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docs: minor wording fixes in overview pages

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Thomas Tendyck 2022-09-16 11:44:24 +02:00 • committed by Thomas Tendyck
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docs/versioned_docs/version-2.0/overview/security-benefits.md
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@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ This opens up a large attack surface where workloads and data can be read, copie
## Infrastructure-based attacks
Malicious cloud users ("hackers") may break out of their tenancy and access other tenants' data. Advanced attackers may even be able to establish a permanent foothold within the infrastructure and repeatedly access data over a longer period. Analogously to the *insider access* scenario, Constellation also prevents access to a deployment's data in this scenario.
Malicious cloud users ("hackers") may break out of their tenancy and access other tenants' data. Advanced attackers may even be able to establish a permanent foothold within the infrastructure and access data over a longer period. Analogously to the *insider access* scenario, Constellation also prevents access to a deployment's data in this scenario.
## Supply chain attacks
Supply chain security is receiving lots of attention recently due to an [increasing number of recorded attacks](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/understanding-the-increase-in-supply-chain-security-attacks). For instance, a malicious actor could attempt to tamper Constellation node images (including Kubernetes and other software) before they're loaded in the confidential VMs of a cluster. Constellation uses remote attestation in conjunction with public transparency logs to prevent this. The approach is detailed [here](../architecture/attestation.md).
Supply chain security is receiving lots of attention recently due to an [increasing number of recorded attacks](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/understanding-the-increase-in-supply-chain-security-attacks). For instance, a malicious actor could attempt to tamper Constellation node images (including Kubernetes and other software) before they're loaded in the confidential VMs of a cluster. Constellation uses [remote attestation](../architecture/attestation.md) in conjunction with public [transparency logs](../workflows/verify-cli.md) to prevent this.
In the future, Constellation will extend this feature to customer workloads. This will enable cluster owners to create auditable policies that precisely define which containers can run in a given deployment.