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@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ Click on the Domains widget to see which Qubes are currently running and how muc
# How to Install Software
While Tails [has a Graphical User Interface](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/additional_software/index.en.html) (GUI) for installing additional software, Qubes OS does not at this time, so new software must be installed from the command line. If you are unfamiliar with the command line or how software works in Linux, see [Linux Essentials](/posts/linux/) to get acquainted. When choosing what additional software to install, keep in mind that being [open-source](/glossary/#open-source) is an essential criteria, but not sufficient to be considered secure. The list of [included software for Tails](https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/features/index.en.html#index1h1) will cover many of your needs with reputable choices.
While Tails [has a Graphical User Interface](https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/additional_software/index.en.html) (GUI) for installing additional software, Qubes OS does not at this time, so new software must be installed from the command line. If you are unfamiliar with the command line or how software works in Linux, see [Linux Essentials](/posts/linux/) to get acquainted. When choosing what additional software to install, keep in mind that being [open-source](/glossary/#open-source) is an essential criteria, but not sufficient to be considered secure. The list of [included software for Tails](https://tails.net/doc/about/features/index.en.html#index1h1) will cover many of your needs with reputable choices.
Software is installed into Templates, which have network access only for their package manager (apt or dnf). Installing a package requires knowing its name, which can be found using a web browser for both [Debian](http://packages.debian.org/) and [Fedora](https://packages.fedoraproject.org/), or on the command line.
@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ Configuring Qubes OS is much more flexible than configuring Tails, but most of t
* For sensitive activities, don't use Internet connections that could deanonymize you, and prioritize .onion links when available. BusKill is also [available for Qubes OS](https://www.buskill.in/qubes-os/) (and we recommend not obtaining it through the mail).
* If you might be a target for physical surveillance, consider doing [surveillance detection](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/surveillance-detection.html) and [anti-surveillance](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/anti-surveillance.html) before going to a cafe to use the Internet. Alternatively, use a Wi-Fi antenna from indoors. See the Tails article for further discussion of deciding what Internet to use.
* Reducing risks when using untrusted computers
* The [verification stage](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) of the Qubes OS installation is equivalent to the [GnuPG verification of Tails](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html).
* The [verification stage](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) of the Qubes OS installation is equivalent to the [GnuPG verification of Tails](https://tails.net/install/expert/index.en.html).
* Only attach USBs and external drives to a qube that is disposable and offline.
* To mitigate physical attacks on the computer, buy a dedicated laptop from a refurbished store, make the laptop screws [tamper-evident, and use tamper-evident storage](/posts/tamper/).
* To mitigate remote attacks on the computer, you can use anonymous Wi-Fi. You can also replace the BIOS with [HEADS](/posts/tails-best/#to-mitigate-against-remote-attacks), though this is advanced. Unlike for Tails, it's not possible to remove the hard drive because it is used by the operating system. Qubes OS already isolates the Bluetooth interface, camera, and microphone. USBs with secure firmware are less important thanks to the isolation provided by sys-usb, and a USB with a physical write-protect switch is unnecessary because the operating system files are stored on the hard drive (and App qubes don't have write access to their templates).