constellation/internal/attestation/vtpm/attestation.go
Moritz Sanft 913b09aeb8
Support SEV-SNP on GCP (#3011)
* terraform: enable creation of SEV-SNP VMs on GCP

* variant: add SEV-SNP attestation variant

* config: add SEV-SNP config options for GCP

* measurements: add GCP SEV-SNP measurements

* gcp: separate package for SEV-ES

* attestation: add GCP SEV-SNP attestation logic

* gcp: factor out common logic

* choose: add GCP SEV-SNP

* cli: add TF variable passthrough for GCP SEV-SNP variables

* cli: support GCP SEV-SNP for `constellation verify`

* Adjust usage of GCP SEV-SNP throughout codebase

* ci: add GCP SEV-SNP

* terraform-provider: support GCP SEV-SNP

* docs: add GCP SEV-SNP reference

* linter fixes

* gcp: only run test with TPM simulator

* gcp: remove nonsense test

* Update cli/internal/cmd/verify.go

Co-authored-by: Daniel Weiße <66256922+daniel-weisse@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update docs/docs/overview/clouds.md

Co-authored-by: Daniel Weiße <66256922+daniel-weisse@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update terraform-provider-constellation/internal/provider/attestation_data_source_test.go

Co-authored-by: Adrian Stobbe <stobbe.adrian@gmail.com>

* linter fixes

* terraform_provider: correctly pass down CC technology

* config: mark attestationconfigapi as unimplemented

* gcp: fix comments and typos

* snp: use nonce and PK hash in SNP report

* snp: ensure we never use ARK supplied by Issuer (#3025)

* Make sure SNP ARK is always loaded from config, or fetched from AMD KDS
* GCP: Set validator `reportData` correctly

---------

Signed-off-by: Daniel Weiße <dw@edgeless.systems>
Co-authored-by: Moritz Sanft <58110325+msanft@users.noreply.github.com>

* attestationconfigapi: add GCP to uploading

* snp: use correct cert

Signed-off-by: Moritz Sanft <58110325+msanft@users.noreply.github.com>

* terraform-provider: enable fetching of attestation config values for GCP SEV-SNP

* linter fixes

---------

Signed-off-by: Daniel Weiße <dw@edgeless.systems>
Signed-off-by: Moritz Sanft <58110325+msanft@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Weiße <66256922+daniel-weisse@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Adrian Stobbe <stobbe.adrian@gmail.com>
2024-04-16 18:13:47 +02:00

