-reported, "Year over year, Google has observed over a 1,500% increase in the number of geofence requests it received in 2018 compared to 2017; and to date, the rate has increased over 500% from 2018 to 2019." [^39]
|
||||
The physical use of your device, from pinging telecommunications infrastructure to local area network (LAN) connections will rat you out. Geofencing requests have gained increasing popularity with American law enforcement. Google self-reported, "Year over year, Google has observed over a 1,500% increase in the number of geofence requests it received in 2018 compared to 2017; and to date, the rate has increased over 500% from 2018 to 2019."[^44]
|
||||
After the physical side is dealt with, the digital side can start to be addressed. Just like scripts can be implemented to increase efficiency, they can also be used to aid and/or create alibis.
|
||||
|
||||
Consider the creation of python scripts to engage your devices to perform certain functions. For instance, create a wordlist that your browser searches for on demand (with a hint of randomness). Program your music player to play certain songs at certain times. The goal of these actions is to emulate real activity that could provide that alibi for you.
|
||||
|
|
@ -462,14 +462,14 @@ Often times a double-edged pendulum comes to swing. If an investigator were to b
|
|||
|
||||
You will likely not come out unscathed from the psychological toll of withholding secrets. Not only do fabrications add unneeded complexity into your relationships by forcing you to drain energy keeping narratives intact, but they place you in a state of isolation from others. All tyranny stems from deceit, and your own psyche can stand to be a worse tyrant than the state. Make sure the endeavor is worth the burden.
|
||||
|
||||
"As we have seen, every personal secret has the effect of a sin or of guilt—whether or not it is, from the standpoint of popular morality, a wrongful secret. Now another form of concealment is the act of "withholding"—it being usually emotions that are withheld. As in the case of secrets, so here also we must make a reservation: self-restraint is healthful and beneficial; it is even a virtue. This is why we find self-discipline to have been one of man's earliest moral attainments. Among primitive peoples it has its place in the initiation ceremonies, chiefly in the forms of ascetic continence and the stoical endurance of pain and fear. Self-restraint, however, is here practised within the secret society as something undertaken in company with others. But if self-restraint is only a private matter, and perhaps devoid of any religious aspect, then it may be as harmful as the personal secret." - C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul[^40]
|
||||
"As we have seen, every personal secret has the effect of a sin or of guilt—whether or not it is, from the standpoint of popular morality, a wrongful secret. Now another form of concealment is the act of "withholding"—it being usually emotions that are withheld. As in the case of secrets, so here also we must make a reservation: self-restraint is healthful and beneficial; it is even a virtue. This is why we find self-discipline to have been one of man's earliest moral attainments. Among primitive peoples it has its place in the initiation ceremonies, chiefly in the forms of ascetic continence and the stoical endurance of pain and fear. Self-restraint, however, is here practised within the secret society as something undertaken in company with others. But if self-restraint is only a private matter, and perhaps devoid of any religious aspect, then it may be as harmful as the personal secret." - C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## False Compromise
|
||||
Malware with computing is still in the early stages. It truly is the wild west in many regards. For an extra layer of plausible deniabilty, embed a tailored backdoor or malware variant. This method will not protect you if there are logs that correlate your activity and no logs correlating connection attempts.
|
||||
The vast majority of cases related to online operations become unsolved mysteries in the archives of law enforcement. Most happenings become heresay or mere hunches. Take APT groups and nation-states as an example; the majority of cyberwarfare that occurs today is between state-funded APT groups with a primary focus of non-attribution. Despite how many correlating clues lead back to the APT groups and their communications with nation-states, the water remains murky. In replacement or in conjunction with the killswitch, consider weaponizing your own variant of ransomware. You could create a maintain ownership of the key or you could accept the loss of your data. The malware could also perform shred functions as with any script that you could program. Not only does the embedded malware render your data inaccessible, but it provides another level of plausible deniability. "I was not aware my infrastructure was being used for that." Technically, "malware" implies the application of code that will create adverse or undesired action to the system. This is not truly malware, but rather programmed code designed to mimic malicious function.
