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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ a4="tails-best-a4.pdf"
letter="tails-best-letter.pdf"
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All anarchists should know how to use Tails — this text describes some additional precautions you can take that are relevant to an anarchist [threat model](/glossary/#threat-model). Not all anarchist threat models are the same, and only you can decide which mitigations are worth putting into practice for your activities, but we aim to provide advice that is appropriate for high-risk activities like [claiming an action](https://notrace.how/resources/#how-to-submit-an-anonymous-communique). If you are new to Tails, start with [Tails for Anarchists](/posts/tails/).
All anarchists should know how to use Tails — this text describes some additional precautions you can take that are relevant to an anarchist [threat model](/glossary/#threat-model). Not all anarchist threat models are the same, and only you can decide which mitigations are worth putting into practice for your activities, but we aim to provide advice that is appropriate for high-risk activities like [claiming an action](https://www.notrace.how/resources/#how-submit). If you are new to Tails, start with [Tails for Anarchists](/posts/tails/).
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@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ To mitigate the risk of "targeted" correlation attacks:
* If you only need to use the Internet briefly to submit a communique, you can **do [surveillance detection](https://notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/surveillance-detection.html) and [anti-surveillance](https://notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/anti-surveillance.html) before going to a coffee shop**, just like you would prior to a direct action.
* For projects like moderating a website or hacking that require daily Internet access, it is not realistic to find a new Wi-Fi location every day. In that case, the ideal mitigation is to **use a Wi-Fi antenna from indoors** — a physical surveillance effort won't see you entering a cafe, and a digital surveillance effort won't see anything on your home Internet.
* If a Wi-Fi antenna is too technical for you, you may even want to **use your home internet** for some projects that require frequent internet access. This contradicts the previous advice to not use your personal Wi-Fi. It's a trade-off: using Tor from home avoids creating a physical footprint that is so easy to observe, at the expense of creating a digital footprint which is more technical to observe, and may be harder to draw meaningful conclusions from (especially if you intentionally [make correlation attacks more difficult](/posts/tails/#make-correlation-attacks-more-difficult)). In our view, the main risk of using your home internet is not that the adversary is able to break Tor through a correlation attack, but that the adversary is able to hack your system, such as through [phishing](/posts/tails-best/#phishing-awareness), which [enables them to bypass Tor](/posts/qubes/#when-to-use-tails-vs-qubes-os).
* If you want to submit a report-back the morning after a riot, or a communique shortly after an action (times when there may be a higher risk of targeted surveillance), consider waiting and at least taking surveillance detection and anti-surveillance measures beforehand. In 2010, the morning after a bank arson in Canada, police surveilled a suspect as he traveled from his home to an Internet cafe, and watched him post the communique and then bury the laptop in the woods. More recently, investigators physically surveilling [an anarchist in France](https://notrace.how/resources/#quelques-premiers-elements-du-dossier-d-enquete-contre-ivan) installed a hidden camera to monitor access to an Internet cafe near the comrade's home and requested CCTV footage for the day an arson communique was sent.
* If you want to submit a report-back the morning after a riot, or a communique shortly after an action (times when there may be a higher risk of targeted surveillance), consider waiting and at least taking surveillance detection and anti-surveillance measures beforehand. In 2010, the morning after a bank arson in Canada, police surveilled a suspect as he traveled from his home to an Internet cafe, and watched him post the communique and then bury the laptop in the woods. More recently, investigators physically surveilling [an anarchist in France](https://notrace.how/resources/#ivan) installed a hidden camera to monitor access to an Internet cafe near the comrade's home and requested CCTV footage for the day an arson communique was sent.
To summarize: For sensitive and brief Internet activities, use Internet from a random cafe, preceeded by surveillance detection and anti-surveillance. For activities that require frequent internet access such that the random cafe model isn't sustainable, it's best to use a Wi-Fi antenna positioned behind a window to access from a few hundred metres away. If this is too technical for you, using your home Wi-Fi is an option, but requires putting faith in it being difficult to break Tor with a non-targeted correlation attack, and it being difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from your home's Tor traffic through a "targeted" correlation attack.