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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ This guide has not been changed since publication.
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This guide has not been changed since publication.
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# Why Anarchists Shouldn't Have Phones
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# Kill the Cop in Your Pocket
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This guide has not been changed since publication.
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@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ Many [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps) will require Sand
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# VoIP
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A Wi-Fi only smartphone doesn't require a monthly SIM card fee. As explained in [Why Anarchists Shouldn't Have Phones](/posts/nophones#bureaucracy), bureaucracies often require a phone number that can be called normally (without encryption). [VoIP](/glossary#voip-voice-over-internet-protocol) applications allow you to create a number and make calls over the Internet rather than through cell towers. A phone number is also occasionally required for applications such as [Signal registration](/posts/e2ee/#signal), and a VoIP number will often work.
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A Wi-Fi only smartphone doesn't require a monthly SIM card fee. As explained in [Kill the Cop in Your Pocket](/posts/nophones#bureaucracy), bureaucracies often require a phone number that can be called normally (without encryption). [VoIP](/glossary#voip-voice-over-internet-protocol) applications allow you to create a number and make calls over the Internet rather than through cell towers. A phone number is also occasionally required for applications such as [Signal registration](/posts/e2ee/#signal), and a VoIP number will often work.
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Some of the VoIP applications [that work on computers](/posts/nophones#bureaucracy) also work on smartphones; the main advantage is that you can hear the phone ringing even when your computer is turned off. The [jmp.chat](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Mobile_Phone_Security#Phone_Number_Registration_Unlinked_to_SIM_Card) VoIP service works well with their [Cheogram client](https://cheogram.com/) and can be paid for in Bitcoin. There are also mobile-only paid options such as MySudo (although it only works in a [handful of countries](https://support.mysudo.com/hc/en-us/articles/360020177133-Why-isn-t-MySudo-working-in-my-country-)). A MySudo subscription can be purchased anonymously with [Google Play gift cards](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/3422734), but this is probably unnecessary if the point is to give the number to bureaucracies. MySudo requires Google Play Services.
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title="Why Anarchists Shouldn't Have Phones"
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title='Kill the Cop in Your Pocket'
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date=2023-04-06
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[taxonomies]
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<!-- more -->
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On the flip side, after more than 30 recent arsons in a small town in France went unsolved, [investigators complained](https://actforfree.noblogs.org/post/2022/04/17/grenoblefrance-these-saboteurs-of-the-ultra-left-have-been-elusive-for-five-years/) that "it is impossible to exploit phone or vehicle registration data because they operate without phones or cars!" This article will outline some strategies for getting around any need you might have for a phone.
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On the flip side, after more than 30 recent arsons in a small town in France went unsolved, [investigators complained](https://actforfree.noblogs.org/post/2022/04/17/grenoblefrance-these-saboteurs-of-the-ultra-left-have-been-elusive-for-five-years/) that "it is impossible to exploit phone or vehicle registration data because they operate without phones or cars!" This article will outline some strategies for killing the cop in your pocket.
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# Encryption and Geolocation
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Some comrades respond to the issues with smartphones by using flip phones or a landline to communicate with each other, but this approach leaves nothing hidden from the eyes of the State because nothing is [encrypted](/glossary/#encryption) - neither the content of your conversations nor who is talking to whom. For example, in a [recent repressive operation](https://www.csrc.link/#quelques-premiers-elements-du-dossier-d-enquete-contre-ivan), the police set up real-time geolocation of the suspect's phone and made a list of everyone the suspect communicated with using unencrypted phone calls. A short biography was written for each contact.
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It has become quite common for comrades to carry a cell phone around with them wherever they go, and in the contexts where people use flip phones, to make unencrypted calls to other anarchists. We shouldn't make the job of the police and intelligence agencies so easy; if the police don't have a phone to track, their only means of locating people is through physical surveillance around the clock, which is resource-intensive and can be detected. The first step in such a surveillance effort is to build a movement profile for the target, and the geolocation history of a cell phone provides this in comprehensive detail. Another primary goal of targeted surveillance is to map the target's social network in order to identify other targets. The only way to avoid giving this to our enemies on a silver platter is to use only encrypted tools to communicate with other anarchists; these tools can help prevent investigators from knowing who is talking to whom, or what they are talking about.