303 lines
10 KiB
Go

/*
Copyright (c) Edgeless Systems GmbH
SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
*/
package vtpm
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"slices"
"github.com/google/go-sev-guest/proto/sevsnp"
tpmClient "github.com/google/go-tpm-tools/client"
"github.com/google/go-tpm-tools/proto/attest"
tpmProto "github.com/google/go-tpm-tools/proto/tpm"
tpmServer "github.com/google/go-tpm-tools/server"
"github.com/google/go-tpm/legacy/tpm2"
"github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2/internal/attestation"
"github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2/internal/attestation/measurements"
)
var (
// AzurePCRSelection are the PCR values verified for Azure Constellations.
// PCR[0] is excluded due to changing rarely, but unpredictably.
// PCR[6] is excluded due to being different for any 2 VMs. See: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A157%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C33%2C400%2C0%5D
// PCR[10] is excluded since its value is derived from a digest of PCR[0-7]. See: https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/#ima-measurement-list
AzurePCRSelection = tpm2.PCRSelection{
Hash: tpm2.AlgSHA256,
PCRs: []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23},
}
// GCPPCRSelection are the PCR values verified for GCP Constellations.
// On GCP firmware and other host controlled systems are static. This results in the same PCRs for any 2 VMs using the same image.
GCPPCRSelection = tpmClient.FullPcrSel(tpm2.AlgSHA256)
// AWSPCRSelection are the PCR values verified for AWS based Constellations.
// PCR[1] is excluded. See: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22:157,%22gen%22:0%7D,%7B%22name%22:%22XYZ%22%7D,33,400,0%5D
// PCR[10] is excluded since its value is derived from a digest of PCR[0-7]. See: https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/#ima-measurement-list
AWSPCRSelection = tpm2.PCRSelection{
Hash: tpm2.AlgSHA256,
PCRs: []int{0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23},
}
// QEMUPCRSelection are the PCR values verified for QEMU based Constellations.
// PCR[1] is excluded. See: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22:157,%22gen%22:0%7D,%7B%22name%22:%22XYZ%22%7D,33,400,0%5D
// PCR[10] is excluded since its value is derived from a digest of PCR[0-7]. See: https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/#ima-measurement-list
QEMUPCRSelection = tpm2.PCRSelection{
Hash: tpm2.AlgSHA256,
PCRs: []int{0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23},
}
)
type (
// GetTPMAttestationKey loads a TPM key to perform attestation.
GetTPMAttestationKey func(tpm io.ReadWriter) (*tpmClient.Key, error)
// GetTPMTrustedAttestationPublicKey verifies and returns the attestation public key.
GetTPMTrustedAttestationPublicKey func(context.Context, AttestationDocument, []byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error)
// GetInstanceInfo returns VM metdata.
GetInstanceInfo func(ctx context.Context, tpm io.ReadWriteCloser, extraData []byte) ([]byte, error)
// ValidateCVM validates confidential computing capabilities of the instance issuing the attestation.
ValidateCVM func(attestation AttestationDocument, state *attest.MachineState) error
)
// AttestationDocument contains the TPM attestation with signed user data.
type AttestationDocument struct {
// Attestation contains the TPM event log, PCR values and quotes, and public key of the key used to sign the attestation.
Attestation *attest.Attestation
// InstanceInfo is used to verify the provided public key.
InstanceInfo []byte
// arbitrary data, quoted by the TPM.
UserData []byte
}
// Issuer handles issuing of TPM based attestation documents.
type Issuer struct {
openTPM TPMOpenFunc
getAttestationKey GetTPMAttestationKey
getInstanceInfo GetInstanceInfo
log attestation.Logger
}
// NewIssuer returns a new Issuer.
func NewIssuer(
openTPM TPMOpenFunc, getAttestationKey GetTPMAttestationKey,
getInstanceInfo GetInstanceInfo, log attestation.Logger,
) *Issuer {
if log == nil {
log = &attestation.NOPLogger{}
}
return &Issuer{
openTPM: openTPM,
getAttestationKey: getAttestationKey,
getInstanceInfo: getInstanceInfo,
log: log,
}
}
// Issue generates an attestation document using a TPM.
func (i *Issuer) Issue(ctx context.Context, userData []byte, nonce []byte) (res []byte, err error) {
i.log.Info("Issuing attestation statement")
defer func() {
if err != nil {
i.log.Warn(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to issue attestation statement: %s", err))
}
}()
tpm, err := i.openTPM()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening TPM: %w", err)
}
defer tpm.Close()
// Load the TPM's attestation key
aK, err := i.getAttestationKey(tpm)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("loading attestation key: %w", err)
}
defer aK.Close()
extraData := attestation.MakeExtraData(userData, nonce)
// Fetch instance info of the VM
instanceInfo, err := i.getInstanceInfo(ctx, tpm, extraData)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetching instance info: %w", err)
}
tpmNonce := makeTpmNonce(instanceInfo, extraData)
// Create an attestation using the loaded key
tpmAttestation, err := aK.Attest(tpmClient.AttestOpts{Nonce: tpmNonce[:]})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating attestation: %w", err)
}
attDoc := AttestationDocument{
Attestation: tpmAttestation,
InstanceInfo: instanceInfo,
UserData: userData,
}
rawAttDoc, err := json.Marshal(attDoc)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshaling attestation document: %w", err)
}
i.log.Info("Successfully issued attestation statement")
return rawAttDoc, nil
}
// Validator handles validation of TPM based attestation.
type Validator struct {
expected measurements.M
getTrustedKey GetTPMTrustedAttestationPublicKey
validateCVM ValidateCVM
log attestation.Logger
}
// NewValidator returns a new Validator.
func NewValidator(expected measurements.M, getTrustedKey GetTPMTrustedAttestationPublicKey,
validateCVM ValidateCVM, log attestation.Logger,
) *Validator {
if log == nil {
log = &attestation.NOPLogger{}
}
return &Validator{
expected: expected,
getTrustedKey: getTrustedKey,
validateCVM: validateCVM,
log: log,
}
}
// Validate a TPM based attestation.
func (v *Validator) Validate(ctx context.Context, attDocRaw []byte, nonce []byte) (userData []byte, err error) {
v.log.Info("Validating attestation document")
defer func() {
if err != nil {
v.log.Warn(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to validate attestation document: %s", err))
}
}()
// Explicitly initialize this struct, as TeeAttestation
// is a "oneof" protobuf field, which needs an explicit
// type to be set to be unmarshaled correctly.
// Note: this value is incompatible with TDX attestation!
// TODO(msanft): select the correct attestation type (SEV-SNP, TDX, ...) here.
attDoc := AttestationDocument{
Attestation: &attest.Attestation{
TeeAttestation: &attest.Attestation_SevSnpAttestation{
SevSnpAttestation: &sevsnp.Attestation{},
},
},
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(attDocRaw, &attDoc); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshaling TPM attestation document: %w", err)
}
extraData := attestation.MakeExtraData(attDoc.UserData, nonce)
// Verify and retrieve the trusted attestation public key using the provided instance info
aKP, err := v.getTrustedKey(ctx, attDoc, extraData)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("validating attestation public key: %w", err)
}
tpmNonce := makeTpmNonce(attDoc.InstanceInfo, extraData)
// Verify the TPM attestation
state, err := tpmServer.VerifyAttestation(
attDoc.Attestation,
tpmServer.VerifyOpts{
Nonce: tpmNonce[:],
TrustedAKs: []crypto.PublicKey{aKP},
AllowSHA1: false,
},
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("verifying attestation document: %w", err)
}
// Validate confidential computing capabilities of the VM
if err := v.validateCVM(attDoc, state); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("verifying VM confidential computing capabilities: %w", err)
}
// Verify PCRs
quoteIdx, err := GetSHA256QuoteIndex(attDoc.Attestation.Quotes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
warnings, errs := v.expected.Compare(attDoc.Attestation.Quotes[quoteIdx].Pcrs.Pcrs)
for _, warning := range warnings {
v.log.Warn(warning)
}
if len(errs) > 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("measurement validation failed:\n%w", errors.Join(errs...))
}
v.log.Info("Successfully validated attestation document")
return attDoc.UserData, nil
}
// GetSHA256QuoteIndex performs safety checks and returns the index for SHA256 PCR quotes.
func GetSHA256QuoteIndex(quotes []*tpmProto.Quote) (int, error) {
if len(quotes) == 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("attestation is missing quotes")
}
for idx, quote := range quotes {
if quote == nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("quote is nil")
}
if quote.Pcrs == nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("no PCR data in attestation")
}
if quote.Pcrs.Hash == tpmProto.HashAlgo_SHA256 {
return idx, nil
}
}
return 0, fmt.Errorf("attestation did not include SHA256 hashed PCRs")
}
// GetSelectedMeasurements returns a map of Measurments for the PCRs in selection.
func GetSelectedMeasurements(open TPMOpenFunc, selection tpm2.PCRSelection) (measurements.M, error) {
tpm, err := open()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer tpm.Close()
pcrList, err := tpmClient.ReadPCRs(tpm, selection)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m := make(measurements.M)
for i, pcr := range pcrList.Pcrs {
if len(pcr) != 32 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid measurement: invalid length: %d", len(pcr))
}
m[i] = measurements.Measurement{
Expected: pcr,
}
}
return m, nil
}
// makeTpmNonce creates a nonce for the TPM attestation and returns it in its marshaled form.
func makeTpmNonce(instanceInfo []byte, extraData []byte) [32]byte {
// Finding: GCP nonces cannot be larger than 32 bytes.
return sha256.Sum256(slices.Concat(instanceInfo, extraData))
}