decentralized-protocols-toolkit/cryptoeconomics

cryptoeconomics

game theory

• columbia cryptoeconomics workshop 2022
• standford class on game theory and advanced course
• finding pure strategy nash equilibrium in finite simultaneous games
• censorship resistance in on-chain auctions, pai et al.
  • single proposer blockchains are not ideal for holding time sensitive auctions when the number of potential bidders is large. collusion arrangements are extremely profitable for the colluding bidder but only marginally profitable for the proposer. order agnostics mechanism should solve mev.
• algorithmic game theory, by t. roughgarden
• algorithmic game theory (the book), by nisan et al.

protocol economics and auctions

• CADlabs's ethereum economic model
• protocol economics: the ethereum protocol’s perspective, by vub
• a16z menagerie of auction mechanisms implemented in solidity
• on some results and challenges in cryptoeconomics, by t. roughgarden
• centralization in attester-proposer separation, m. pai and m. resnick
• the cases for focil and multi-proposer schemes on ethereum, by p. garimidi