|
||||
|
||||
On GNU/Linux, there are many ways to embed malware on the system. Some of which leverage crontabs or other variants of scheduling tools. Aliases can be altered to perform malicious functions rather than the desired results. System process in `bin/` directories can perform unintended tasks, or simply be swapped out and/or linked to alternate processes. Some files such as `/etc/rc.local` or `/home/$USER/.bashrc` can contain commands to execute upon booting to the disk or logging into a user account respectively. Analyzing the newest trends of threat actors can useful to determine indicators of compromise (IOC). Kinsing[^41] and other threat actors that leverage new vulnerabilities to compromise internet-facing systems and embed cryptominers provide insight into the world of persistence, along with a competitive nature that stunts competition. The sub-sections listed below identify remnance that could indicate past compromise.
|
||||
On GNU/Linux, there are many ways to embed malware on the system. Some of which leverage crontabs or other variants of scheduling tools. Aliases can be altered to perform malicious functions rather than the desired results. System process in `bin/` directories can perform unintended tasks, or simply be swapped out and/or linked to alternate processes. Some files such as `/etc/rc.local` or `/home/$USER/.bashrc` can contain commands to execute upon booting to the disk or logging into a user account respectively. Analyzing the newest trends of threat actors can useful to determine indicators of compromise (IOC). Kinsing[^46] and other threat actors that leverage new vulnerabilities to compromise internet-facing systems and embed cryptominers provide insight into the world of persistence, along with a competitive nature that stunts competition. The sub-sections listed below identify remnance that could indicate past compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
### Cron example
|
||||
`echo "*/30 * * * * sh /etc/.newinit.sh >/dev/null 2>&1" > /etc/$crondir`
|
||||
|
|
@ -498,30 +498,30 @@ Zcash (ZEC) was ground-breaking in the implementation of a protocol known as Suc
|
|||
|
||||
Monero is often hailed as the privacy king of cryptocurrency. While it has commendable features with its RingCT protocol, the overarching theme is obscurity rather than traceless transactions.
|
||||
"The fundamental problem of coin mixing methods though is that transaction data is not being hidden through encryption. RingCT is a system of disassociation where information is still visible in the blockchain. Mind that a vulnerability might be discovered at some point in the future which allows traceability since Monero’s blockchain provides a record of every transaction that has taken place."
|
||||
This operates similar to a mixnet where it is difficult to discern the originating address from a transaction. One of Monero's developers publicly admits that "zk-SNARKs provides much stronger untraceability characteristics than Monero (but a much smaller privacyset and much higher systemic risks)." Intelligence agencies have placed their eyes on Monero for some time. The United States has even brought in a private firm called CipherTrace who claims to have built tools capable of tracing transactions.[^42] At the time of writing, these are unsubstantiated claims; there is no evidence to suggest that Monero has been deobfuscated.
|
||||
This operates similar to a mixnet where it is difficult to discern the originating address from a transaction. One of Monero's developers publicly admits that "zk-SNARKs provides much stronger untraceability characteristics than Monero (but a much smaller privacyset and much higher systemic risks)." Intelligence agencies have placed their eyes on Monero for some time. The United States has even brought in a private firm called CipherTrace who claims to have built tools capable of tracing transactions.[^47] At the time of writing, these are unsubstantiated claims; there is no evidence to suggest that Monero has been deobfuscated.
|
||||
|
||||
Pirate Chain's ARRR addresses the fungibility problem of Zcash by removing the transparent address schema (t-tx) and forcing all transactions to use Sapling shielded transactions (z-tx). "By consistently utilizing zk-SNARKs technology, Pirate leaves no usable metadata of user’s transactions on its blockchain." This means that even if the blockchain was compromised down the line, the adversary would obtain little to no useful metadata. The transactions contain no visible amount to no visible address from no visible address. The underlying cryptography would have to be broken or the viewing/spending keys would have to be intercepted in order to peer into the transactions. For an adversary without key possession, the trace is baseless. "A little bit of math can accomplish what all the guns and barbed wire can’t: a little bit of math can keep a secret." - Edward Snowden
|
||||
|
||||
While I could write mounds of literature diving into the depths of cryptocurrency, I have brought forth only what is useful to the aims of anti-forensics. There is no real purpose in regurgitating quotations from various whitepapers and protocol designs. Any further research into the matter is up to you. If this has peaked your interest, consider diving into the various communities, protocol specifications, and whitepapers.
