An overview about what data is measured into the different registers can be found [in the TPM spec](https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A157%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C33%2C400%2C0%5D).
We use the TPM and its PCRs to verify all nodes of a Constellation run with the same firmware and OS software.
### Azure trusted launch
PCR[0] measures the firmware volume (FV). Changes to FV also change PCR[0], making it unreliable for attestation.
PCR[6] measures the VM ID. This is unusable for cluster attestation for two reasons:
2. A user may attest any node of the cluster without knowing the VM ID
PCR[10] is used by Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA).
IMA creates runtime measurements based on a measurement policy (which is obsolete for Constellation, since we use dm-verity).
The first entry of the runtime measurements is the `boot_aggregate`. It is a SHA1 hash over PCRs 0 to 7.
As detailed earlier, PCR[6] is different for every VM in Azure, therefore PCR[10] will also be different since it includes PCR[6], meaning we can not use it for attestation.
IMA writing its measurements into PCR[10] can not be disabled without rebuilding the kernel.
### Azure flexible deployment and attestation (FDA)
With FDA CVMs measuring all of the firmware, it should be possible to use all PCRs for attestation since we know, and can choose, what firmware is running.
### GCP confidential VM
GCP uses confidential VMs based on AMD SEV-ES with a vTPM interface.
PCR[0] contains the measurement of a string marking the VM as using ADM SEV-ES.