csrc links to notrace.how, miscellaneous edits

content/posts/nophones/index.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ a4="nophones-a4.pdf"
 letter="nophones-letter.pdf"
 +++
 
-With effective [security culture and operational security](https://www.csrc.link/read/csrc-bulletin-1-en.html#header-a-base-to-stand-on-distinguishing-opsec-and-security-culture), the forces of repression wouldn't  know about our specific criminal activities, but they also wouldn't know about our lives, [relationships](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html), movement patterns, and so on. This knowledge is a huge advantage in narrowing down suspects and conducting targeted surveillance. Your phone's location is [tracked at all times](https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vqkv/how-fbi-gets-phone-data-att-tmobile-verizon), and this data is harvested by private companies, allowing police to bypass laws requiring them to obtain a warrant. The phone's [hardware identifiers and subscription information](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#your-imei-and-imsi-and-by-extension-your-phone-number) are logged by cell towers with every connection. Hacking services like [Pegasus](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/) put total phone compromise within reach of even local law enforcement and are "zero-click," meaning success doesn't depend on you clicking a link or opening a file. 
+With effective [security culture and operational security](https://www.notrace.how/resources/read/csrc-bulletin-1-en.html#header-a-base-to-stand-on-distinguishing-opsec-and-security-culture), the forces of repression wouldn't  know about our specific criminal activities, but they also wouldn't know about our lives, [relationships](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html), movement patterns, and so on. This knowledge is a huge advantage in narrowing down suspects and conducting targeted surveillance. Your phone's location is [tracked at all times](https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vqkv/how-fbi-gets-phone-data-att-tmobile-verizon), and this data is harvested by private companies, allowing police to bypass laws requiring them to obtain a warrant. The phone's [hardware identifiers and subscription information](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#your-imei-and-imsi-and-by-extension-your-phone-number) are logged by cell towers with every connection. Hacking services like [Pegasus](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/) put total phone compromise within reach of even local law enforcement and are "zero-click," meaning success doesn't depend on you clicking a link or opening a file. 
 
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ On the flip side, after more than 30 recent arsons in a small town in France wen
 
 # Encryption and Geolocation
 
-Some comrades respond to the issues with smartphones by using flip phones or a landline to communicate with each other, but this approach leaves nothing hidden from the eyes of the State because nothing is [encrypted](/glossary/#encryption) - neither the content of your conversations nor who is talking to whom. For example, in a [recent repressive operation](https://www.csrc.link/#quelques-premiers-elements-du-dossier-d-enquete-contre-ivan), the police set up real-time geolocation of the suspect's phone and made a list of everyone the suspect communicated with using unencrypted phone calls. A short biography was written for each contact.
+Some comrades respond to the issues with smartphones by using flip phones or a landline to communicate with each other, but this approach leaves nothing hidden from the eyes of the State because nothing is [encrypted](/glossary/#encryption) - neither the content of your conversations nor who is talking to whom. For example, in a [recent repressive operation](https://www.notrace.how/resources/#quelques-premiers-elements-du-dossier-d-enquete-contre-ivan), the police set up real-time geolocation of the suspect's phone and made a list of everyone the suspect communicated with using unencrypted phone calls. A short biography was written for each contact.
 
 It has become quite common for comrades to carry a cell phone around with them wherever they go, and in the contexts where people use flip phones, to make unencrypted calls to other anarchists. We think both of these practices should be completely avoided. Let's not make the job of the police and intelligence agencies so easy by providing them with our social network and geolocation history on a silver platter. 
 
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Another primary goal of targeted surveillance is to map the target's social netw
 
 # Metadata Patterns
 
-The normalization of constant connectivity within dominant society has led some anarchists to correctly note that the [metadata](/glossary/#metadata) generated by phone activity is useful to investigators.  However, the conclusion that some draw from this insight, that we should ["never turn off the phone,"](https://www.csrc.link/#never-turn-off-the-phone-a-new-approach-to-security-culture) takes us in the wrong direction. Their logic is that if you step out of the normal metadata patterns, those moments become suspicious, and if those moments coincide with when an action occurs, that could be used as evidence to link you to the crime or to investigate you more closely. This is true, but the only conclusion that can be drawn from this - which is not a total dead end, at least - is to minimize the creation of normal metadata patterns in the first place.
+The normalization of constant connectivity within dominant society has led some anarchists to correctly note that the [metadata](/glossary/#metadata) generated by phone activity is useful to investigators.  However, the conclusion that some draw from this insight, that we should ["never turn off the phone,"](https://web.archive.org/web/20210126183740/https://325.nostate.net/2018/11/09/never-turn-off-the-phone-a-new-approach-to-security-culture) takes us in the wrong direction. Their logic is that if you step out of the normal metadata patterns, those moments become suspicious, and if those moments coincide with when an action occurs, that could be used as evidence to link you to the crime or to investigate you more closely. This is true, but the only conclusion that can be drawn from this - which is not a total dead end, at least - is to minimize the creation of normal metadata patterns in the first place.
 
 Our connections to the infrastructures of domination must remain sporadic and unpredictable if we are to retain any semblance of freedom and ability to strike at the enemy. What if the reconnaissance required for an action requires an entire weekend away from electronic devices? Or let's start with the simple fact that phones must be left at home during an action - this only becomes the outlier to a pattern if phones otherwise accompany us wherever we go. In a normatively "always connected" life, either of these metadata changes would stick out like a sore thumb, but this is not the case if you refuse to always be plugged in.