short resource URLs

content/posts/e2ee/index.md

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Before proceeding, let’s go over a few concepts to help you distinguish betwee
 * **Peer-to-peer** means that the messages do not pass through a centralized server. 
 * **Tor** is an [anonymity network](/glossary/#tor-network). Some applications route your messages through Tor by default. 
 
-For a more in-depth look at these various considerations, we recommend [The Guide to Peer-to-Peer, Encryption, and Tor: New Communication Infrastructure for Anarchists](https://notrace.how/resources/#the-guide-to-peer-to-peer-encryption-and-tor). This text criticizes Signal for not being peer-to-peer and not using Tor by default, and goes on to compare Signal, Cwtch, and Briar. 
+For a more in-depth look at these various considerations, we recommend [The Guide to Peer-to-Peer, Encryption, and Tor: New Communication Infrastructure for Anarchists](https://www.notrace.how/resources/#pet-guide). This text criticizes Signal for not being peer-to-peer and not using Tor by default, and goes on to compare Signal, Cwtch, and Briar. 
 
 Since anonymous public-facing projects such as counter-info websites interact with unknown (ie untrusted) contacts, they need more from encrypted communication than a personal user. These additional needs include:
 
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ Another barrier to anonymous registration is that Signal Desktop will only work
 
 These barriers to anonymous registration mean that Signal is rarely used anonymously. This has significant implications if the State gains [physical](/glossary/#physical-attacks) or [remote](/glossary/#remote-attacks) access to the device. One of the primary goals of State surveillance of anarchists is [network mapping](https://notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html), and it's common for them to gain physical access to devices through [house raids](https://notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/house-raid.html) or arrests. For example, if police bypass your device's [authentication](https://notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/authentication-bypass.html), they can identify Signal contacts (as well as the members of any groups you are in) simply by their phone numbers, if those contacts haven't changed their settings to hide their phone number. 
 
-In a recent [repressive operation in France against a riotous demonstration](https://notrace.how/resources/read/lafarge-case-the-investigation-methods-used.html#header-access-to-phone-contents-during-and-after-police-custody), the police did exactly that. Police got physical access to suspects' phones during arrests and house raids, remote access through spyware, and then identified Signal contacts and group members. These identities were added to the list of suspects who were subsequently investigated.
+In a recent [repressive operation in France against a riotous demonstration](https://www.notrace.how/resources/#lafarge), the police did exactly that. Police got physical access to suspects' phones during arrests and house raids, remote access through spyware, and then identified Signal contacts and group members. These identities were added to the list of suspects who were subsequently investigated.
 
 The risk of a compromised device aiding the police in network mapping is partly mitigated by the [username feature](https://signal.org/blog/phone-number-privacy-usernames/) — use it to prevent a Signal contact from being able to learn your phone number. In **Settings → Privacy → Phone Number**, set both **Who can see my number** and **Who can find me by number** to **Nobody**. We recommend that you select a profile name and photo that won't be useful for establishing your identity. For voice and video calls, Signal reveals the IP address of both parties by default, which could also be used to identify Signal contacts. If you aren't using Signal from behind a VPN or Tor, then in **Settings → Privacy → Advanced**, enable **Always relay calls** to prevent this.