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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Into the Crypt: The Art of Anti-Forensics
---- TOC ----
---- Begin TOC ----
- [Introduction](#introduction)
- [Philosophy](#philosophy)
- [Hardware Selection](#hardware-selection)
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
- [Browsing](#browsing)
- [Browser Configuration](#browser-configuration)
- [Search Engine](#search-engine)
- [Live media alternatives](#)
- [Live media alternatives](#live-media-alternatives)
- [Physical Destruction](#physical-destruction)
- [Cryptography](#cryptography)
- [Randomness](#randomness)
@ -34,13 +34,14 @@
- [False Compromise](#false-compromise)
- [Traceless Procurement](#traceless-procurement)
- [Cryptocurrency](#cryptocurrency)
- [Account Security](#)
- [Account Security](#account-security)
- [Defensive Mechanisms](#defensive-mechanisms)
- [Offline Password Managers](#offline-password-managers)
- [Physical Precautions](#physical-precautions)
- [Use Cases](#use-cases)
- [Conclusion](#conclusion)
- [References](#references)
---- End TOC ----
## Introduction
The digital age has ushered in a dystopia, at least for those unwilling to circumvent or stretch the bounds of the law. There is a significant gap in literature in regards to circumvention, largely due to this being an underground activity. It is pseudo-illegal; authors would be afraid that creations today will come back to haunt them. Exposing anti-forensic procedures will erode some of their operational security (OPSEC) in the process. This being said, not all of my tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) will be sand-grain granular. However, I hope the ideas described can be applied to help disguise yourself in the sandswept dunes.
@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ There is now a concerted effort with the primary goal as follows: control the fl
From a technological standpoint, they will redirect internet traffic and inject malware into your devices as disclosed from the Snowden revelations (e.g. NSA's TURMOIL program). Not only will they create passive attack mechanisms against you, they have extensive disinformation and suppression campaigns. They control the flow of information in a multitude of ways. "Private" (I say this loosely) contractors will collaboratively process censor requests on behalf of governmental institutions. Platforms will unilaterally censor dissident journalists and news outlets across various platforms. These cases are difficult to record as the vast majority are not conducted in the light of day. Even in this new age of technological censorship of anything that does not cater to the system's narrative, the activity falls behind a veil of private companies acting on ambiguous "policy" violations.
While I have primarily focused on examples solely with the tech-industry, financial blockades are also leveraged to censor and snuff out organizations. Wikileaks was perhaps the first example of the integrated power dynamic with both the tech and financial industry alike. They lay out an excellent chronology of the events on their site, but the summary is that their servers being hosted by AWS were pulled, Apple removed their application from the App Store with Paypal, and a financial blockade was set in place between VISA, Mastercard, Bank of America, and Western Union. Bank of America commissioned proposals for a systematic attack against their computer systems with firms of the intelligence community such as Palantir, Berico, and HBGary. Palo Alto, the parent company of Palantir, even came out publicly to apologize and severed all relations with HBGary. [#](https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/02/11/palantir-apologizes-for-wikileaks-attack-proposal-cuts-ties-with-hbgary/) It seems this set the stage as they were the test run.
While I have primarily focused on examples solely with the tech-industry, financial blockades are also leveraged to censor and snuff out organizations. Wikileaks was perhaps the first example of the integrated power dynamic with both the tech and financial industry alike. They lay out an excellent chronology of the events on their site, but the summary is that their servers being hosted by AWS were pulled, Apple removed their application from the App Store with Paypal, and a financial blockade was set in place between VISA, Mastercard, Bank of America, and Western Union. Bank of America commissioned proposals for a systematic attack against their computer systems with firms of the intelligence community such as Palantir, Berico, and HBGary. Palo Alto, the parent company of Palantir, even came out publicly to apologize and severed all relations with HBGary.[^1] It seems this set the stage as they were the test run.
More systematic censorship was witnessed in mid 2018 where sites and individuals such as InfoWars, RTNews journalists, and many more were banned without reason from Youtube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Disqus, Flickr, Vimeo, Tumblr, Paypal. They will control Domain Name Service (DNS) records from the main root servers. They will have search engines such as Google blacklist the DNS resolution for websites. An example of this occurred in early February, 2019 where CodeIsFreeSpeech.com was hidden from public domain. The government's relationship with tech-industry oligarchs have become even more apparent in early January, 2021 where the President of the United States (POTUS) was silenced. The platform Parlor, while insecurely coded, offered a censorship resistant platform (by policy). Not only will Google/Apple remove access to platforms such as these, but even those hosting web services (predominantly Amazon and Digital Ocean) can and will pull the plug to shutdown the platforms. Most occurences come from recollection as there is no journal detailing the cases of censorship at large; my recollection is largely incomplete. This being said, we have collectively facilitated their bulk data collection, aggregation, surveillance, and censorship to where it is mere child's play.
@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ This section has been prioritized as hardware is at the core of your operations.
Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions in the realm of hardware. There are many rabbit holes one can take in regards to the avoidance of negative ring architecture (layers below the operating system), selecting processors that gut/avoid the use of MinixOS and Intel's management engine (ME), inherent vulnerabilities to the processor, chipsets that require proprietary blobs, and ultimately procuring hardware that isn't subject to side-loading attacks (this can weaken device encryption).
Central processing units (CPU) have a narrowed list of options. For the vast majority of desktops and laptops, the competitors are Intel and AMD. Both of these CPUs have the potential for root level backdoors that are undetectable by your OS. Some privacy-oriented organizations, such as Purism and System76, claim to neutralize Intel's ME. If you are going to select a system with an Intel CPU and detest this critical design, you are limited to a few options. You can shill out the money to System76 (disables ME) and Purism (neutralizes ME by gutting critical components), or you can flash the computer's motherboard with a Raspberry Pi by running the me_cleaner program (if supported processor/architecture) and installing coreboot in replace of the BIOS[#](https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner). The novice runs the risk of ruining their device, coupled with the fact that the setup was likely completed for legacy hardware that has unpatched vulnerabilities. This process is not a trivial task and will cause headaches for those who simply want the system to work. If you are not willing to shill out the money to one of these organizations that disables the ME and are not technologically savvy, consider using a CPU by AMD while noting that this is far from a silver bullet.
Central processing units (CPU) have a narrowed list of options. For the vast majority of desktops and laptops, the competitors are Intel and AMD. Both of these CPUs have the potential for root level backdoors that are undetectable by your OS. Some privacy-oriented organizations, such as Purism and System76, claim to neutralize Intel's ME (See Purism's technical write-up [^2]. If you are going to select a system with an Intel CPU and detest this critical design, you are limited to a few options. You can shill out the money to System76 (disables ME) and Purism (neutralizes ME by gutting critical components), or you can flash the computer's motherboard with a Raspberry Pi by running the me_cleaner program[^3] (if supported processor/architecture) and installing coreboot[^4] in replace of the BIOS. The novice runs the risk of ruining their device, coupled with the fact that the setup was likely completed for legacy hardware that has unpatched vulnerabilities. This process is not a trivial task and will cause headaches for those who simply want the system to work. If you are not willing to shill out the money to one of these organizations that disables the ME and are not technologically savvy, consider using a CPU by AMD while noting that this is far from a silver bullet.
Taking a step back from the two CPU monoliths, Broadcom provides CPUs for smaller devices such as Raspberry Pis
##### Lots to add with broadcomm
@ -84,20 +85,20 @@ Taking a step back from the two CPU monoliths, Broadcom provides CPUs for smalle
Researching the right operating system (OS) for your specific operation can be a monstrous task. If Operations Security (OPSEC) is of utmost importance, then operating systems that generate excess logs and call home with telemetry and error reporting should be ruled out.
