- description needs to stay changed from just cookies since it also clears site data
- keep the info about n days out of it, it's just messy (ESR users should be on version 60)
- get the values correct (I mixed them up earlier)
- fixup [setting] path
- leave in one (of two) extra [notes] I previously added
whatever we thought it may have done in the past, it doesn't do that now as far as we know. And it's not an issue since we allow extension update-CHECKs anyway.
regardless of this pref setting: the permissions.sqlite file will still be abused to store a flag for this for every single site you connect to (as third party?) - fun.
* clean up "Firefox Data Collection & Use"
- telemetry prefs to 330's
- Firefox Data Collection & Use prefs to 340's (but leave crash reports in 350s)
- move `app.shield.optoutstudies.enabled` to 330's - this is an internal pref which controls if you get the system addon
- make notes that `datareporting.healthreport.uploadEnabled` controls studies and ext recommendations
- split crash reports better to reflex the UI setting
`browser.urlbar.maxHistoricalSearchSuggestions` is default 0 is FF60 thru to FF66. It is also default 0 in ESR60.1 thru 60.5. (at least on Windows)
IDK if this has ever been used, maybe android, in which case it's probably useful?
The location bar dropdown cannot be disabled via prefs except with css, in which case the whole thing is hidden regardless of he above prefs. So there is no point in making any of them active. This is also in line with what we can achieve with relaxed and hardened tags / sticky issues - that is we can find a better balance, Shoulder surfers is a low risk, not even Tor Browser disables this stuff. People need to take responsibility and/or use common sense. Sure, we can leave em in for users to know about and enable if they want. End of story.
userChrome.css code is
```css
/* locationbar dropdown FF65+ */
#PopupAutoCompleteRichResult {display: none!important;}
```
might as well add it: needs t be taken into consideration when looking at the whole http2 thing. Will be interesting to see what Tor Browser does with it in ESR68
it's too hard to follow AS changes, and work out if disabling showing items (basic toggling of show/hide sections etc) actually stops downloading a localized local copy etc. For items we actually want to block, let the endpoint slaughter begin.
let's just coverage-our-ass on this one
While I don't mind telemetry (development needs meaningful feedback to better the product), and I trust the data is not PII, and/or anonymized into buckets etc (you can check this you know), and I understand this one needs to be outside the Telemetry pref in order to gather the one-time ping ... and I trust Mozilla's motives ... I'm starting to get a little annoyed at the non-stop incessant increasing telemetry bullshittery and ass-fuckery around sending data home, and the lengths some Mozilla devs will go to, to hide this info (hidden prefs, access denied tickets to hide discussion of what should be public, and even **not even adhering to their own documentation**).
I will also be killing as many Activity Stream endpoints as well - as long as they are in line with our js - pocket, snippets, onboarding etc. And I will add those from personal as inactive for end-users - eg cfr
remember the new Coverage Telemetry shit? with a **hidden** opt-out pref? guess what, they are already collecting for 3 months ...
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1487578 - **3 months ago**: "I see data coming in that looks reasonable"
guess what else ...
"It has also replaced the previous version that was there (from bug 1480194)" and oh, surprise surprise, 1480194 is ACCESS DENIED!
they're not just using private tickets to hide security critical information from potential hackers and blackhats, no they also use it to hide shady AF things. Things that they fully know are shady as fuck and that they absolutely know a lot of people would not like. There's simply no other reason why they'd do that
but wait, that's not all. If you think an opt-out pref that 99% of people wouldn't know about even if it showed up in about:config BUT ALSO HAPPENS TO BE HIDDEN is kind of questionable, well ... the system addon that they use for this shit apparently looked or still looks for `toolkit.telemetry.coverage.opt-out` [1] instead of `toolkit.coverage.opt-out` as their documentation [2] claims
[1] https://github.com/mozilla/one-off-system-add-ons/pull/131/files#diff-6e0cbf76986d04383ccb32a29ef27a7aR25
[2] https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/file/tip/toolkit/components/telemetry/docs/data/coverage-ping.rst#l32
It's time to opt out of all that shit for good. Disable system addon updates and kill it at the root
> In FF61 and lower, you will not get any System Add-on updates except when you update Firefox
on its own that's not true. You will get SA updates unless you disable app update checks + auto install. Let's just remove that as well.
* move 1260 to 122x
"disable or limit SHA-1 certificates" is about certs, not ciphers.
Because CERTS is 1st in the title I moved it to the 1st item there because it's arguably also the most important of the lot (and renumbered the rest)
We can also drop HSTS from the subgroup title because there's nothing HSTS left atm.