|
||||
|
||||
- Further information pertaining to zk-SNARKs - [^43]
|
||||
- Monero (XMR) Whitepaper - [^44]
|
||||
- Pirate Chain Whitepaper - [^45]
|
||||
- Further information pertaining to zk-SNARKs - [^48]
|
||||
- Monero (XMR) Whitepaper - [^49]
|
||||
- Pirate Chain Whitepaper - [^50]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Defensive Mechanisms
|
||||
System security or hardening is vital for successful operations. Lack of hardening could result in your machines being cut through like hot butter. Center for Internet Security (CIS)[^46] and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) with Standard Technical Implementation Guides[^47] both have decent system hardening standards that are to be applied to all DoD contractor, government, and affiliated nodes. For Linux and Unix systems, Kernel Self-Protection Project (KSPP)[^48] is a great resource for kernel configuration settings.
|
||||
System security or hardening is vital for successful operations. Lack of hardening could result in your machines being cut through like hot butter. Center for Internet Security (CIS)[^51] and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) with Standard Technical Implementation Guides[^52] both have decent system hardening standards that are to be applied to all DoD contractor, government, and affiliated nodes. For Linux and Unix systems, Kernel Self-Protection Project (KSPP)[^53] is a great resource for kernel configuration settings.
|
||||
Hardening procedures fall in line with the concept of minimizing architecture and running processes on a system. This makes each system easier to audit with less noise/clutter, and reduces the attack surface for exploitation. Hardening should encompass patches, scans with most recent virus definitions, restrictive permissions, kernel hardening, purging unnecessary software, and disabling physical ports, unnecessary users, filesystems, firmware modules, compilers, and network protocols.
|
||||
System hardening is far from a quick and easy process, unless you have preconfigured images for systems. For small operations lacking technical prowess, preconfigured operating systems such as TAILS or Whonix mentioned in the Operating System section assure the greatest security and the least hassle.
|
||||
If the goal is to run a more persistent lightweight OS with minimal functionality, I suggest running a variant of Arch Linux that does not use SystemD (Consider runit, OpenRC, or s6). If wide community support is needed, Arch with a hardened configuration will be your best bet. For the tech-savvy, hardened variants of Gentoo are ideal.
|
||||
The more persistence desired for the operation increases the complexity of the hardening. Some projects have been introduced to rival Xen-based hypervisors with minimalist GNU/Linux systems. Some development towards Whonix Host[^49] was started but has not yet come to fruition. PlagueOS[^50] is based on the Void musl build with numerous hardening mechanisms. This is designed to act strictly as a locked down hypervisor with all system activities conducted inside of Kicksecure/Whonix VMs. The VMs also are restricted by AppArmor profiles and are ran inside a `bwrap`[^51] sandboxed container. See the PARSEC repository for examples of how to implement bubblewrap profiles.[^52]. Do note that the listed hardening is incomplete and will not fit all operations and GNU/Linux systems. This is not meant to be a book on methods for defensive cybersecurity. For those concerned with exploitation of GNU/Linux systems, see the reference to Madaidan's hardening guide.[^53]
|
||||
The more persistence desired for the operation increases the complexity of the hardening. Some projects have been introduced to rival Xen-based hypervisors with minimalist GNU/Linux systems. Some development towards Whonix Host[^54] was started but has not yet come to fruition. PlagueOS[^55] is based on the Void musl build with numerous hardening mechanisms. This is designed to act strictly as a locked down hypervisor with all system activities conducted inside of Kicksecure/Whonix VMs. The VMs also are restricted by AppArmor profiles and are ran inside a `bwrap`[^56] sandboxed container. See the PARSEC repository for examples of how to implement bubblewrap profiles.[^57]. Do note that the listed hardening is incomplete and will not fit all operations and GNU/Linux systems. This is not meant to be a book on methods for defensive cybersecurity. For those concerned with exploitation of GNU/Linux systems, see the reference to Madaidan's hardening guide.[^58]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Physical Precautions
|
||||
|
||||
This wouldn't be a complete work on anti-forensics without some mention of physical precautions. While wireless transmitters are ill-advised, wireless technology can prove useful when larger proximity is needed. Directional antennas could allow you to stay hidden from cameras and remotely authenticate to a network.