For desktop, this process eliminates Windows, Mac, and ChromiumOS/CloudReady from the race. While there are significant attempts at undermining Windows telemetry, this requires a substantial amount of effort that is bound to corrupt processes and retain the bloat from disabled software.
Note: Solutions with Windows 10 aren't necessarily the anti-thesis to anti-forensics. These systems are extremly bloated and can pursue the same aims. Windows provides many areas to hide files amongst the system. Windows systems can also be an overload to inexperienced investigators with the caches, shellbags, shortcut files, monolithic registry hives, and a myriad of way to set persistence mechanisms. This could force investigators to expend more time in the investigation. The reason it is avoided in this book is due to the proprietary blobs, bloatware, legacy protocols (which will continue to render it vulnerable to exploitation), and excess telemetry. In good faith, one could not claim to provide secure cryptography on a system that was designed for the aims of counterinsurgency.
Note: Solutions with Windows 10 aren't necessarily the anti-thesis to anti-forensics. These systems are extremly bloated and can pursue the same aims. Windows provides many areas to hide files amongst the system. Windows systems can also be an overload to inexperienced investigators with the caches, shellbags, shortcut files, monolithic registry hives, and a myriad of way to set persistence mechanisms. This could force investigators to expend more time in the investigation. The reason it is avoided in this book is due to the proprietary blobs, bloatware, legacy protocols (which will continue to render it vulnerable to exploitation), and excess telemetry. In good faith, one could not claim to provide secure cryptography on a system that was designed for the aims of counterinsurgency.
GNU/Linux is the only operating system baseline that will not phone home and create excess logs locally. Even after making such a decision, there are hundreds of derivatives to sift through. At the time of writing, the only anti-forensic friendly distributions designed to reduce the creation and storage of artifacts are Qubes, TAILS, and Whonix. However, any OS lacking telemetry with properly implemented full-disk encryption (FDE) and physical security is sufficient for the job of anti-forensics. If more persistence is desired while keeping distribution size minimal, hardened variants of Arch, Void, Gentoo, or Alpine are advised.
One more factor to consider for the OS selection is the service manager being used. There are plenty of security enthusiasts who justifiably denounce the use of the SystemD service manager (used to spawn processes like networking, scheduled tasks, logging, etc). There are a variety of service managers that have less bloat and a more simple codebase - OpenRC, runit, etc. The fact that most of these OSs are open-source results in the problem of funding. A side-project that has peaked a developer's interest often go long durations (if not permanantly) without any efforts to maintain/patch. The best OS alternatives without systemD at the time of writing include Artix (Arch variant), Void Linux (Debian Variant), and Alpine Linux.
One more factor to consider for the OS selection is the service manager being used. There are plenty of security enthusiasts who justifiably denounce the use of the SystemD service manager (used to spawn processes like networking, scheduled tasks, logging, etc). There are a variety of service managers that have less bloat and a more simple codebase - OpenRC, runit, etc. The fact that most of these OSs are open-source results in the problem of funding. A side-project that has peaked a developer's interest often go long durations (if not permanantly) without any efforts to maintain/patch. The best OS alternatives without systemD at the time of writing include Artix (Arch variant)[^5], Void Linux (Debian Variant)[^6], and Alpine Linux.[^7]
note: Ideally, an operating system running a microkernel (minimal core) such as seL4 could be in the running. These alternatives are still too early to advise with little community support.
Note: Ideally, an operating system running a microkernel (minimal core) such as seL4 could be in the running. These alternatives are still too early to advise with little community support.
For mobile devices, options are extraordinarily limited. Phones are designed to constantly ping telecommunications infrastructure and receive incoming packets by design. The core purpose is to be reached. Google, Apple, and other players in the telecommunications industry have taken this to an intrusive extent. Android stock phones home an average of 90 times per hour. Apple accounts for at least 18 times per hour [1](https://www.statista.com/chart/15207/smartphone-data-collection-by-google-and-apple/). Both operating systems do not operate in an anti-forensically sound manner. It seems that the only remaining options are to disable all sync capabilities on iPhone, or flash an open-source operating system to an Android.
For mobile devices, options are extraordinarily limited. Phones are designed to constantly ping telecommunications infrastructure and receive incoming packets by design. The core purpose is to be reached. Google, Apple, and other players in the telecommunications industry have taken this to an intrusive extent. Android stock phones home an average of 90 times per hour. Apple accounts for at least 18 times per hour.[^8] Both operating systems do not operate in an anti-forensically sound manner. It seems that the only remaining options are to disable all sync capabilities on iPhone, or flash an open-source operating system to an Android.
For Android, the best operating system to date is GrapheneOS. [#](https://grapheneos.org). This operating system can only be flashed to Google Pixel variants. This is a security-centric OS that accounts for many hardening mechanisms from software to hardware. GrapheneOS encrypts the entire device using block-level encryption, unlike most Android versions which use file-level encryption. If physical forensics of the handset is an issue, GrapheneOS is the best solution.
For Android, the best operating system to date is GrapheneOS.[^9] This operating system can only be flashed to Google Pixel variants. This is a security-centric OS that accounts for many hardening mechanisms from software to hardware. GrapheneOS encrypts the entire device using block-level encryption, unlike most Android versions which use file-level encryption. If physical forensics of the handset is an issue, GrapheneOS is the best solution.
GNU/Linux based phones, such as Pine64's Pine Phone or Purism's Librem 5, are now hitting the market. These devices are inherently insecure in early conception. One could consider these devices private but not secure. If an injection could reach the device, then all privacy is lost.
GNU/Linux based phones, such as Pine64's Pine Phone[^10] or Purism's Librem 5[^11], are now hitting the market. These devices are inherently insecure in early conception. One could consider these devices private but not secure. If an injection could reach the device, then all privacy is lost.
## Disable Logging
Disable logging at the source is the best solution to ensure excess logs are not being stored. Daemons or processes can automate the process of log collection. This has its useful functions for both debugging and security (auditing), however it is detrimental to the idea of information retention.
@ -108,12 +109,10 @@ systemctl disable rsyslog.service
systemctl disable systemd-journald.service
```
Note: These commands will not work on systems running lightweight service managers such as OpenRC.
Note: These commands will not work on systems running lightweight service managers such as OpenRC, runit, or S6.
While it is wise to reduce your logging footprint locally on your device, full disk encryption (FDE) is a sufficient anti-forensic mitigation for logging. If the attacker obtains access to your device as it is running (either physical or remote via a security compromise), logging is most likely the least of your concerns.
##### Include information about filesystem journaling
## Traffic Manipulation
### Packet Filter
While physical forensics is a primary concern of investigations, network forensics can provide fruit-bearing evidence to investigators. Therefore it is vital to restrict and regulate what traffic is passed on.
@ -129,11 +128,11 @@ If you are more concerned with a traffic leakage, leak prevention of traffic (me
As it stands today, there are three avenues for anonymization and encryption of internet packets: VPN, TOR, and Mixnets.
Each avenue possesses pitfalls. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) can provide privacy from the local internet service providers (ISP). Internet traffic will be encrypted based on designated configurations and protocols. OpenVPN is subject to various attacks.
