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content/posts/qubes/index.md
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@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ There is much more flexibility in how you configure Qubes OS than Tails, but mos
* Still [clean metadata](/posts/metadata/) from files before you share them.
* Compartmentalization is baked into Qubes OS; instead of restarting Tails, use a dedicated qube.
* Limitations of the Tor network
* For sensitive activities, don't use Internet connections that could deanonymize you, and prioritize .onion links when available.
* For sensitive activities, don't use Internet connections that could deanonymize you, and prioritize .onion links when available. BusKill is also [available for Qubes OS](https://www.buskill.in/qubes-os/) (and we recommend not obtaining it through the mail).
* If you might be a target for physical surveillance, consider doing [surveillance detection](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/mitigations/surveillance-detection.html) and [anti-surveillance](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/mitigations/anti-surveillance.html) before going to a cafe. Alternatively, use a Wi-Fi antenna from indoors.
* Reducing risks when using untrusted computers
* The [verification stage](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) of the Qubes OS installation is equivalent to the [GnuPG verification of Tails](https://tails.boum.org/install/expert/index.en.html).

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content/posts/tails-best/index.md
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@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ Use an Internet connection that isn't connected to you, such as in a cafe withou
* Do not get into a routine of using the same cafes repeatedly if you can avoid it.
* If you have to buy a coffee to get the Wi-Fi password, pay in cash!
* Position yourself with your back against a wall so that no one can "shoulder surf" to see your screen, and ideally install a [privacy screen](/posts/tails/#privacy-screen) on your laptop.
* Maintain situational awareness and be ready to pull out the Tails USB to shut down the computer at a moment's notice. One person in charge of a darknet marketplace had his Tails computer seized while distracted by a fake fight next to him. Similar tactics have been used [in other police operations](https://dys2p.com/en/2023-05-luks-security.html#attacks). If his Tails USB had been attached to a belt with a short piece of fishing line, the police would most likely have lost all evidence when the Tails USB was pulled out - note that [Tails warns](https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/shutdown/index.en.html) "Only physically remove the USB stick in case of emergency as doing so can sometimes break the file system of the Persistent Storage." A more technical equivalent is [BusKill](https://docs.buskill.in/buskill-app/en/stable/introduction/what.html) - however, we only recommend buying this in person, such as at a conference (because any mail can be [intercepted](https://docs.buskill.in/buskill-app/en/stable/faq.html#q-what-about-interdiction) and altered, making the hardware [malicious](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BadUSB)). If the Tails USB is removed, Tails will shut down and [overwrite the RAM with random data](https://tails.boum.org/doc/advanced_topics/cold_boot_attacks/index.en.html). Any LUKS USBs that were unlocked in the Tails session will now be encrypted again. If maintaining situational awareness seems unrealistic, consider asking a trusted friend to hang out who can dedicate themselves to keeping an eye on your surroundings.
* Maintain situational awareness and be ready to pull out the Tails USB to shut down the computer at a moment's notice. If maintaining situational awareness seems unrealistic, consider asking a trusted friend to hang out who can dedicate themselves to keeping an eye on your surroundings. If the Tails USB is removed, Tails will shut down and [overwrite the RAM with random data](https://tails.boum.org/doc/advanced_topics/cold_boot_attacks/index.en.html). Any LUKS USBs that were unlocked in the Tails session will now be encrypted again. Note that [Tails warns](https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/shutdown/index.en.html) "Only physically remove the USB stick in case of emergency as doing so can sometimes break the file system of the Persistent Storage."
* One person in charge of a darknet marketplace had his Tails computer seized while distracted by a fake fight next to him. Similar tactics have been used [in other police operations](https://dys2p.com/en/2023-05-luks-security.html#attacks). If his Tails USB had been attached to a belt with a short piece of fishing line, the police would most likely have lost all evidence when the Tails USB was pulled out. A more technical equivalent is [BusKill](https://www.buskill.in/tails/) - however, we only recommend buying this in person (such as at a conference) or [3D printing it](https://www.buskill.in/3d-print-2023-08/). This is because any mail can be [intercepted](https://docs.buskill.in/buskill-app/en/stable/faq.html#q-what-about-interdiction) and altered, making the hardware [malicious](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BadUSB).
* If coffee shops without CCTV cameras are few and far between, you can try accessing a coffee shop's Wi-Fi from outside, out of view of the cameras. Some external Wi-Fi adapters can pick up signals from further away, as discussed [below](#appendix-2-location-location-location).
#### Non-Targeted and Targeted Correlation Attacks