phones update

content/_index.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ paginate_by = 10
 title = "Tech Guides for Anarchists"
 +++
 * You want a quick overview of our advice for all anarchists? → [**Recommendations**](/recommendations)
-* You need to write anonymous responsibility claims or do action research? → [**Tails for Anarchists**](/posts/tails) and [**Tails Best Practices**](/posts/tails-best)
+* You need to write anonymous communiques or do action research? → [**Tails for Anarchists**](/posts/tails) and [**Tails Best Practices**](/posts/tails-best)
 * You need to manage a large number of digital identities on a daily basis? → [**Qubes OS for Anarchists**](/posts/qubes)
 * You want to protect your digital devices from covert house visits by law enforcement? → [**Make Your Electronics Tamper-Evident**](/posts/tamper)
 

content/posts/nophones/index.md

@@ -28,13 +28,13 @@ It has become quite common for comrades to carry a cell phone around with them w
 
 If you don't carry a phone with you everywhere, their only means of determining geolocation is through physical surveillance, which is resource-intensive and can be detected. The first step in a surveillance effort is to build a movement profile for the target, and the geolocation history of a cell phone provides this in comprehensive detail. 
 
-Another primary goal of targeted surveillance is to map the target's social network in order to identify other targets. The only way to avoid giving this to our enemies is to use only encrypted tools to communicate with other anarchists; these tools can help prevent investigators from knowing who is talking to whom, or what they are talking about.  
+Another primary goal of targeted surveillance is to map the target's social network in order to identify other targets. The only way to avoid giving this to our enemies is to use only [encrypted messaging](/posts/e2ee/) to communicate with other anarchists; these tools can help prevent investigators from knowing who is talking to whom, or what they are talking about.  
 
 # Metadata Patterns
 
 The normalization of constant connectivity within dominant society has led some anarchists to correctly note that the [metadata](/glossary/#metadata) generated by phone activity is useful to investigators. However, the conclusion that some draw from this insight, that we should ["never turn off the phone,"](https://web.archive.org/web/20210126183740/https://325.nostate.net/2018/11/09/never-turn-off-the-phone-a-new-approach-to-security-culture) takes us in the wrong direction. Their logic is that if you step out of the normal metadata patterns, those moments become suspicious, and if those moments coincide with when an action occurs, that could be used as evidence to link you to the crime or to investigate you more closely. This is true, but the only conclusion that can be drawn from this - which is not a total dead end, at least - is to minimize the creation of normal metadata patterns in the first place.
 
-Our connections to the infrastructures of domination must remain sporadic and unpredictable if we are to retain any semblance of freedom and ability to strike at the enemy. What if the reconnaissance required for an action requires an entire weekend away from electronic devices? Or let's start with the simple fact that phones must be left at home during an action - this only becomes the outlier to a pattern if phones otherwise accompany us wherever we go. In a normatively "always connected" life, either of these metadata changes would stick out like a sore thumb, but this is not the case if you refuse to always be plugged in.
+Our connections to the infrastructures of domination must remain sporadic and unpredictable if we are to retain any semblance of freedom and ability to strike at the enemy. What if the reconnaissance required for an action requires an entire weekend away from electronic devices? Or let's start with the simple fact that phones must be left at home during an action - this only becomes the outlier to a pattern if phones otherwise accompany us wherever we go. In a normatively "always connected" life, either of these metadata changes would stick out like a sore thumb, but this is not the case if you refuse to always be plugged in. **This requires leaving your phone at home by default**. 
 
 # Do You Really Need a Phone? 
 

content/recommendations/_index.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ We agree with the conclusion of an overview of [targeted surveillance measures i
 
 ## Your Phone
 
->**[Operating system](/glossary#operating-system-os)**: **GrapheneOS** is the only reasonably secure choice for cell phones. See [GrapheneOS for Anarchists](/posts/grapheneos/). Better yet, [kill the cop in your pocket](/posts/nophones/). 
+>**[Operating system](/glossary#operating-system-os)**: **GrapheneOS** is the only reasonably secure choice for cell phones. See [GrapheneOS for Anarchists](/posts/grapheneos/). [Kill the cop in your pocket](/posts/nophones/) - if you decide to have a phone, treat it like an "encrypted landline" and leave it at home when you are out of the house. 
 
 Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet the [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support) of GrapheneOS. If that is not possible for you, [DivestOS](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/android/#divestos) has more [supported devices](https://divestos.org/pages/devices) and is still significantly better than stock Android.