Wireguard is currently the most secure. Unfortunately, it has faced little scrutiny. Often security defects are uncovered with the right amount of time. Disregarding its adolescence, the Wireguard protocol has been formally verified. Also, the reduced complexity of the protocol makes it easier to properly implement than OpenVPN. Easier implementation reduces room for error that could lead to compromise. The primary issue with VPNs today lies with the inherent trust given to the provider. If you decide a VPN is desired for your operation(s), you should be searching for a provider that has strict privacy laws, a no logging policy, and jurisdiction being outside of the known growing number of eyes (collaborative government intelligence community). This intelligence community went from 5 eyes to 9 eyes to 14 eyes. I suspect the number will continue its pattern of growth as discussed in the Philosophy section of the book. VPNs are rarely suitable against powerful (government or corporate) attackers; VPNs cannot grant anonymity. [#](https://protonvpn.com/blog/threat-model/)
Wireguard is currently the most secure. Unfortunately, it has faced little scrutiny. Often security defects are uncovered with the right amount of time. Disregarding its adolescence, the Wireguard protocol has been formally verified. Also, the reduced complexity of the protocol makes it easier to properly implement than OpenVPN. Easier implementation reduces room for error that could lead to compromise. The primary issue with VPNs today lies with the inherent trust given to the provider. If you decide a VPN is desired for your operation(s), you should be searching for a provider that has strict privacy laws, a no logging policy, and jurisdiction being outside of the known growing number of eyes (collaborative government intelligence community). This intelligence community went from 5 eyes to 9 eyes to 14 eyes. I suspect the number will continue its pattern of growth as discussed in the Philosophy section of the book. VPNs are rarely suitable against powerful (government or corporate) attackers; VPNs cannot grant anonymity. [^12]
The Onion Router (TOR) has faced the most scrutiny of all protocols and provides the most anonymity. While facing the most scrutiny from various individuals and governments, TOR has many overarching issues yet to be addressed. Someone with a God's eye view of the telecommunications traffic could deanonymize users by sending out certain sized packets to different destinations. This is something to keep in mind while hosting infrastructure, however the standard user sending out typical sized packets from web requests has little concern of this deanonymization tactic. TOR does not add timing obfuscations or decoy traffic to hinder traffic pattern analysis which can be used to deanonymize users.
Both of these channels have some pitfalls, so why not combine them for layered security? There have been numerous articles published by Whonix [#](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Connecting_to_Tor_before_a_VPN) and TAILS [#](https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/vpn_support) developers along with other Information Security professionals highlighting the ineffectiveness of the VPN / TOR combination. The synopsis of their articles is that at best it doesn't help you, at worst, it hurts you. I find it useful if I am trying to mask the fact that I am using TOR from the ISP. Bridges can also be used for this purpose, but they are likely easier to identify by the Intelligence Community (IC). While on public WiFi, I recommend solely using TOR.
Both of these channels have some pitfalls, so why not combine them for layered security? There have been numerous articles published by Whonix [^13] and TAILS [^14] developers along with other Information Security professionals highlighting the ineffectiveness of the VPN / TOR combination. The synopsis of their articles is that at best it doesn't help you, at worst, it hurts you. I find it useful if I am trying to mask the fact that I am using TOR from the ISP. Bridges can also be used for this purpose, but they are likely easier to identify by the Intelligence Community (IC). While on public WiFi, I recommend solely using TOR.
I2P or the Invisible Internet Project spawned in 2003. This is an encrypted private network layer designed to mask user identity. I2P is not the same concept as TOR, although some concepts cross over. I2P users cannot officially communicate with clearnet sites like TOR users can; all I2P traffic stays internal to the I2P network. Without having the exit of traffic via exit nodes or outproxies to the internet, this reduces usability and enhances privacy. I2P can prove useful at limiting the information captured by global passive adversaries. I should note that some mixnets have called I2P legacy technology claiming that it opens up users to a number of attacks that can isolate, misdirect, and deanonymize users. Therefore I2P should not be solely relied on. If one is adament about using I2P, there are configurations that facilitate the use of I2P via TOR.
@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ Mixnets have the goal of anonymizing packets through uniformity. The design is t
In regards to implementation, there are a variety of options. Host-based virtualization with pre-configured systems like Whonix can be used. This routes all of the Whonix workstation's traffic through the Whonix gateway to prevent leakage. A bootable TAILS USB is also preconfigured to allow only TOR traffic, excluding the exempt or whitelisted insecure browser designed for getting your device through WiFi portals. Open-source operating systems, such as OpenWRT, on a travel router can force certain subnets to use a VPN configuration or route via TOR.
As previously stated in the Traffic Leakage section, software-based routing should not be relied on. If it is to be implemented, it should be viewed as adding an additional layer of security. There are applications such as Orbot which allows the use of the TOR network, a variety of VPN applications (which are primarily wrappers for OpenVPN), and there are scripts that configure local packet filters to "torrify" all traffic. While I have no basis in saying all software-based leak prevention mechanisms are prone to failure, historically leak prevention has been inadequate. Even Whonix reports that they "cannot do the impossible and magically prevent every kind of protocol leak and identifier disclosure." [#](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection) Hardware routing adds more architecture into the mix, but it provides the bulletproof assurance that there is no leakage of traffic. For critical operations, consider hardware mechanisms. For the privacy-centric individual, software-based kill switches should be more than sufficient.
As previously stated in the Traffic Leakage section, software-based routing should not be relied on. If it is to be implemented, it should be viewed as adding an additional layer of security. There are applications such as Orbot which allows the use of the TOR network, a variety of VPN applications (which are primarily wrappers for OpenVPN), and there are scripts that configure local packet filters to "torrify" all traffic. While I have no basis in saying all software-based leak prevention mechanisms are prone to failure, historically leak prevention has been inadequate. Even Whonix reports that they "cannot do the impossible and magically prevent every kind of protocol leak and identifier disclosure." [^15] Hardware routing adds more architecture into the mix, but it provides the bulletproof assurance that there is no leakage of traffic. For critical operations, consider hardware mechanisms. For the privacy-centric individual, software-based kill switches should be more than sufficient.
## Clean Caches
There are various caches containing sensitive information on both mobile devices and GNU/Linux systems. Linux systems have the tendency to push most logs to the /var/log/ directory. This is a simple deletion process.
@ -150,27 +149,31 @@ Due to Android sandbox implementations, caches can no longer be centrally erased
## Secure Deletion
Deletion of files in most operating systems today is a loose version of the term. Deletion implies the eradication of the selected file. Rather, this is deletion of the file's reference. To truly delete a file from the drive, one must completely overwrite the data. This can be done over time by passive dumb luck or it could be a conscious effort. There are existing tools for secure deletion (wiping over the file) on most platforms. On GNU/Linux systems, there is a tool in the "secure-delete" package called shred that will zero over the file. This performs deletion using the Gutmann method. Another tool called Bleachbit is known to clean the caches of the system. Built into the tool is an option to overwrite all free space on the disk. This could be a routine cleanup procedure for the concerned. On Windows, there is a tool included in the SysInternals package called SDelete that will provide a similar function to GNU/Linux's shred.
A simple shred command in a Linux bash shell: shred -n 32 -z -u <FILE>
A simple shred command in a Linux bash shell: `shred -n 32 -z -u <FILE>`
This command would use GNU coreutils shred function to wipe over the designated file with 32 iterations. The -z adds a final overwrite to hide the shredding process, and the -u unlinks the file completely.
-note: this is an example command; I am not recommending 32 overwrites.
Note: this is an example command; I am not recommending 32 overwrites.
Secure deletion should not be assumed to be possible. The NSA has in the past developed malicious firmware for HDDs that can create secret copies of user-written data.
SSDs which make use of wear-leveling (look into SSD wear-leveling) cannot have information securely erased by the user. However, SSDs with wear leveling also pose a significant annoyance, and even create difficulty for, forensic investigators (look into SSD garbage collection). Such annoyance cannot be considered a security guarantee.
## Browsing
### Browser Configuration
Ungoogled variants of Chromium are advised. The security model actually exists unlike Gecko-based browser derivatives (i.e. Firefox).