|
||||
|
||||
With nuances added from the modern surveillance state, traffic cameras force your hand by revealing every intersection which you have passed through. There are a few methods to circumventing this privacy infringement. Darkened weather covers for your license plate (Warning: This method could result in a fine with the wrong officer) or a well-rigged bicycle rack could prevent cameras from picking up your plate number. Alternatively, if a destination is within a few miles of proximity you could either ride a bicycle (with a disguise), or decide to become a motorcyclist. With motocycles, the plate numbers are significantly smaller and could even be blocked by your feet on certain bikes. The helmet would stand to mask facial features, and the jacket would cover any identifiable features such as tattoos. Palantir has been involved in "predictive policing" leveraging footage obtained from traffic cameras to profile individuals.[^53]
|
||||
With nuances added from the modern surveillance state, traffic cameras force your hand by revealing every intersection which you have passed through. There are a few methods to circumventing this privacy infringement. Darkened weather covers for your license plate (Warning: This method could result in a fine with the wrong officer) or a well-rigged bicycle rack could prevent cameras from picking up your plate number. Alternatively, if a destination is within a few miles of proximity you could either ride a bicycle (with a disguise), or decide to become a motorcyclist. With motocycles, the plate numbers are significantly smaller and could even be blocked by your feet on certain bikes. The helmet would stand to mask facial features, and the jacket would cover any identifiable features such as tattoos. Palantir has been involved in "predictive policing" leveraging footage obtained from traffic cameras to profile individuals.[^59]
|
||||
|
||||
It should go without saying that any tech devices that you purchase will have some identifier that could lead back to you. Make this a moot point and procure every device (even USBs) anonymously with cash. If you're out on a distant roadtrip, make some of your purchases. Wear a hat accompanied with some baggy clothes. Perform a slight change in your gait as you walk (uncomfortable shoes could help with this). Alternatively, pay that bum off the street to do your bidding.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -549,13 +549,13 @@ It's evident that poking powerful players could result in irreversable consequen
|
|||
|
||||
The OS selection should be oriented towards amnesia. TAILS could be leveraged with a USB, and the drive in the system could simply be a dummy (filled with insignificant data, vacation pictures, etc). The physical wireless chipset should be removed and replaced with a wireless dongle and attached only when needed. While I prefer hardware mitigations over software mitigations, you may not wish to fry the USB ports or desolder the SATA ports. The BIOS should be password-protected, and the USB ports at the very least can be disabled from the menu. If you will be operating from public locations, consider running a blank keyboard with a privacy screen covering the LED.
|
||||
|
||||
Fortunately, amnesiac solutions are growing. One can run TAILS with the HiddenVM project.[^55] HiddenVM is precompiled VirtualBox binaries to allow running virtual machines without an installation directly on TAILS. HiddenVM leverages the TAILS amnesiac system with Veracrypt's hidden partitions for plausible deniability. In this way, Whonix can be ran from TAILs and there will not be an overlapping use of TOR.
|
||||
Fortunately, amnesiac solutions are growing. One can run TAILS with the HiddenVM project.[^60] HiddenVM is precompiled VirtualBox binaries to allow running virtual machines without an installation directly on TAILS. HiddenVM leverages the TAILS amnesiac system with Veracrypt's hidden partitions for plausible deniability. In this way, Whonix can be ran from TAILs and there will not be an overlapping use of TOR.
|
||||
|
||||
If a live USB with minimal processing power is not your niche, consider running a hardened base Linux, preferably using a Windows Manager (WM) over a full Desktop Environment (DE), to act as a hyper-visor that runs amnesiac virtual machines such as Whonix. If the option is taken to avoid live boot, the hardware selection becomes more important. First off, it would be in your best interest to use at least 16 GB of RAM. Secondly, consider using one SSD and one HDD. The HDD will be used to hold files, while the SSD is used for facilitating performance for the host OS. As previously stated, HDDs can be wiped by degaussing or overwriting physical sectors while this should be assumed an impossibility for an SSD. Each VM on the host should have a primary function; separate cases and even processes should have separate VMs. For the more technical, sandboxing applications can be used to add nested layers of security. Consider using a sandboxed profile[^51] for your virtualization software, whether it be KVM[^56] or VirtualBox[^57]. Inside the VM, use sandboxing to isolate your processes.