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It has become quite common for comrades to carry a cell phone around with them wherever they go, and in the contexts where people use flip phones, to make unencrypted calls to other anarchists. We think both of these practices should be completely avoided. Let's not make the job of the police and intelligence agencies so easy by providing them with our social network and geolocation history on a silver platter.
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If you don't carry a phone with you everywhere, their only means of determining geolocation is through physical surveillance, which is resource-intensive and can be detected. The first step in a surveillance effort is to build a movement profile for the target, and the geolocation history of a cell phone provides this in comprehensive detail.
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Another primary goal of targeted surveillance is to map the target's social network in order to identify other targets. The only way to avoid giving this to our enemies is to use only encrypted tools to communicate with other anarchists; these tools can help prevent investigators from knowing who is talking to whom, or what they are talking about.
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# Metadata Patterns
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# Do You Really Need a Phone?
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Whether you need a phone or not depends on whether you need *synchronous* communication every moment of your life. [*Synchronous*](/glossary/#synchronous-communication) means that two or more parties communicate in real time, as opposed to something [*asynchronous*](/glossary/#asynchronous-communication) like email, where messages are sent at different times. This "need" has become normalized, but it is worth resisting within the anarchist space. [Anarchy can only be anti-industrial](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bismuto-beyond-the-moment#toc1), and this requires that we learn to live without the conveniences sold to us by the telecom companies: we should be able to live without being connected to the Internet at all times, without algorithmic real-time directions, and without the infinite flexibility that allows us to change plans at the last minute.
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Phones have colonized everyday life because people have been instilled with the belief that they need *synchronous* communication in every moment. [*Synchronous*](/glossary/#synchronous-communication) means that two or more parties communicate in real time, as opposed to something [*asynchronous*](/glossary/#asynchronous-communication) like email, where messages are sent at different times. This "need" has become normalized, but it is worth resisting within the anarchist space. [Anarchy can only be anti-industrial](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bismuto-beyond-the-moment#toc1), and this requires that we learn to live without the conveniences sold to us by the telecom companies: we should be able to live without being connected to the Internet at all times, without algorithmic real-time directions, and without the infinite flexibility that allows us to change plans at the last minute.
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If you absolutely must use a phone, it should be as difficult as possible for an adversary to geotrack, intercept messages, or hack, which means using [GrapheneOS](/posts/grapheneos/). This is because using *only* [encrypted communications](/posts/e2ee/) to communicate with other anarchists rules out flip phones and landlines, and GrapheneOS is the only smartphone option that provides reasonable privacy and security. To prevent your movements from being tracked, you need to treat the smartphone like a landline and leave it at home when you are out of the house. Even if you use an anonymously purchased SIM card, if it is linked to your identity in the future, the service provider can be retroactively queried for any geolocation data. If you use the phone as we recommend, as a [Wi-Fi only device](/posts/grapheneos/#what-is-grapheneos), and keep it in airplane mode at all times, cell towers won't be able to connect to the phone. However, [malware](/glossary/#malware) could still turn the phone into an audio recording device or log GPS history. Also, it's not enough to only leave it at home when you're going to a demo or action, because that pattern of behavior will stand out as an outlier and serve as an indication that criminal activity is taking place in that window of time.
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If you decide to use a phone, it should be as difficult as possible for an adversary to geotrack, intercept messages, or hack, which means using [GrapheneOS](/posts/grapheneos/). This is because **only [encrypted communications](/posts/e2ee/) should be used to communicate with other anarchists** - this rules out flip phones and landlines. GrapheneOS is the only smartphone operating system that provides reasonable privacy and security.
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However, it's best to not use a phone at all (for communication with other anarchists, at least). If only the comrades who are taking the biggest risks do this, they'll stand out. Identical in principle to black bloc tactics, the simple act of wearing a mask will provide cover for anyone to act anonymously. Therefore, we propose that those parts of the anarchist space that have been overtaken by dominant society's relationship to technology take several steps back to re-establish less intrusive baselines around phones. The strategies for living without phones that we will explain in the rest of this article rely on computers, where synchronous communication is possible but more limited because your computer is generally left at home.