It is no secret that governments deliver malware based on anomalous internet activity, alternately put, flagged activity. While the common forms of investigations are typically conducted via physical device seizure, security mechanisms should be taken into account to stunt "passive" investigations. Browsers can be configured to disable the installation of extensions, device storage usage, setting alterations, theme changes, cookie restrictions, and cache deletions. Browser security and anti-fingerprinting do not always align. For instance, the TOR Browser is not unique based on fingerprinting. Tor Browser with JavaScript disabled is generally a secure setup. Most browser-based vulnerabilities require JavaScript or some other browser-run code (fonts, WebGL, etc). Tor Browser on security setting "Safest" reduces this attack surface hugely. While Chromium browsers may have upped the ante in terms of security, they do not have any built-in anti-fingerprinting features.
Ungoogled variants of Chromium [^16] are advised. The security model actually exists unlike Gecko-based browser derivatives (i.e. Firefox).
It is no secret that governments deliver malware based on anomalous internet activity, alternately put, flagged activity. While the common forms of investigations are typically conducted via physical device seizure, security mechanisms should be taken into account to stunt "passive" investigations. Browsers can be configured to disable the installation of extensions, device storage usage, setting alterations, theme changes, cookie restrictions, and cache deletions. Browser security and anti-fingerprinting do not always align. For instance, the TOR Browser is not unique based on fingerprinting. Tor Browser with JavaScript disabled is generally a secure setup. Most browser-based vulnerabilities require JavaScript or some other browser-run code (fonts, WebGL, etc). Tor Browser on security setting "Safest" reduces this attack surface significantly. While Chromium browsers may have upped the ante in terms of security, they do not have any built-in anti-fingerprinting features. Some projects have taken the initiative to provide anti-fingerprinting configurations such as Bromite[^17] or Brave Browser[^18].
### Search Engine Selection
DuckDuckGo (DDG) [#](https://duckduckgo.com) has long been used as an alternative to Google. There are some underlying problems with DDG such as being based in the US, and they are not completely open-source. Without having reviewable source code, there is no way of validating their seemingly well-intentioned privacy mission statement. However, source code review becomes a moot point when you consider the fact that you are using their centralized services. Odds are that the providers of the service do not make the entirety of their systems publicly reviewable/auditable. Arbitrary code or excess applications could exist on their servers. Searx instances [#](https://searx.space/) are decentralized search engines that can be stood up by anyone. Decentralization with Searx doesn't remove the issue of inherent trust that must be placed in the instances, but it ensures that you have control in where you place your trust. This also enables people to stand up their own instances and configure them with better protections. Decentralization is preferred, however some of the instances are likely ran by intelligence agencies.
#### DuckDuckGo
DuckDuckGo (DDG) [^19] has long been used as an alternative to Google. It is worth mentioning that DDG is TOR Projects default selection. This has granted them significant notoriety and trust. There are some underlying problems with DDG such as being based in the US, and they are not completely open-source. Without having reviewable source code, there is no way of validating their seemingly well-intentioned privacy mission statement. However, source code review becomes a moot point when you consider the fact that you are using their centralized services. Odds are that the providers of the service do not make the entirety of their systems publicly reviewable/auditable. Arbitrary code or excess applications could exist on their servers.
#### Searx
Searx instances [^20] are decentralized search engines that can be stood up by anyone. Decentralization with Searx doesn't remove the issue of inherent trust that must be placed in the instances, but it ensures that you have control in where you place your trust. This also enables people to stand up their own instances and configure them with better protections. Decentralization is preferred, however some of the instances are likely ran by intelligence agencies.
## Live booting
Live media (USB or CD) can be booted from in a process called Live Boot. Data is prevented from being stored on the hard drive of your computer (so long as you do not attempt to decrypt your hard drive that is detected). Nothing lives in permenance from the live boot. This is a useful tool for the privacy conscious as there is little to no cleanup process of your actions. Some operating systems such as The Amnesiac Incognito Live System (TAILS) are forensicly conscious and wipe the data from the device's physical memory once the USB is removed or the system is shutdown. This is not always the case for live media. Be conscious of network activity living on in permenance. This is where the use of strong cryptography can come into play from Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations to the use of TOR. Live booting reduces the effectiveness of the Cold Boot attacks. Cold boot is heavily reliant upon data that is temporarily stored in Random Access Memory (RAM).
Live media (USB or CD) can be booted from in a process called Live Boot. Data is prevented from being stored on the hard drive of your computer (so long as you do not attempt to decrypt your hard drive that is detected). Nothing lives in permenance from the live boot. This is a useful tool for the privacy conscious as there is little to no cleanup process of your actions. Some operating systems such as The Amnesiac Incognito Live System (TAILS)[^21] are forensicly conscious and wipe the data from the device's physical memory once the USB is removed or the system is shutdown. This is not always the case for live media. Be conscious of network activity living on in permenance. This is where the use of strong cryptography can come into play from Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations to the use of TOR. Live booting reduces the effectiveness of the Cold Boot attacks. Cold boot is heavily reliant upon data that is temporarily stored in Random Access Memory (RAM).
- note:
Note:
Cold boot attacks require a system to be under attacker control. DDR3 memory modules lose data within 3 seconds of losing power under normal circumstances. DDR4 loses data within 1 second (more like a fraction of a second) after losing power under normal conditions.
Sufficient mitigation against cold boot attacks is generally to simply remove memory before control of the system is released.
Linux allows this via the "magic" SysRq combo SysRq+o. This is available by default on some OSs, but needs to be enabled manually on others.
@ -180,20 +183,20 @@ Live media (USB or CD) can be booted from in a process called Live Boot. Data is
## Physical Destruction
Physical destruction of critical operation data is advised. Institutional authorities such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) see no value in the wiping of critical data. If they believe data is at risk or a device under classification is to be removed from a closed area, all media drives must be completely degaussed. The lesson to be learned here is that if institutional authorities do not trust wiping and overwriting methods, be cautious in your operational threat model. If your life depends on the media being sanitized, save yourself the stress and physically destroy it. If your operation would have adverse consequences if you are caught, there is no room for sentiment.
- note:
Note:
The DoD generally cites a drive wiping policy of 7 passes using random data. Each pass is peformed on the entire drive.
Other acceptable means of data removal include a single random pass (modern drives make it nearly impossible to recover data, even with a single overwrite), microwaving the platter (the platter should be removed from the enclosure before doing this), applying sand paper aggressively to the platter, heating the drive in an oven (500 degrees farhenheit for 15 minutes? 30 if you want to be extra paranoid, or just leave it in the oven until investigators arrive), or taking a powerful magnet (perhaps from a home/car stereo) to degauss the drive (the platter should be removed first to maximize effectiveness)
Other acceptable means of data removal include a single random pass (modern drives make it nearly impossible to recover data, even with a single overwrite), microwaving the platter (the platter should be removed from the enclosure before doing this), applying sand paper aggressively to the platter, heating the drive in an oven (500 degrees Fahrenheit for 15 minutes? 30 if you want to be extra paranoid, or just leave it in the oven until investigators arrive), or taking a powerful magnet (perhaps from a home/car stereo) to degauss the drive (the platter should be removed first to maximize effectiveness)
## Cryptography
Cryptography is a monolith of a topic that is included with the anti-forensics threat model. If the cryptography cannot be broken, forensic investigations are stunted in their tracks. Cryptography can range from encryption of individual files or messages to Full Disk Encryption (FDE). As Simon Singh has said in The Code Book, "I must mention a problem that faces any author who tackles the subject of cryptography: the science of secrecy is largely a secret science."
