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@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ Qubes OS can be configured to force all Internet connections through the [Tor ne
# Who is Qubes OS For?
Given that anarchists are [regularly targeted](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/malware.html) for hacking in repressive investigations, Qubes OS is an excellent choice for us. AnarSec [recommends](/recommendations) Qubes OS for everyday use, and [below](#when-to-use-tails-vs-qubes-os) we compare when it is appropriate to use Tails vs. Qubes OS - both have unique strengths. While Tails is so easy to use that you don't even need to know anything about Linux, Qubes OS is a bit more involved, but still designed to be accessible to users like journalists who don't know much about Linux. This guide is labelled as "intermediate", though if you need to extensively customize your set up or troubleshoot something, it is more likely to be "advanced".
Given that anarchists are [regularly targeted](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/malware.html) for hacking in repressive investigations, Qubes OS is an excellent choice for us. AnarSec [recommends](/recommendations) Qubes OS for everyday use, and [below](#when-to-use-tails-vs-qubes-os) we compare when it is appropriate to use Tails vs. Qubes OS - both have unique strengths. While Tails is so easy to use that you don't even need to know anything about Linux, Qubes OS is a bit more involved, but still designed to be accessible to users like journalists who don't know much about Linux. This guide is labelled as "intermediate", though if you need to extensively customize your set up or troubleshoot something, it is more likely to be "advanced".
Even if nothing directly incriminating is done on a computer you use every day, its compromise will still give investigators a field day for [network mapping](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html) - knowing who you talk to and what you talk to them about, what projects you are involved in, what websites you read, etc. Most anarchists use everyday computers for some anarchist projects and to commmunicate with other comrades, so making our personal computers difficult to hack is a reasonable goal for all anarchists. That said, the time investment to learn Qubes OS isn't for everyone. For those with limited energy to put towards increased anonymity and security, Tails is much more straightforward.
Even if nothing directly incriminating is done on a computer you use every day, its compromise will still give investigators a field day for [network mapping](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html) - knowing who you talk to and what you talk to them about, what projects you are involved in, what websites you read, etc. Most anarchists use everyday computers for some anarchist projects and to commmunicate with other comrades, so making our personal computers difficult to hack is a reasonable goal for all anarchists. That said, the time investment to learn Qubes OS isn't for everyone. For those with limited energy to put towards increased anonymity and security, Tails is much more straightforward.
# How Does Qubes OS Work?
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Qubes includes Whonix by default for when you want to force all connections thro
>
>Whonix virtual machines may be more leak-proof, however they are not amnesic, meaning data may be recovered from your storage device. By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted persistent storage can be configured to store some data between reboots.
In order to recover data from a Qubes OS system, the [Full Disk Encryption](/glossary#full-disk-encryption-fde) would still need to be successfully [bypassed](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/authentication-bypass.html) (e.g. by seizing the computer when it is turned on, or using a weak password). If the Tails Persistent Storage feature is in use, any data configured to persist will face the same problem.
In order to recover data from a Qubes OS system, the [Full Disk Encryption](/glossary#full-disk-encryption-fde) would still need to be successfully [bypassed](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/authentication-bypass.html) (e.g. by seizing the computer when it is turned on, or using a weak password). If the Tails Persistent Storage feature is in use, any data configured to persist will face the same problem.
Our recommendation is to use Qubes OS:
@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ You don't always need to attach a USB drive to another qube with the Qubes Devic
# How to Backup
Once your qubes are organized the way you want them, you should back up your system. Depending on your needs, we recommend a weekly backup - pick a day of the week and add a reminder to your calendar. We also recommend a redundant backup that is stored off-site and synchronized monthly (to protect against data loss in a [house raid](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/house-raid.html)).
Once your qubes are organized the way you want them, you should back up your system. Depending on your needs, we recommend a weekly backup - pick a day of the week and add a reminder to your calendar. We also recommend a redundant backup that is stored off-site and synchronized monthly (to protect against data loss in a [house raid](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/house-raid.html)).
Adapted from the [docs](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate/#creating-a-backup):
@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ There is much more flexibility in how you configure Qubes OS than Tails, but mos
* Compartmentalization is baked into Qubes OS; instead of restarting Tails, use a dedicated qube.
* Limitations of the Tor network
* For sensitive activities, don't use Internet connections that could deanonymize you, and prioritize .onion links when available. BusKill is also [available for Qubes OS](https://www.buskill.in/qubes-os/) (and we recommend not obtaining it through the mail).
* If you might be a target for physical surveillance, consider doing [surveillance detection](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/mitigations/surveillance-detection.html) and [anti-surveillance](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/mitigations/anti-surveillance.html) before going to a cafe. Alternatively, use a Wi-Fi antenna from indoors.
* If you might be a target for physical surveillance, consider doing [surveillance detection](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/surveillance-detection.html) and [anti-surveillance](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/anti-surveillance.html) before going to a cafe. Alternatively, use a Wi-Fi antenna from indoors.
* Reducing risks when using untrusted computers
* The [verification stage](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) of the Qubes OS installation is equivalent to the [GnuPG verification of Tails](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html).
* Only attach USBs and external drives to a qube that is disposable and offline.