|
||||
If a live USB with minimal processing power is not your niche, consider running a hardened base Linux, preferably using a Windows Manager (WM) over a full Desktop Environment (DE), to act as a hyper-visor that runs amnesiac virtual machines such as Whonix. If the option is taken to avoid live boot, the hardware selection becomes more important. First off, it would be in your best interest to use at least 16 GB of RAM. Secondly, consider using one SSD and one HDD. The HDD will be used to hold files, while the SSD is used for facilitating performance for the host OS. As previously stated, HDDs can be wiped by degaussing or overwriting physical sectors while this should be assumed an impossibility for an SSD. Each VM on the host should have a primary function; separate cases and even processes should have separate VMs. For the more technical, sandboxing applications can be used to add nested layers of security. Consider using a sandboxed profile[^56] for your virtualization software, whether it be KVM[^61] or VirtualBox[^62]. Inside the VM, use sandboxing to isolate your processes.
|
||||
|
||||
>Note: Amnesiac computing is highly advised for journalists with state targets on their back. Most malware will not be able to persist through different sessions, and often they will have to interact with hostile platforms and networks.
|
||||
|
||||
If a mobile device is deemed a necessity, leverage GrapheneOS on a Google Pixel. Encrypt all communications through trusted services or peer-to-peer (P2P) applications like Briar.[^58] Route all device traffic through TOR with the use of Orbot. Keep the cameras blacked out with electrical or gorilla tape. The concept of treating all signals as hostile should be emphasized here as the hardware wireless chipset cannot be desoldered. Sensors and microphones can successfully be disabled, but the trend with smaller devices is that they run as a System on a Chip (SoC). In short, multiple functions necessary for the system to work are tied together in a single chip. Even if you managed not to fry the device from the desoldering process, you would have gutted the core mechanisms of the system, resulting in the newfound possession of a paperweight.
|
||||
If a mobile device is deemed a necessity, leverage GrapheneOS on a Google Pixel. Encrypt all communications through trusted services or peer-to-peer (P2P) applications like Briar.[^63] Route all device traffic through TOR with the use of Orbot. Keep the cameras blacked out with electrical or gorilla tape. The concept of treating all signals as hostile should be emphasized here as the hardware wireless chipset cannot be desoldered. Sensors and microphones can successfully be disabled, but the trend with smaller devices is that they run as a System on a Chip (SoC). In short, multiple functions necessary for the system to work are tied together in a single chip. Even if you managed not to fry the device from the desoldering process, you would have gutted the core mechanisms of the system, resulting in the newfound possession of a paperweight.
|
||||
|
||||
### Market Vendor
|
||||
Let's assume the vendor is selling some sort of vice found on the DEA's list of schedule 1 narcotics. Fortunately in this use-case, unlike that of the anonymous activist (or the journalist in some cases), OPSEC is welcomed with open arms. In fact, vendors are even rated with their stealth (both from shipping and processing) as one of the highest criteria in consideration, along with the markets being TOR friendly, leveraging PGP, and ensuring full functionality without Javascript. Given the ongoing nature of these operations, and that they are tailored towards privacy and security, a more persistent system will likely be the best fit.