Cryptography is a monolith of a topic that is included with the anti-forensics threat model. If the cryptography cannot be broken, forensic investigations are stunted in their tracks. Cryptography can range from encryption of individual files or messages to Full Disk Encryption (FDE). As Simon Singh has said in The Code Book, "I must mention a problem that faces any author who tackles the subject of cryptography: the science of secrecy is largely a secret science."[^22]
History goes back and forth favoring both codemakers and codebreakers through different eras. While there are algorithms that exist (and yet to be created) that could be unbreakable for the necessary classification time (at least outside the statute of limitations) against codebreakers. Such encryption could involve the use of multiple algorithms such as Serpent((Twofish)(AES)) with the hash algorithm of Whirlpool, Streebog-512, or SHA512. Do be warned that there are threats imposed from the use of cascading algorithms or the use of multiple algorithms with the same key.
All this being said, there is only one form of unbreakable encryption that will stand the test of time. This is a one-time pad (OTP) cipher. This encrypts the message based on completely randomized data. This cannot be digitally or mentally generated; this needs pure randomness to be bulletproof.
"The security of the onetime pad cipher is wholly due to the randomness of the key. The key injects randomness into the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext is random then it has no patterns, no structure, nothing the cryptanalyst can latch onto. In fact, it can be mathematically proved that it is impossible for a cryptanalyst to crack a message encrypted with a onetime pad cipher. In other words, the onetime pad cipher is not merely believed to be unbreakable, just as the Vigenère cipher was in the nineteenth century, it really is absolutely secure. The onetime pad offers a guarantee of secrecy: the Holy Grail of cryptography." - Simon Sughes, The Code Book
"The security of the onetime pad cipher is wholly due to the randomness of the key. The key injects randomness into the ciphertext, and if the ciphertext is random then it has no patterns, no structure, nothing the cryptanalyst can latch onto. In fact, it can be mathematically proved that it is impossible for a cryptanalyst to crack a message encrypted with a onetime pad cipher. In other words, the onetime pad cipher is not merely believed to be unbreakable, just as the Vigenère cipher was in the nineteenth century, it really is absolutely secure. The onetime pad offers a guarantee of secrecy: the Holy Grail of cryptography." - Simon Sughes, The Code Book[^22]
- note:
Note:
An OTP using a CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator) still maintains the security of the CSPRNG used, although isn't really an OTP anymore. Instead, it acts as a stream cipher.
OTPs are information-theoretically secure, but are not tamper-resistant.
Full-disk encryption should only ever be performed using the XTS mode of operation.
@ -204,7 +207,7 @@ All this being said, there is only one form of unbreakable encryption that will
### Randomness
This is the complement to cryptography, or rather a fundamental component. There are two forms of randomness that one would use to generate a One-Time Pad (OTP) message. This randomness can be derived from computational randomness (pseudo random) or pure (theoretical) randomness. Pure randomness is always the goal with the use of OTPs. Unfortunately, there are few ways of achieving this pure randomness. Computational randomness but not theoretical randomness has potential to be broken.
- note:
Note:
Many (most) modern computers contain hardware true-random number generators (TRNG). To identify if your hardware has such hardware, run `cat /dev/random` on a Linux-based OS.
For systems with no TRNG, `cat /dev/random` will produce some amount of output, then produce nothing or produce output slowly.
For systems with a TRNG, `cat /dev/random` will produce output continuously, appearing to behave the same as `cat /dev/urandom`.
@ -217,18 +220,18 @@ Properly implemented cryptographic usage of keys provides a substantial barrier
For the justified paranoid, keep a hardware-based key or a separate USB/MicroSD for the sole purpose of key storage. Create hundreds of keys varying in bit length. Take mental note of the key (or keys) that you decide to use. Only connect designated key storage device into the system when the volume decryption is necessary.
- note:
Note:
Look into: OnlyKey, NitroKey, and SoloKey
### Cryptographic Software
While we would love to maintain idealism and believe that we could write something that would retain relevance in perpetuity, we understand that this is not the nature of the technological system. To successfully orchestrate safe operations, I must address software-based cryptographic solutions. To date, Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS) and Veracrypt are the two most notable options.
-note: Veracrypt can be set to leverage cascading ciphers. Its cascading encryption uses mutually-independent keys.
Note: Veracrypt can be set to leverage cascading ciphers. Its cascading encryption uses mutually-independent keys.
### PIM (Personal Iterations Multiplier)
PIM is treated as a secret value that controls the number of iterations used by the header key derivation function. So long as PIM is treated as a secret parameter, this increases the complexity that an attacker would have to guess.
- note:
Note:
Larger-value PIMs also increase the time complexity of attacks, at the expense of time taken to perform password hashing. Most cryptologists would argue that a PIMs should not be treated as a secret parameter (or at least, such secrecy should not be relied on). The user's own password should be the source of security. Password hashing, in general, is a mitigation for users with less-than-secure passwords.
As a person who values security against the world's most powerful attackers, one should make a point to not rely on password hashing for security.
@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ Code is a great complement to cryptographic ciphers. It has an incredibly easy i
Standard security mechanisms are inadequate for the purpose of anti-forensics. Nation-States and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups do not play by the rules. All bets are on that no matter how hardened your system kernel is or how safe your OPSEC precautions may be, there is always a point of compromise. An unpatched vulnerability is waiting to be exploited against your system. If your device is emitting traffic, all bets are on that with enough resources, these groups will be able to decrypt the traffic. Maybe it won't be today, but it certainly will be in the not-so-distant future. If you are a target, chances are that you are already compromised. Use the masses as cover; open deviation is ill-advised.
- note:
Note:
Go into more detail about using the masses as cover. Also, distro hopping can be a useful method of keeping powerful attackers enough steps behind that they won't be able to compromise your system.
## Minimimal Attack Surface
@ -264,25 +267,18 @@ Every introduced system creates a larger fingerprint and attack vector, ultimate
Depending on your threat model, not all operations can be conducted from a coffee shop. There are an increasing amount of cameras, and facial recognition technology is already being deployed, along with license plate scanners at every street light. If operations are sensitive and must be conducted from the same location consistently, preparation should always lean towards the worst-case scenario.
While some of these proposed methods may be unconventional, these are unconventional times. Mechanisms can be put in place to ensure that your systems are sent shutdown signals that will lock them behind disk encryption. Shutdown signals are the most common, however we are not limited to the commands we issue. The use of radio transmitters to issue shutdowns have some level of intricacy that surpasses skills of the novice user.
#### Still provide remote ideas
A physical wired dead man's switch reduces attack surface and intricacy. After the dead man's switch aka killswitch is configured, we can move on to the commands to issue. If we wanted to securely wipe the random access memory before shutting down, we could issue the "sdmem -v" command to verbosely clean the RAM as the killswitch is activated. The killswitch can be activated from a system event. Any form of shell command that is compatible with the particular GNU/Linux system can be ran based on a specified system behavior. See resources at the end of this section [#](https://tech.michaelaltfield.net/2020/01/02/buskill-laptop-kill-cord-dead-man-switch/) and [#](https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill/blob/master/usbkill/usbkill.py) for USB dead man's switch.
[#] - USBKill/BusKill - https://tech.michaelaltfield.net/2020/01/02/buskill-laptop-kill-cord-dead-man-switch/
[#] - https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill/blob/master/usbkill/usbkill.py
[#] - https://github.com/NateBrune/silk-guardian
- note:
Also look into Silk Guardian (listed in UsbKill's readme on GitHub).
Add info about NFC Kill - https://usbkill.com/products/nfckill
A physical wired dead man's switch reduces attack surface and intricacy. After the dead man's switch aka killswitch is configured, we can move on to the commands to issue. If we wanted to securely wipe the random access memory before shutting down, we could issue the "sdmem -v" command to verbosely clean the RAM as the killswitch is activated. The killswitch can be activated from a system event. Any form of shell command that is compatible with the particular GNU/Linux system can be ran based on a specified system behavior. See resources at the end of this section [^23], [^24], and [^25] for USB dead man's switch. Panic buttons are another form of a killswitch that essentially remains active on your display and is ready to select at any moment. (Centry.py is a good example of a panic button[^26]).
There are USB devices known as "Mouse Jigglers" that are used by forensic teams after device seizure. These jigglers are serial devices plugged in to interface with the system to keep the screenlock from being invoked.
There are easy preventative software-based solutions such as USBGuard that can prevent these devices for operating, however this will likely be picked up on and human mouse jigglers can take their place.
There are easy preventative software-based solutions such as USBCTL[^27] that can prevent these devices for operating, however this will likely be picked up on and human mouse jigglers can take their place.
Ideally a process can be utilized to detect such a device and invoke a shutdown process. A mitigation for the human mouse jigglers could be implementing forced authentication every half hour to an hour. If the credentials have not been entered, the user session could be terminated, memory could be cleared, or the shutdown command could even be invoked.
## Play on Resources
Earlier, it was said that these groups have unlimited resources; this is not entirely true. The one resource which they lack is time. While they have infinite funds to allocate towards password and key cracking methods, so long as quantum physics strays behind computing, time is their main constraint. Taking methods from obscurity, the use of non-default encryption algorithms and hashing mechanisms for keys substantially increases the amount of time the analyst must expend on cracking. If the analyst cannot identify the hash function or cipher, they must try all possible options. Even if the correct password is obtained, this becomes useless without the proper cipher. For instance, Veracrypt uses over fifteen combinations of individual encryption algorithms and cascaded/stacked ciphers. Complement this with the five supported hash functions, and we are looking at 75 possible combinations of symmetric ciphers and one-way hash functions. As stated by ElcomSoft, "Trying all possible combinations is about 175 times slower compared to attacking a single combination of AES+SHA-512." [#](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2020/03/breaking-veracrypt-containers/)
Earlier, it was said that these groups have unlimited resources; this is not entirely true. The one resource which they lack is time. While they have infinite funds to allocate towards password and key cracking methods, so long as quantum physics strays behind computing, time is their main constraint. Taking methods from obscurity, the use of non-default encryption algorithms and hashing mechanisms for keys substantially increases the amount of time the analyst must expend on cracking. If the analyst cannot identify the hash function or cipher, they must try all possible options. Even if the correct password is obtained, this becomes useless without the proper cipher. For instance, Veracrypt uses over fifteen combinations of individual encryption algorithms and cascaded/stacked ciphers. Complement this with the five supported hash functions, and we are looking at 75 possible combinations of symmetric ciphers and one-way hash functions. As stated by ElcomSoft, "Trying all possible combinations is about 175 times slower compared to attacking a single combination of AES+SHA-512."[^28]
Hypothetically, if the algorithm/hash combination is known by the attacker, here is where the cascading algorithms display their value:
"Whether they choose to encrypt with AES, Serpent, Twofish or any other single algorithm, the speed of the attack will remain the same. Attacks on cascaded encryption with two algorithms (e.g. AES(Twofish)) work at half the speed, while cascading three algorithms slows them down to around 1/3 the speed."
- note:
Note:
VeraCrypt does not keep encryption/hashing algorithms secret. Keeping such information secret would break the functionality of VeraCrypt (unless the user were to enter such information on every boot, comparably to how PIMs work). An attacker will never need to attempt multiple combinations. They will simply need to attempt cracking a single, different, algorithm.
Leveraging Veracrypt
@ -300,14 +296,14 @@ When feasible, radio transmitters should be physically removed from devices. Fro
For an adversary who gains a foothold on your system(s) without the physically removed hardware, they could activate certain frequencies to create a persistent foothold and compromise your system even further.
For critical operations, reduce reliance on wireless radio transmissions. Consider the process of removing all radio transmitter chipsets, otherwise known as airgapping, to mitigate a medley of threats.
- note:
Methods of "jumping" airgaps have been found in the past. One must be sure to remove all hardware which could be used for communication. This includes Wi-Fi cards (often Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are within the same physical card), Bluetooth card (if you have a Bluetooth card separate from your Wi-Fi card), microphones (communications protocols have been devised to transmit data through ultrasonic audio). Many modern OSs still have the drivers to support these protocols, and the attacks surface therefore still exists), speakers (usable for data exfiltration using the same means), physical ports (USB, SD, headphone jack). Even power cords have been used as a means of compromise (on both laptop and desktop systems).
Note:
Methods of "jumping" airgaps have been found in the past.[^29] One must be sure to remove all hardware which could be used for communication. This includes Wi-Fi cards (often Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are within the same physical card), Bluetooth card (if you have a Bluetooth card separate from your Wi-Fi card), microphones (communications protocols have been devised to transmit data through ultrasonic audio). Many modern OSs still have the drivers to support these protocols, and the attacks surface therefore still exists), speakers (usable for data exfiltration using the same means), physical ports (USB, SD, headphone jack). Even power cords have been used as a means of compromise (on both laptop and desktop systems).
The traditional methods of interfacing with the internet stand to be the most secure. Systems using direct ethernet connection is optimal. While this is not a technical "airgap," this does prevent packet communications from being analyzed over the air.
For those who still require the use of wireless technology in their daily lives, consider the option of airgapping and utilizing a wireless dongle when necessary. Radio transmissions are only allowed when your device powers the USB wireless dongle. If hardware emitting signals cannot be physically removed from the device, consider implementing faraday cages [See EMF Shielding section].
For those who still require the use of wireless technology in their daily lives, consider the option of airgapping and utilizing a wireless dongle when necessary. Radio transmissions are only allowed when your device powers the USB wireless dongle. If hardware emitting signals cannot be physically removed from the device, consider implementing faraday cages [See EMF Shielding section](#emf-shielding).
- note:
Note:
Wireless drivers have been used as a means of system compromise in the past.
Once the device is ready to be shutdown, simply pull the dongle from the device, and there you have a physical killswitch for wireless technology. Not only is time reduced for remote exploitation, but inherent device identifiers with the built-in chipset are removed.
@ -315,7 +311,7 @@ Once the device is ready to be shutdown, simply pull the dongle from the device,
Many of the radio frequencies require close proximity or directed antennas to effectively capture data and perform exploitation. Another method to consider if wireless technology must be used is the implementation of jamming.
Currently jamming is not a bulletproof method of preventing wireless communications from being intercepted. Wireless removal would be simple to implement in comparison.
While jamming isn't the best route for sniffing/snooping, the creation of excess noise is not a bad idea [See Noise section].
While jamming isn't the best route for sniffing/snooping, the creation of excess noise is not a bad idea [See Noise section](#noise).
## EMF Shielding (Faraday Cage)
@ -334,7 +330,7 @@ Your operations and system must remain accessible despite such intense OPSEC pre
Instead of compromising on security, consider implementing automation. Simple scripts can reduce the effort needed while keeping nested layers of cryptographic solutions.
For instance, create a function for mounting your encrypted drive, closing out an encrypted volume, and the "when things get out of hand" function where files should undergo the process of secure deletion.
- note:
Note:
As previously noted, secure deletion is generally impossible on SSDs. Also, any bad sectors on a drive (SSD or HDD) cannot be securely erased by software. Such bad sectors must be erased physically.
Kali and Parrot include a LUKS "nuke" feature which erases the LUKS headers. This can be used to ensure an encrypted drive cannot be decrypted, even if your password can be broken. This feature can also be installed on any Linux-based OS. Installation of the LUKS nuke feature may conflict with Secure Boot on OSs which don't support it by default.
@ -353,7 +349,7 @@ Perhaps it's a side project of some sort, or some harmless hobby. If there is no
Regarding the creation of online accounts and personas, don't use identifiable names. Your operations should be treated as a second life that should be appropriately segmented. While you may find some of your ideas to be profound/esoteric and want to reuse and redistribute across platforms - refrain. You're only creating a trail that could come back to bite you. Not only should you segment your usernames creative talents, but ensure that projects also become segmented. The more you divulge into separate projects, the less connection you want to have - unless of course they are related and you desire the marketing crossover.
The physical use of your device, from pinging telecommunications infrastructure to local area network (LAN) connections will rat you out. Geofencing requests have gained increasing popularity with American law enforcement. Google self-reported, "Year over year, Google has observed over a 1,500% increase in the number of geofence requests it received in 2018 compared to 2017; and to date, the rate has increased over 500% from 2018 to 2019." [#](https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6747427/2.pdf)
The physical use of your device, from pinging telecommunications infrastructure to local area network (LAN) connections will rat you out. Geofencing requests have gained increasing popularity with American law enforcement. Google self-reported, "Year over year, Google has observed over a 1,500% increase in the number of geofence requests it received in 2018 compared to 2017; and to date, the rate has increased over 500% from 2018 to 2019." [^30]
After the physical side is dealt with, the digital side can start to be addressed. Just like scripts can be implemented to increase efficiency, they can also be used to aid and/or create alibis.
Consider the creation of python scripts to engage your devices to perform certain functions. For instance, create a wordlist that your browser searches for on demand (with a hint of randomness). Program your music player to play certain songs at certain times. The goal of these actions is to emulate real activity that could provide that alibi for you.
@ -361,7 +357,7 @@ Do note that often times a double-edged pendulum comes to swing. If an investiga
Do note that you will likely not come out unscathed from the psychological toll of withholding secrets. Not only do fabrications add unneeded complexity into your relationships by forcing you to drain energy keeping narratives intact, but they place you in a state of isolation from others. Make sure the endeavor is worth the burden.
"As we have seen, every personal secret has the effect of a sin or of guilt—whether or not it is, from the standpoint of popular morality, a wrongful secret. Now another form of concealment is the act of "withholding"—it being usually emotions that are withheld. As in the case of secrets, so here also we must make a reservation: self-restraint is healthful and beneficial; it is even a virtue. This is why we find self-discipline to have been one of man's earliest moral attainments. Among primitive peoples it has its place in the initiation ceremonies, chiefly in the forms of ascetic continence and the stoical endurance of pain and fear. Self-restraint, however, is here practised within the secret society as something undertaken in company with others. But if self-restraint is only a private matter, and perhaps devoid of any religious aspect, then it may be as harmful as the personal secret." - C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul
"As we have seen, every personal secret has the effect of a sin or of guilt—whether or not it is, from the standpoint of popular morality, a wrongful secret. Now another form of concealment is the act of "withholding"—it being usually emotions that are withheld. As in the case of secrets, so here also we must make a reservation: self-restraint is healthful and beneficial; it is even a virtue. This is why we find self-discipline to have been one of man's earliest moral attainments. Among primitive peoples it has its place in the initiation ceremonies, chiefly in the forms of ascetic continence and the stoical endurance of pain and fear. Self-restraint, however, is here practised within the secret society as something undertaken in company with others. But if self-restraint is only a private matter, and perhaps devoid of any religious aspect, then it may be as harmful as the personal secret." - C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul[^31]
## False Compromise
@ -386,32 +382,34 @@ Zcash (ZEC) was ground-breaking in the implementation of a protocol known as Suc
Monero is often hailed as the privacy king of cryptocurrency. While it has commendable features with its RingCT protocol, the overarching theme is obscurity rather than traceless transactions.
"The fundamental problem of coin mixing methods though is that transaction data is not being hidden through encryption. RingCT is a system of disassociation where information is still visible in the blockchain. Mind that a vulnerability might be discovered at some point in the future which allows traceability since Monero’s blockchain provides a record of every transaction that has taken place."
This operates similar to a mixnet where it is difficult to discern the originating address from a transaction. One of Monero's developers publicly admits that "zk-SNARKs provides much stronger untraceability characteristics than Monero (but a much smaller privacyset and much higher systemic risks)." Intelligence agencies have placed their eyes on Monero for some time. The United States has even brought in a private firm called CipherTrace who claims to have built tools capable of tracing transactions. [#](https://ciphertrace.com/ciphertrace-announces-worlds-first-monero-tracing-capabilities/) At the time of writing, these are unsubstantiated claims; there is no evidence to suggest that Monero has been deobfuscated.
This operates similar to a mixnet where it is difficult to discern the originating address from a transaction. One of Monero's developers publicly admits that "zk-SNARKs provides much stronger untraceability characteristics than Monero (but a much smaller privacyset and much higher systemic risks)." Intelligence agencies have placed their eyes on Monero for some time. The United States has even brought in a private firm called CipherTrace who claims to have built tools capable of tracing transactions. [^32](https://ciphertrace.com/ciphertrace-announces-worlds-first-monero-tracing-capabilities/) At the time of writing, these are unsubstantiated claims; there is no evidence to suggest that Monero has been deobfuscated.
Pirate Chain's ARRR addresses the fungibility problem of Zcash by removing the transparent address schema (t-tx) and forcing all transactions to use Sapling shielded transactions (z-tx). "By consistently utilizing zk-SNARKs technology, Pirate leaves no usable metadata of user’s transactions on its blockchain." This means that even if the blockchain was compromised down the line, the adversary would obtain little to no useful metadata. The transactions contain no visible amount to no visible address from no visible address. The underlying cryptography would have to be broken or the viewing/spending keys would have to be intercepted in order to peer into the transactions. For an adversary without key possession, the trace is baseless. "A little bit of math can accomplish what all the guns and barbed wire can’t: a little bit of math can keep a secret." - Edward Snowden
While I could write mounds of literature diving into the depths of cryptocurrency, I have brought forth only what is useful to the aims of anti-forensics. There is no real purpose in regurgitating quotations from various whitepapers and protocol designs. Any further research into the matter is up to you. If this has peaked your interest, consider diving into the various communities, protocol specifications, and whitepapers.
Further information pertaining to zk-SNARKs: https://z[.]cash/technology/zksnarks
Monero (XMR) Whitepaper: https://www.getmonero[.]org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf
Pirate Chain Whitepaper: https://pirate[.]black/files/whitepaper/The_Pirate_Code_V2.0.pdf
Further information pertaining to zk-SNARKs - [^33]
Monero (XMR) Whitepaper - [^34]
Pirate Chain Whitepaper - [^35]
## Defensive Mechanisms
System security or hardening is vital for successful operations. Lack of hardening could result in your machines being cut through like hot butter. Center for Internet Security (CIS) [#](https://www.cisecurity.org) - and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) with Standard Technical Implementation Guides [#](https://public.cyber.mil/stigs) both have decent system hardening standards that are to be applied to all DoD contractor, government, and affiliated nodes. For Linux and Unix systems, Kernel Self-Protection Project (KSPP) [#](https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings) is a great resource for kernel configuration settings. More information about these configurations and concepts can be found at https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/self-protection.html.
System security or hardening is vital for successful operations. Lack of hardening could result in your machines being cut through like hot butter. Center for Internet Security (CIS) [^36] and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) with Standard Technical Implementation Guides [^37] both have decent system hardening standards that are to be applied to all DoD contractor, government, and affiliated nodes. For Linux and Unix systems, Kernel Self-Protection Project (KSPP) [^38] is a great resource for kernel configuration settings. More information about these configurations and concepts can be found at https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/self-protection.html.
Hardening procedures fall in line with the concept of minimizing architecture and running processes on a system. This makes each system easier to audit with less noise/clutter, and reduces the attack surface for exploitation. Hardening should encompass patches, scans with most recent virus definitions, restrictive permissions, kernel hardening, purging unnecessary software, and disabling physical ports, unnecessary users, filesystems, firmware modules, compilers, and network protocols.
System hardening is far from a quick and easy process, unless you have preconfigured images for systems. For small operations lacking technical prowess, preconfigured operating systems such as TAILS or Whonix mentioned in the Operating System section assure the greatest security and the least hassle.
If the goal is to run a more persistent lightweight OS with minimal functionality, I suggest running a variant of Arch Linux that does not use SystemD (Consider runit, OpenRC, or s6). If wide community support is needed, Arch with a hardened configuration will be your best bet. For the tech-savvy, hardened variants of Gentoo are ideal.
- note:
Note:
The listed hardening is incomplete and will not fit all operations and GNU/Linux systems. This is not meant to be a book on methods for defensive cybersecurity.
## Offline Password Managers
Security often comes down to the basics; Make your devices/accounts/services hard to crack. Feds & private forensics companies may be able to allocate ridiculous amounts of computing power against your services to see logs and compromise your accounts, but their brute forcing efforts can be rendered useless.
Consider offline variants of KeePass for secure password storage, then consider placing the KeePass database inside of a hidden veracrypt. Having a password with an absurd amount of characters such as `dHK&*/4pk_!i??5R=^K}~FU!kxF{fG}*&>oMdRt([);7?=v(e^,ch_n)r()]:&k$D@f4#G"Y\v_5-*i$E[+)"bT*@BF+{hkvn7[B]{qq'[~]3@+-Ju6C(@<]=TEM6a\h$c+:W[k$=;Jy[Un7&~NtvK*{Bn` is enough to stunt any brute force attempt. Cryptographic security can only be as strong as the key being used.
Consider offline variants of KeePass[^39] for secure password storage, then consider placing the KeePass database inside of a hidden veracrypt. Having a password with an absurd amount of characters such as `dHK&*/4pk_!i??5R=^K}~FU!kxF{fG}*&>oMdRt([);7?=v(e^,ch_n)r()]:&k$D@f4#G"Y\v_5-*i$E[+)"bT*@BF+{hkvn7[B]{qq'[~]3@+-Ju6C(@<]=TEM6a\h$c+:W[k$=;Jy[Un7&~NtvK*{Bn` is enough to stunt any brute force attempt. Cryptographic security can only be as strong as the key being used.
- note:
Note:
A 20-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 132.877 bits of security (compare to 128 bit symmetric encryption keys).
A 29-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 192.671 bits of security (compare to 192 bit symmetric encryption keys).
A 39-character random password (letters, numbers, and symbols) provides 259.110 bits of security (compare to 256 bit symmetric encryption keys).
@ -426,7 +424,7 @@ Consider offline variants of KeePass for secure password storage, then consider
This wouldn't be a complete work on anti-forensics without some mention of physical precautions. While wireless transmitters are ill-advised, wireless technology can prove useful when larger proximity is needed. Directional antennas could allow you to stay hidden from cameras and remotely authenticate to a network.
With nuances added from the modern surveillance state, traffic cameras force your hand by revealing every intersection which you have passed through. There are a few methods to circumventing this privacy infringement. Darkened weather covers for your license plate (Warning: This method could result in a fine with the wrong officer) or a well-rigged bicycle rack could prevent cameras from picking up your plate number. Alternatively, if a destination is within a few miles of proximity you could either ride a bicycle (with a disguise), or decide to become a motorcyclist. With motocycles, the plate numbers are significantly smaller and could even be blocked by your feet on certain bikes. The helmet would stand to mask facial features, and the jacket would cover any identifiable features such as tattoos. <<add in note about palantir collecting tattoo/vehicle information from state cameras>>
With nuances added from the modern surveillance state, traffic cameras force your hand by revealing every intersection which you have passed through. There are a few methods to circumventing this privacy infringement. Darkened weather covers for your license plate (Warning: This method could result in a fine with the wrong officer) or a well-rigged bicycle rack could prevent cameras from picking up your plate number. Alternatively, if a destination is within a few miles of proximity you could either ride a bicycle (with a disguise), or decide to become a motorcyclist. With motocycles, the plate numbers are significantly smaller and could even be blocked by your feet on certain bikes. The helmet would stand to mask facial features, and the jacket would cover any identifiable features such as tattoos. Palantir has been involved in "predictive policing" leveraging footage obtained from traffic cameras to profile individuals.[^40]
It should go without saying that any tech devices that you purchase will have some identifier that could lead back to you. Make this a moot point and procure every device (even USBs) anonymously with cash. If you're out on a distant roadtrip, make some of your purchases. Wear a hat accompanied with some baggy clothes. Perform a slight change in your gait as you walk (uncomfortable shoes could help with this). Alternatively, pay that bum off the street to do your bidding.
@ -478,9 +476,44 @@ For the hollow men (federal agents or contractors) who stumbled upon my work by
*"If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude better than the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you. May your chains set lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen."* - Samuel Adams
## References
[^1]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/02/11/palantir-apologizes-for-wikileaks-attack-proposal-cuts-ties-with-hbgary/
[^2]: https://puri.sm/posts/deep-dive-into-intel-me-disablement/
[^3]: https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner
[^4]: https://www.coreboot.org
[^5]: https://artixlinux.org
[^6]: https://voidlinux.org
[^7]: https://alpinelinux.org/
[^8]: https://www.statista.com/chart/15207/smartphone-data-collection-by-google-and-apple/
[^9]: https://grapheneos.org
[^10]: https://www.pine64.org/pinephone/
[^11]: https://puri.sm/products/librem-5/
[^12]: https://protonvpn.com/blog/threat-model/
[^13]: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Connecting_to_Tor_before_a_VPN
[^14]: https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/blueprints/-/wikis/vpn_support
[^15]: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection
[^16]: https://ungoogled-software.github.io/ungoogled-chromium-binaries/
[^17]: https://www.bromite.org
[^18]: https://brave.com
[^19]: https://duckduckgo.com
[^20]: https://searx.space/
[^21]: https://tails.boum.org
[^22]: Singh, S. (1999). The code book: the secret history of codes and codebreaking (Vol. 366). London: Fourth Estate.
[^23]: https://tech.michaelaltfield.net/2020/01/02/buskill-laptop-kill-cord-dead-man-switch/
[^24]: https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill/blob/master/usbkill/usbkill.py
[^25]: https://github.com/NateBrune/silk-guardian
[^26]: https://github.com/AnonymousPlanet/Centry
[^27]: https://github.com/anthraxx/usbctl
[^28]: https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2020/03/breaking-veracrypt-containers/
[^29]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.06884.pdf
[^30]: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6747427/2.pdf
[^31]: Jung, C. G. (2014). Modern man in search of a soul. Routledge.
[^32]: https://ciphertrace.com/ciphertrace-announces-worlds-first-monero-tracing-capabilities/
[^33]: https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks
[^34]: https://www.getmonero.org/resources/research-lab/pubs/whitepaper_annotated.pdf
[^35]: https://pirate.black/files/whitepaper/The_Pirate_Code_V2.0.pdf
[^36]: https://www.cisecurity.org
[^37]: https://public.cyber.mil/stigs
[^38]: https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings
[^39]: https://keepassxc.org
[^40]: https://www.documentcloud.org/search/projectid:51061-Palantir-September-2020