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docs: update state of clouds (#1732)

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Co-authored-by: Thomas Tendyck <51411342+thomasten@users.noreply.github.com>
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docs/docs/overview/clouds.md
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@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ For Constellation, the ideal environment provides the following:
(1) is a functional must-have. (2)--(4) are required for remote attestation that fully keeps the infrastructure/cloud out. Constellation can work without them or with approximations, but won't protect against certain privileged attackers anymore. (1) is a functional must-have. (2)--(4) are required for remote attestation that fully keeps the infrastructure/cloud out. Constellation can work without them or with approximations, but won't protect against certain privileged attackers anymore.
The following table summarizes the state of features for different infrastructures as of September 2022. The following table summarizes the state of features for different infrastructures as of May 2023.
| **Feature** | **Azure** | **GCP** | **AWS** | **OpenStack (Yoga)** | | **Feature** | **Azure** | **GCP** | **AWS** | **OpenStack (Yoga)** |
|-------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|----------------------| |-------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|----------------------|
| **1. Custom images** | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | | **1. Custom images** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| **2. SEV-SNP or TDX** | Yes | No | No | Depends on kernel/HV | | **2. SEV-SNP or TDX** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Depends on kernel/HV |
| **3. Raw guest attestation** | Yes | No | No | Depends on kernel/HV | | **3. Raw guest attestation** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Depends on kernel/HV |
| **4. Reviewable firmware** | No* | No | No | Depends on kernel/HV | | **4. Reviewable firmware** | No* | No | No* | Depends on kernel/HV |
## Microsoft Azure ## Microsoft Azure
@ -28,11 +28,19 @@ With its [CVM offering](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/confidential-comp
## Google Cloud Platform (GCP) ## Google Cloud Platform (GCP)
The [CVMs available in GCP](https://cloud.google.com/compute/confidential-vm/docs/create-confidential-vm-instance) are based on AMD SEV but don't have SNP features enabled. This impacts attestation capabilities. Currently, GCP doesn't offer CVM-based attestation at all. Instead, GCP provides attestation statements based on its regular [vTPM](https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/virtual-trusted-platform-module-for-shielded-vms-security-in-plaintext), which is managed by the hypervisor. On GCP, the hypervisor is thus currently part of Constellation's TCB. The [CVMs Generally Available in GCP](https://cloud.google.com/compute/confidential-vm/docs/create-confidential-vm-instance) are based on AMD SEV but don't have SNP features enabled.
CVMs with SEV-SNP enabled are currently in [private preview](https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/rsa-snp-vm-more-confidential). Regarding (3), with their SEV-SNP offering Google provides direct access to remote-attestation statements.
However, regarding (4), the CVMs still include closed-source firmware.
Intel and Google have [collaborated](https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/rsa-google-intel-confidential-computing-more-secure) to enhance the security of TDX, and have recently [revealed](https://venturebeat.com/security/intel-launches-confidential-computing-solution-for-virtual-machines/) their plans to make TDX compatible with Google Cloud.
## Amazon Web Services (AWS) ## Amazon Web Services (AWS)
Amazon EC2 [supports AMD SEV-SNP](https://aws.amazon.com/de/about-aws/whats-new/2023/04/amazon-ec2-amd-sev-snp/). Regarding (3), AWS provides direct access to remote-attestation statements.
However, attestation is partially based on the [NitroTPM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/nitrotpm.html) for [measured boot](../architecture/attestation.md#measured-boot), which is a vTPM managed by the Nitro hypervisor. Hence, the hypervisor is currently part of Constellation's TCB.
\* Regarding (4), the CVMs include initial firmware inside the CVM based on [OVMF](https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/OVMF). Once this firmware will be reproducible and therefore verifiable, (4) switches from *No* to *Yes*.
AWS currently doesn't offer CVMs. AWS proprietary Nitro Enclaves offer some related features but [are explicitly not designed to keep AWS itself out](https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/confidential-computing-an-aws-perspective/). Besides, they aren't suitable for running entire Kubernetes nodes inside them. Therefore, Constellation uses regular EC2 instances on AWS [Nitro](https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/nitro/) without runtime encryption. Attestation is based on the [NitroTPM](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/nitrotpm.html), which is a vTPM managed by the Nitro hypervisor. Hence, the hypervisor is currently part of Constellation's TCB.
## OpenStack ## OpenStack