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advanced_expert/vulnerabilities/reentrancy_attacks/README.md
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advanced_expert/vulnerabilities/reentrancy_attacks/README.md
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## reentrancy attacks
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### tl; dr
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* when a contract calls an external function, that external function may itself call the calling function.
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* a reentrancy attack may occur when a function makes an external call to another untrusted contract. Then, the unstrusted contract makes a recursive callback to the vulnerable contract function to steal funds.
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* to prevent this attack, a contract can implement a lock in storage that prevents re-entrant calls.
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<br>
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---
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### example
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<br>
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for example, suppose this method:
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```
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function withdrawBalance() public {
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uint amountToWithdraw = userBalances[msg.sender];
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(bool success, ) = msg.sender.call.value(amountToWithdraw)("");
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requires(success);
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userBalances[msg.sender] = 0;
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}
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```
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and this exploit:
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```
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function() public payable {
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if(msg.sender == address(vulnContract)) {
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vulnContract.withdrawBalance();
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}
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}
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```
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How to fix?
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#### Option 1: Adding a mutex locking:
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```
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modifier noReentrant() {
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require(!locked, "nooooope");
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locked = true;
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_;
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locked = false;
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}
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```
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so
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```
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function withdrawBalance() public noReentrant {
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...
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}
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```
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<br>
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#### Option 2: CEI (checks effects interaction) pattern
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```
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function withdrawBalance() public {
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uint amountToWithdraw = userBalances[msg.sender];
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userBalances[msg.sender] = 0; // update state first
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(bool success, ) = msg.sender.call.value(amountToWithdraw)("");
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requires(success);
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}
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```
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<br>
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----
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### resources
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* [reentrancy on solidity docs](https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/security-considerations.html#re-entrancy)
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* [reentrancy on DASP](https://www.dasp.co/#item-1)
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* [reentrancy on SWC](https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-107)
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* [reentrancy patterns](https://github.com/uni-due-syssec/eth-reentrancy-attack-patterns)
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* [list of reentrancy attacks by pcaversaccio](https://github.com/pcaversaccio/reentrancy-attacks)
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* [reentrancy on not so smart contract](https://github.com/crytic/not-so-smart-contracts/tree/master/reentrancy)
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