currently 3rd party service workers are blocked in FF95 when dFPI is enabled (which this version has should anyone update to 96-alpha)
- but I get an error even on first party - https://arkenfox.github.io/TZP/tzp.html#storage
- I get : service worker | test : enabled | failed: SecurityError
in FF96+ service workers they are covered by dFPI
- see https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1731999
we've never used these
- service workers are disabled (or soon to be covered by dFPI when enabled) and sanitizing is already done (or will be done via enhanced cookie cleaning)
- storage API, storage access API: we sanitize on close, and sites are isolated by eTLD+1
- in v94 we switched to cookies lifetime as session, so users could use site exceptions to retain selected cookies (to stay logged in one assumes)
- that mean not deleting all cookies on shutdown
- but some login methods/types require more than cookies and also need the "site data" part of "cookies + site data" - that's the offlineApps part
- note: all site data (and cookies) is still cleared on close except site exceptions
FYI: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1738372
There is a small privacy issue with shoulder surfers, but in reality, this just needs to happen IMO
- we already prompt where to save, but even if we didn't, we also know we clicked or initiated a download
- unless it's a drive by or user-gesture trickery - which is why we prompt
- the download icon is shown (if hidden) and the throbber/accent color go to work
- users can always click the icon to show entries (and open folder etc)
- this maintains the current behavior in FF94
anti-fingerprinting doesn't fit here: it's not a major component or priority of this user.js, and only a few prefs outside RFP (as a robust built-in browser solution that defeats naive scripts) have anything to do with it
move all sanitizing on exit prefs into 2800
switch to cookie lifetime as session
- now users can utilize exceptions (as allow)
- session cookies still block service workers (which we disable anyway)
- we still block 3rd party cookies (until we move to dFPI)
- we still have defense in depth for 3rd party cookies with 2803
- we still bulk sanitize offlineApps on exit: localStorage, service worker cache, QuotaManager (IndexedDB, asm-cache)
- i.e you get to keep the cookies only IF you add an exception
add `privacy.clearsitedata.cache.enabled`
The point was that google have said (stated in policy, but fuck knows where that is located these days) that it is anonymized and not used for tracking. It's an API used by **_4 billion devices_** - the API has privacy policies for use. If a whistleblower or someone else found out that google was using this to enhance their user profiling, then all hell would break loose. And they don't even need this to fuel their ad revenue. It is provided, gratis, to the web to help ensure security - they wouldn't dare taint it and get it caught up in a privacy scandal involving **+4 billion devices_**. And in all this time (since 2007), there has been no such whistleblower or proof it is used to track or announcements by google of changes to the contrary.
Anyway, a quick search brings up
- Here is their policy - https://www.google.com/intl/en_us/privacy/browsing.html - it's empty and points to
- https://www.google.com/intl/en/chrome/privacy/
- and if you scroll down to "Safe Browsing practices" it doesn't say anything about privacy policies for the API itself (or the owner of the API) - it just spells out what happens in chrome
- I'm not going to bother to look any further and find a history of policy changes
Anyway, this is Firefox and hashes are part hashes bundled with other real hashes - and we turned off real time binary checks. So this line can fuck the fuck off. It was meant to reassure those who want the security of real-time binary checks, that privacy "shouldn't" be an issue, but I'm not going to expand on it
- and remove obsolete ESR78 notations
- note: we leave the deprecated ESR78.x section and item 6050 until v95 so users upgrading to ESR91 can easily reset those prefs with prefsCleaner
- this helps mitigate the need for scratchpad for those who use prefsCleaner
- in future, if anything was active during the ESR cycle, then it goes in here when removed
- similar to deprecated items: clean out after ESR EOL
- I am no longer short one parrot
- move inactive screenshots to personal
- move FORM autofill to `0800... FORMS` - can't find it now, but this is slated to cease being a system addon and instead be "built-in"
- the rest will get swallowed into a revamped, split QUIETER FOX
- there was only one perf left
- warning is down to 5: two in section headers, 3 on inactive prefs: no need to mention it, people will see them if they read each item/section
More minor tweaks to come. This isn't final
- 0102: ambiguous that the clearing was related to PB mode
- 0900s:
- get rid of 0901, it has no pref, stick link in header
- 0905: values on multi-lines use spaces = more readable
- 1000s:
- rename as disk avoidance and remove sub-section headers
- remove the outdated section header
- 4001: it will never be perfected, it's doing it's job
- 5500s: optional hardening
- legit security measures, but commonality in caveats, so I made them a separate section
- this flips graphite, asm.js and wasm from active to inactive: these are overkill: exhibit A: hundreds of millions of Firefox users
- e.g. graphite and wasm are enabled on Tor Browser
- new CVE keyword links
- 7000s: don't bother - two more items added
- 5000s: optional opsec and cleanout 0800s header
- re-number
- 0900s, 1000s, 1400s, 2400s
PS: I need a new parrot: "9000 syntax error: I ran out of parrots"
Yes it's pretty much useless. Yes it's fingerprintable, and what that entropy is, who knows. Since it's sent regardless with ETP, which we enable in all windows, then who cares. And if you don't use ETP in all windows, then I don't care either - just saying
probably more professional to keep it at the end since it isn't strictly project related. It also opens up space for `DON'T TOUCH` and `OPTIONAL OPSEC`
- merged 3DES cipher to bottom: it is still the same order of [1]
- 3DES pref will be deprecated: pref name changes, and the cipher slated to be unavailable unless you downgrade to < TLS1.2 - see https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1724072
- FYI: we reset TLS downgrades to session only by resetting the pref currently in 1203
- "Minimal/non-existent threat of downgrade attacks"
- FYI: these old ciphers are about 1-2% of traffic (from memory) - but that's still significant breakage
- So the only reason to do this would be to harden against downgrade attacks (and inadvertently use weak sites = breakage): but that doesn't fit most user's threat model: and is probably never going to happen for them. Not sure if I can word that much better and just as succinct
- inactive in user.js since
- v55: gfx.direct2d.disabled
- v67: layers.acceleration.disabled
- the way to counter hardware fingerprinting is within each API that may expose it
- this may have made some sense way back in the day, when there were less options/protections, but not any more
- [are we web render yet](https://arewewebrenderyet.com/) - yes, 100% - there is no need to cripple your browser's perf
- inactive since we added it in v63
- this is not how you defeat fingerprinting (unless done in an enforced set)
- for the record: not even tor browser disable this
- fingerprinting this is not cheap in gecko (for now)
- from [2]
- decoding/encoding capabilities: "it is expected that the entropy ... isn’t going to be significant"
- HDR detection: "... has the potential to add significant entropy .. however .. but ... thus minimizing effective entropy" - it is what it is
- note that RFP has some mitigations in FF82+ 1461454