|
||||
|
|
@ -695,50 +695,54 @@ Donations to support projects under https://git.envs.net/WhichDoc are welcome wi
|
|||
[^11]: GrapheneOS - https://grapheneos.org
|
||||
[^12]: Pine64 Pinephone - https://www.pine64.org/pinephone/
|
||||
[^13]: Purism Librem 5 - https://puri.sm/products/librem-5/
|
||||
[^12]: OSI Model - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model
|
||||
[^13]: ProtonVPN threat model - https://protonvpn.com/blog/threat-model/
|
||||
[^14]: Whonix VPN leakage - https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Connecting_to_Tor_before_a_VPN
|
||||
[^15]: Tails VPN article - https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/vpn_support
|
||||
[^16]: I2P - https://geti2p.net/en/
|
||||
[^17]: Orbot - https://guardianproject.info/apps/org.torproject.android/
|
||||
[^18]: Whonix leak protection - https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection
|
||||
[^19]: Ungoogled Chromium binaries - https://ungoogled-software.github.io/ungoogled-chromium-binaries/
|
||||
[^20]: Bromite Browser - https://www.bromite.org
|
||||
[^21]: Brave Browser - https://brave.com
|
||||
[^22]: The Hitchhikers Guide to Anonymity (Browser Hardening) - https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#appendix-v1-hardening-your-browsers
|
||||
[^23]: DuckDuckGo - https://duckduckgo.com
|
||||
[^24]: Searx instances - https://searx.space/
|
||||
[^25]: TAILS - https://tails.boum.org
|
||||
[^26]: Singh, S. (1999). The code book: the secret history of codes and codebreaking (Vol. 366). London: Fourth Estate.
|
||||
[^27]: Linux Entropy - https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#entropy
|
||||
[^28]: GNU Privacy Assistant - gnupg.org/related_software/gpa/index.html
|
||||
[^29]: Minisign - https://github.com/jedisct1/minisign/
|
||||
[^30]: Veracrypt - https://www.veracrypt.fr/code/VeraCrypt/
|
||||
[^31]: KeepassXC - https://keepassxc.org
|
||||
[^32]: USB dead man's switch - https://tech.michaelaltfield.net/2020/01/02/buskill-laptop-kill-cord-dead-man-switch/
|
||||
[^33]: USBKill - https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill/blob/master/usbkill/usbkill.py
|
||||
[^34]: Silk Guardian - https://github.com/NateBrune/silk-guardian
|
||||
[^35]: Centry Panic Button - https://github.com/AnonymousPlanet/Centry
|
||||
[^36]: USBCTL - https://github.com/anthraxx/usbctl
|
||||
[^37]: Elcomsoft Forensics - https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2020/03/breaking-veracrypt-containers/
|
||||
[^38]: Jumping Airgaps - https://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.06884.pdf
|
||||
[^39]: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6747427/2.pdf
|
||||
[^40]: Jung, C. G. (2014). Modern man in search of a soul. Routledge.
|
||||
[^41]: https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability
|
||||
[^42]: CipherTrace - https://ciphertrace.com/ciphertrace-announces-worlds-first-monero-tracing-capabilities/
|
||||
[^43]: ZkSnarks - https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks
|
||||
[^44]: Monero Whitepaper - https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf
|
||||
[^45]: Pirate Chain Whitepaper - https://pirate.black/files/whitepaper/The_Pirate_Code_V2.0.pdf
|
||||
[^46]: CIS - https://www.cisecurity.org
|
||||
[^47]: DISA STIGs - https://public.cyber.mil/stigs
|
||||
[^48]: KSPP - https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings
|
||||
[^49]: Whonix Host - https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Whonix-Host
|
||||
[^50]: PlagueOS- https://git.envs.net/whichdoc/plagueos
|
||||
[^51]: BubbleWrap Sandbox - https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap
|
||||
[^52]: SalamanderSecurity's PARSEC repository - https://codeberg.org/SalamanderSecurity/PARSEC
|
||||
[^53]: Linux Hardening - https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html
|
||||
[^54]: FOIA request for Palantir operations -https://www.documentcloud.org/search/projectid:51061-Palantir-September-2020
|
||||
[^55]: HiddenVM - https://github.com/aforensics/HiddenVM
|
||||
[^56]: KVM - https://www.linux-kvm.org/
|
||||
[^57]: Oracle VirtualBox - https://virtualbox.org
|
||||
[^58]: Briar P2P Messenger - https://briarproject.org
|
||||
[^14]: Cover your track on UNIX systems - https://github.com/sundowndev/covermyass
|
||||
[^15]: OSI Model - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model
|
||||
[^16]: ProtonVPN threat model - https://protonvpn.com/blog/threat-model/
|
||||
[^17]: Whonix VPN leakage - https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Connecting_to_Tor_before_a_VPN
|
||||
[^18]: Tails VPN article - https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/vpn_support
|
||||
[^19]: I2P - https://geti2p.net/en/
|
||||
[^20]: URLScan of anom[.]io - https://urlscan.io/result/f7b4c5ae-3864-4b3f-be0e-ad10e39276bc/#summary
|
||||
[^21]: Orbot - https://guardianproject.info/apps/org.torproject.android/
|
||||
[^22]: Whonix leak protection - https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection
|
||||
[^23]: Ungoogled Chromium binaries - https://ungoogled-software.github.io/ungoogled-chromium-binaries/
|
||||
[^24]: Bromite Browser - https://www.bromite.org
|
||||
[^25]: Brave Browser - https://brave.com
|
||||
[^26]: The Hitchhikers Guide to Anonymity (Browser Hardening) - https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#appendix-v1-hardening-your-browsers
|
||||
[^27]: DuckDuckGo - https://duckduckgo.com
|
||||
[^28]: Searx instances - https://searx.space/
|
||||
[^29]: TAILS - https://tails.boum.org
|
||||
[^30]: Drive Destruction - https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#how-to-securely-wipe-your-whole-laptopdrives-if-you-want-to-erase-everything
|
||||
[^31]: Singh, S. (1999). The code book: the secret history of codes and codebreaking (Vol. 366). London: Fourth Estate.
