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# What is GrapheneOS?
GrapheneOS is a private and secure version of the Android [operating system](/glossary#operating-system-os). Standard Android smartphones have Google baked into them (for example, [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) has irrevocable ability to access your files, call logs, location, etc.), and it is trivial to [bypass standard Android authentication](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/authentication-bypass.html) with [physical access](/glossary/#physical-attacks) to the device. GrapheneOS uses hardware-based security to [substantially increase the difficulty](https://grapheneos.org/faq#encryption) of bypassing the authentication, it is significantly [hardened](/glossary#hardening) against hacking, and it has all Google apps and services removed by default. Other alternative Android operating systems exist [but they are inferior](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/). See the [GrapheneOS documentation](https://grapheneos.org/features) for an extensive list of the privacy and security improvements over standard Android. GrapheneOS is [regularly audited](https://grapheneos.org/faq#audit).
Cellphones leave a geolocation history when they connect to cell towers, by nature of [how the technology works](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#your-metadata-including-your-geo-location). For this reason, we recommend using a smartphone which stays at home like a landline, and connects to the Internet through Wi-Fi rather than by using a SIM card to connect through cell towers. Even if you use an anonymously acquired SIM, if this is linked to your identity in the future, the service provider can be retroactively queried for all geolocation data. Additionally, it's insufficient to only leave a phone at home when you are going to a demo or action because this then [stands out](/posts/nophones/#metadata-patterns) as an outlier, serving as an indication that there is conspiratorial activity in that time window.
Cellphones leave a geolocation history when they connect to cell towers, by nature of [how the technology works](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/android-tips/#carrier-tracking). For this reason, we recommend using a smartphone which stays at home like a landline, and connects to the Internet on airplane mode through Wi-Fi rather than by using a SIM card to connect through cell towers. Even if you use an anonymously acquired SIM, if this is linked to your identity in the future, the service provider can be retroactively queried for all geolocation data. Additionally, it's insufficient to only leave a phone at home when you are going to a demo or action because this then [stands out](/posts/nophones/#metadata-patterns) as an outlier, serving as an indication that there is conspiratorial activity in that time window.
# Installation
[Google Pixel](https://www.privacyguides.org/android/#google-pixel) phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's hardware security requirements - see the [supported devices](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support) and [recommended devices](https://grapheneos.org/faq#recommended-devices). Beginning with the Pixel 6, Pixel devices receive a minimum of [5 years of security updates](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-lifetime) from when they are released. End-of-life devices (GrapheneOS "extended support" devices) do not have full security updates so they are not recommended. Avoid carrier variants of the phone, meaning don't buy one from a mobile network operator, which can prevent you from installing GrapheneOS. The cheapest option is to buy the "a" model just after the next flagship model is released - for example, the Google Pixel 6a after the Pixel 7 is released.