dark mode fix

content/posts/tails-best/index.md

@@ -131,7 +131,12 @@ Our adversaries have two attack vectors to compromise BIOS, firmware, hardware,
 
 * First, **get a fresh computer**. A laptop from a random refurbished computer store is unlikely [to already be compromised](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factory-show-cisco-router-getting-implant/). Buy your computer with cash so it cannot be traced back to you, and in person because mail can be intercepted—a used [T Series](https://www.thinkwiki.org/wiki/Category:T_Series) or [X Series](https://www.thinkwiki.org/wiki/Category:X_Series) Thinkpad from a refurbished computer store is a cheap and reliable option. It is best to use Tails with a dedicated laptop, which prevents the adversary from targeting the hardware through a less secure operating system or through your normal non-anonymous activities. Another reason to have a dedicated laptop is that if something in Tails breaks, any information that leaks and exposes the laptop won't automatically be tied to you and your daily computer activities.
 
+<p>
+<span class="is-hidden">
 ![](X230.jpg)
+</span>
+<img src="X230.jpg" class="no-dark">
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 * **Make the laptop's screws tamper-evident, store it in a tamper-evident manner, and monitor for break-ins**. With these precautions in place, you'll be able to detect any future physical attacks. See the [Make Your Electronics Tamper-Evident](/posts/tamper/) tutorial to adapt your laptop's screws, use some form of intrusion detection, and store your laptop so you'll know if it's been physically accessed. Store any external devices you’ll be using with the laptop in the same way (USB, external hard drive, mouse, keyboard). When physical attack vectors are mitigated, an adversary can only use remote attacks.