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**To prevent your movements from being tracked, you need to treat the smartphone like a landline and leave it at home when you are out of the house**. Even if you use an anonymously purchased SIM card, if it is linked to your identity in the future, the service provider can be retroactively queried for any geolocation data. If you use the phone as we recommend, as a [Wi-Fi only device](/posts/grapheneos/#what-is-grapheneos), and keep it in airplane mode at all times, cell towers won't be able to connect to the phone. It's not enough to only leave it at home when you're going to a demo or action, because that pattern of behavior will stand out as an outlier and serve as an indication that criminal activity is taking place in that window of time. Keep in mind that even if this "encrypted landline" cannot track your movements if you leave it at home, [malware](/glossary/#malware) could still turn it into an audio recording device.
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If only the comrades who are taking the biggest risks don't carry a cop in their pockets everywhere they go, they'll stand out. Identical in principle to black bloc tactics, the simple act of wearing a mask will provide cover for anyone to act anonymously. Therefore, we propose that those parts of the anarchist space that have been overtaken by dominant society's relationship to technology take several steps back to re-establish less intrusive baselines around phones.
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You may choose to entirely live without phones, if you don't feel that you need an "encrypted landline". The strategies for minimizing the need for phones that follow rely on computers, where synchronous communication is also possible but more limited.
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## Bureaucracy
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Any VoIP application option on a computer is asynchronous because it doesn't ring when the computer is off - you rely on the voicemail feature to return missed calls. For example, a service like [jmp.chat](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Mobile_Phone_Security#Phone_Number_Registration_Unlinked_to_SIM_Card) gives you a VoIP number, which you can optionally pay for in bitcoin, and you make calls using an XMPP (Jabber) client - [Cheogram](https://cheogram.com/) works well.
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Though usually more expensive than VoIP, a flip phone or landline also works well for making and receiving 'normal life' calls if you're not going to use it to talk to anarchists, and in the case of the flip phone, if you will leave it at home. These have the advantage that you don't need a computer to be turned on to hear it ring.
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If you use an "encrypted landline", you can use a [VoIP app](/posts/grapheneos/#voip).
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A flip phone can be used for any [two-factor authentication](/glossary/#two-factor-authentication-2fa) (2FA) you need (if a service requires you to receive a text message to log in), which does not always work with VoIP providers. If you only need a flip phone for 2FA, [online phone numbers](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#online-phone-number) are another option.
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Though usually more expensive than VoIP, a flip phone or landline also works well for making and receiving 'normal life' calls if you're not going to use it to talk to anarchists, and in the case of the flip phone, if you will leave it at home.
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VoIP usually works for any [two-factor authentication](/glossary/#two-factor-authentication-2fa) (2FA) you need (if a service requires you to receive a random number to log in). [Online phone numbers](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#online-phone-number) are another option.
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## Communication
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Not having a phone requires a change in the way you socialize if you are [already caught in the net](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/return-fire-vol-4-supplement-caught-in-the-net). Being intentional about minimizing the mediation of screens in our relationships is a valuable goal in and of itself.
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Not carrying a phone everywhere requires a change in the way you socialize if you are [already caught in the net](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/return-fire-vol-4-supplement-caught-in-the-net). Being intentional about minimizing the mediation of screens in our relationships is a valuable goal in and of itself.
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An "encrypted landline" allows you to be reachable at home and can be dedicated to voice calls. If someone needs to get your attention, this is how. You can otherwise use a computer for encrypted messaging, which we find far preferable to an unending stream of notifications on a device that is always within reach.
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Except in cases where it is unavoidable (as in the case of a publication whose editors live in different regions), organizing should not be mediated by technology. The dynamic by which, in some parts of the anarchist space, the entirety of how anarchists organize projects together has been reduced to a monoculture of Signal group chats (or worse) warrants much criticism. This capture of organizing relationships by smartphone culture has led to a meeting that never ends. It also means that our organizing is relatively easy to surveil. Only one phone in the group chat needs to be compromised with malware to access all the messages.
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* [Qubes OS for Anarchists](/posts/qubes/)
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#### Phones
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* [Why Anarchists Shouldn't Have Phones](/posts/nophones/)
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* [Kill the Cop in Your Pocket](/posts/nophones/)
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* [GrapheneOS for Anarchists](/posts/grapheneos/)
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#### General
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