|
||||
[^32]: Linux Entropy - https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#entropy
|
||||
[^33]: GNU Privacy Assistant - gnupg.org/related_software/gpa/index.html
|
||||
[^34]: Minisign - https://github.com/jedisct1/minisign/
|
||||
[^35]: Veracrypt - https://www.veracrypt.fr/code/VeraCrypt/
|
||||
[^36]: KeepassXC - https://keepassxc.org
|
||||
[^37]: USB dead man's switch - https://tech.michaelaltfield.net/2020/01/02/buskill-laptop-kill-cord-dead-man-switch/
|
||||
[^38]: USBKill - https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill/blob/master/usbkill/usbkill.py
|
||||
[^39]: Silk Guardian - https://github.com/NateBrune/silk-guardian
|
||||
[^40]: Centry Panic Button - https://github.com/AnonymousPlanet/Centry
|
||||
[^41]: USBCTL - https://github.com/anthraxx/usbctl
|
||||
[^42]: Elcomsoft Forensics - https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2020/03/breaking-veracrypt-containers/
|
||||
[^43]: Jumping Airgaps - https://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.06884.pdf
|
||||
[^44]: Geofence Requests - https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6747427/2.pdf
|
||||
[^45]: Jung, C. G. (2014). Modern man in search of a soul. Routledge.
|
||||
[^46]: Kinsing Crypto-Miner - https://blog.aquasec.com/threat-alert-kinsing-malware-container-vulnerability
|
||||
[^47]: CipherTrace - https://ciphertrace.com/ciphertrace-announces-worlds-first-monero-tracing-capabilities/
|
||||
[^48]: ZkSnarks - https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks
|
||||
[^49]: Monero Whitepaper - https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf
|
||||
[^50]: Pirate Chain Whitepaper - https://pirate.black/files/whitepaper/The_Pirate_Code_V2.0.pdf
|
||||
|
||||
[^51]: CIS - https://www.cisecurity.org
|
||||
[^52]: DISA STIGs - https://public.cyber.mil/stigs
|
||||
[^53]: KSPP - https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings
|
||||
[^54]: Whonix Host - https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Whonix-Host
|
||||
[^55]: PlagueOS- https://git.envs.net/whichdoc/plagueos
|
||||
[^56]: BubbleWrap Sandbox - https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap
|
||||
[^57]: SalamanderSecurity's PARSEC repository - https://codeberg.org/SalamanderSecurity/PARSEC
|
||||
[^58]: Linux Hardening - https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html
|
||||
[^59]: FOIA request for Palantir operations -https://www.documentcloud.org/search/projectid:51061-Palantir-September-2020
|
||||
[^60]: HiddenVM - https://github.com/aforensics/HiddenVM
|
||||
[^61]: KVM - https://www.linux-kvm.org/
|
||||
[^62]: Oracle VirtualBox - https://virtualbox.org
|
||||
[^63]: Briar P2P Messenger - https://briarproject.org
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue