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156 lines
7.1 KiB
Plaintext
156 lines
7.1 KiB
Plaintext
## Configuration file for Haveno Seednode
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##
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## To start/reload/etc this instance, run "systemctl start tor" (or reload, or..).
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## This instance will run as user debian-tor; its data directory is /var/lib/tor.
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##
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## This file is configured via:
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## /usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc
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##
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## See 'man tor', for more options you can use in this file.
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## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
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## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
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## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
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#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
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# ### SocksPort flag: OnionTrafficOnly ###
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## Tell the tor client to only connect to .onion addresses in response to SOCKS5 requests on this connection.
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## This is equivalent to NoDNSRequest, NoIPv4Traffic, NoIPv6Traffic.
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# ### SocksPort flag: ExtendedErrors ###
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## Return extended error code in the SOCKS reply. So far, the possible errors are:
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# X'F0' Onion Service Descriptor Can Not be Found
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# X'F1' Onion Service Descriptor Is Invalid
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# X'F2' Onion Service Introduction Failed
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# X'F3' Onion Service Rendezvous Failed
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# X'F4' Onion Service Missing Client Authorization
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# X'F5' Onion Service Wrong Client Authorization
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# X'F6' Onion Service Invalid Address
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# X'F7' Onion Service Introduction Timed Out
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SocksPort 9050 OnionTrafficOnly ExtendedErrors
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## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
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## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
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## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
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## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
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## you make.
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SocksPolicy accept 127.0.0.1
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SocksPolicy accept6 [::1]
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SocksPolicy reject *
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## Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol
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## — ones that only provide an IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
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## Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS. (Default: 0)
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#SafeSocks 1
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## Tor will make a notice-level log entry for each connection to the Socks port indicating
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## whether the request used a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks).
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## This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking DNS requests. (Default: 0)
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TestSocks 1
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## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
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## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
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## you want.
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##
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## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
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## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
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##
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## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
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#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
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## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
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#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
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## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles (This is default)
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#Log notice syslog
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## To send all messages to stderr:
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#Log debug stderr
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# Try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise. This is useful when running on flash memory.
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AvoidDiskWrites 1
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## TODO: This option has no effect. Bisq/Haveno is tor client &/or hidden service. 'man torrc':
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## Relays and bridges only. When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated statistics on its
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## role as hidden-service directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours.
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## If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published as part of the extra-info document. (Default: 1)
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HiddenServiceStatistics 0
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## NOTE: In order to use the ControlPort, the <user> must belong to the tor group.
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## sudo usermod -aG debian-tor <user>
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##
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## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
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## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
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#ControlPort 9051
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## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
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## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
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##
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## Compute the hash of a password with "tor --hash-password password".
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#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
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CookieAuthentication 0 # (Default: 1)
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## MetricsPort provides an interface to the underlying Tor relay metrics.
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## Exposing publicly is dangerous, set a very strict access policy.
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## Retrieve the metrics with: curl http://127.0.0.1:9035/metrics
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MetricsPort 127.0.0.1:9035
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MetricsPortPolicy accept 127.0.0.1
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MetricsPortPolicy accept [::1]
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############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
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## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
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## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
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## to tell people. e.g.: 'sudo cat /var/lib/tor/haveno_seednode/hostname'
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##
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## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
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## address y:z.
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##
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## If you plan to keep your service available for a long time, you might want to make a backup copy
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## of the private_key file or complete folder /var/lib/tor/hidden_service somewhere.
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#### Haveno seednode incoming anonymity connections ###
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/haveno_seednode
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HiddenServicePort 2002 127.0.0.1:2002
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HiddenServicePort 2002 [::1]:2002
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## NOTE: HiddenService options are per onion service
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## https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/dos/
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##
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## Rate limiting at the Introduction Points
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## Intropoint protections prevents onion service DoS from becoming a DoS for the entire machine and its guard.
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HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense 1
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#HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSRatePerSec 25 # (Default: 25)
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#HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSBurstPerSec 200 # (Default: 200)
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# Number of introduction points the hidden service will have. You can’t have more than 20.
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#HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 3 # (Default: 3)
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## https://tpo.pages.torproject.net/onion-services/ecosystem/technology/pow/#configuring-an-onion-service-with-the-pow-protection
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## Proof of Work (PoW) before establishing Rendezvous Circuits
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## The lower the queue and burst rates, the higher the puzzle effort tends to be for users.
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HiddenServicePoWDefensesEnabled 1
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HiddenServicePoWQueueRate 50 # (Default: 250)
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HiddenServicePoWQueueBurst 250 # (Default: 2500)
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## Stream limits in the established Rendezvous Circuits
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## The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous circuit. The max value allowed is 65535. (0 = unlimited)
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HiddenServiceMaxStreams 25
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#HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 1
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#### Haveno seednode2 incoming anonymity connections ###
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/haveno_seednode2
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HiddenServicePort 2003 127.0.0.1:2003
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HiddenServicePort 2003 [::1]:2003
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HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSDefense 1
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#HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSRatePerSec 25 # (Default: 25)
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#HiddenServiceEnableIntroDoSBurstPerSec 200 # (Default: 200)
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#HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 3 # (Default: 3)
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HiddenServicePoWDefensesEnabled 1
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HiddenServicePoWQueueRate 50 # (Default: 250)
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HiddenServicePoWQueueBurst 250 # (Default: 2500)
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HiddenServiceMaxStreams 25
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#HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 1
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#####################################################################
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LongLivedPorts 2002,2003
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## Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300
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