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@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ There is a lot more flexibility in how you configure Qubes OS than Tails, but mo
* Reducing risks when using untrusted computers
* The [verification stage](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) of the Qubes OS installation is equivalent to [GnuPG verification of Tails](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html).
* Only attach USBs and external drives to a qube that is disposable and offline.
* To mitigate against physical attacks to the computer, buy a dedicated laptop from a refurbished store, make it [tamper-evident and store it in a tamper-evident safe](/posts/tamper/).
* To mitigate against physical attacks to the computer, buy a dedicated laptop from a refurbished store, make the laptop screws [tamper-evident and use tamper-evident storage](/posts/tamper/).
* To mitigate against remote attacks to the computer, you can use anonymous Wi-Fi, and replace the BIOS with [HEADS](https://osresearch.net/). It's not possible to remove the hard drive, and Qubes OS already isolates the Bluetooth interface, camera and microphone. USBs with secure firmware are less important thanks to the isolation that sys-usb provides, and a USB with a physical write-protect switch is unnecessary because the operating system files are stored on the hard drive (and App qubes don't have write access to their templates).
* Encryption
* Passwords: [See above](#password-management)