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docs: publish to 2.1
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@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ The remote attestation statement of a Constellation cluster combines *baseID* an
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Constellation encrypts all cluster network communication using the [container network interface (CNI)](https://github.com/containernetworking/cni).
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See [network encryption](networking.md) for more details.
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The Cilium agent running on each cluster node will establish a secure WireGuard tunnel between it and all other known nodes in the cluster.
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Each node automatically creates its own [Curve25519](http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html) encryption key-pair and distributes its public key via Kubernetes.
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Each node’s public key is then used by other nodes to decrypt and encrypt traffic from and to Cilium-managed endpoints running on that node.
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The Cilium agent running on each node establishes a secure [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com/) tunnel between it and all other known nodes in the cluster.
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Each node creates its own [Curve25519](http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html) encryption key pair and distributes its public key via Kubernetes.
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A node uses another node's public key to decrypt and encrypt traffic from and to Cilium-managed endpoints running on that node.
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Connections are always encrypted peer-to-peer using [ChaCha20](http://cr.yp.to/chacha.html) with [Poly1305](http://cr.yp.to/mac.html).
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WireGuard implements [forward secrecy with key rotation every 2 minutes](https://lists.zx2c4.com/pipermail/wireguard/2017-December/002141.html).
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Cilium supports [key rotation](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/gettingstarted/encryption-ipsec/#key-rotation) for the long-term node keys via Kubernetes secrets.
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@ -61,10 +61,10 @@ As a cluster administrator, when creating a cluster, you can use the Constellati
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#### Key material and key derivation
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During the creation of a Constellation, the cluster's master secret is used to derive a KEK.
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During the creation of a Constellation cluster, the cluster's master secret is used to derive a KEK.
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This means creating two clusters with the same master secret will yield the same KEK.
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Any data encryption key (DEK) is derived from the KEK via HKDF.
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Note that the master secret is recommended to be unique for every Constellation cluster and shouldn't be reused (except in case of [recovering](../workflows/recovery.md) a cluster).
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Note that the master secret is recommended to be unique for every cluster and shouldn't be reused (except in case of [recovering](../workflows/recovery.md) a cluster).
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#### State and storage
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@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ User-managed key management is under active development and will be available so
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In scenarios where constellation-managed key management isn't an option, this mode allows you to keep full control of your keys.
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For example, compliance requirements may force you to keep your KEKs in an on-prem key management system (KMS).
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During the creation of a Constellation, you specify a KEK present in a remote KMS.
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During the creation of a Constellation cluster, you specify a KEK present in a remote KMS.
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This follows the common scheme of "bring your own key" (BYOK).
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Constellation will support several KMSs for managing the storage and access of your KEK.
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Initially, it will support the following KMSs:
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