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nophones update
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@ -22,41 +22,37 @@ Your phone's location is [tracked at all times](https://www.vice.com/en/article/
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# Encryption and Geolocation
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# Encryption and Geolocation
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Some comrades respond to the issues that arise with smartphones by using flip phones or a landline to communicate with each other, but since these devices are not [encrypted](/glossary/#encryption), the State can see the content of your conversations, who you call and who calls you. For example, in a [recent repressive operation](https://notrace.how/resources/#quelques-premiers-elements-du-dossier-d-enquete-contre-ivan), the police tracked the geolocation of the suspect's flip phone phone in real time and made a list of everyone the suspect called.
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In a [recent repressive operation](https://notrace.how/resources/#ivan) against an anarchist, the police tracked the geolocation of the suspect's flip phone in real time and made a list of everyone the suspect had called. It is well known that surveillance like this is not uncommon, and yet many comrades carry a cell phone with them wherever they go, or make unencrypted calls to other anarchists. We believe that both of these practices should be avoided. Let's not make the job of the police and intelligence agencies so easy by handing them our social networks and geolocation history on a silver platter.
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It has become quite common for comrades to carry cell phones around with them wherever they go, and, where people use flip phones, to make unencrypted calls to other anarchists. We think both of these practices should be avoided. Let's not make the job of the police and intelligence agencies so easy by providing them with our social networks and geolocation history on a silver platter.
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If you don't leave the house with a phone, the police will have to resort to physical surveillance to determine your whereabouts, which is resource-intensive and detectable. If you are ever placed under physical surveillance, the investigator's first step is to understand your "movement profile," and your phone's geolocation history provides a detailed picture of your daily patterns.
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If you don't carry a phone with you everywhere, their only means of determining geolocation is through physical surveillance, which is resource-intensive and can be detected. The first step in a surveillance effort is to build a movement profile for the target, and cell phone geolocation history provides a detailed picture of your daily patterns.
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Some anarchists respond to the problems with smartphones by using flip phones or landlines to communicate with each other, but these devices do not support [encrypted communication](/glossary/#end-to-end-encryption-e2ee), so the State learns who is talking to whom and what they are talking about. A primary goal of targeted surveillance is to map the target's social network in order to identify other targets. The only way to avoid giving this information to our enemies is to use only [encrypted mediums](/posts/e2ee/) to communicate with other anarchists through technology.
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Another primary goal of targeted surveillance is to map the target's social network in order to identify other targets. The only way to avoid giving this to our enemies is to use only [encrypted messaging](/posts/e2ee/) to communicate with other anarchists; these tools can help prevent investigators from knowing who is talking to whom, or what they are talking about.
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# Metadata Patterns
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# Metadata Patterns
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The normalization of constant connectivity within dominant society has led some anarchists to correctly note that phone [metadata](/glossary/#metadata) is useful to investigators. However, the conclusion that some draw from this insight, that we should ["never turn off the phone,"](https://web.archive.org/web/20210126183740/https://325.nostate.net/2018/11/09/never-turn-off-the-phone-a-new-approach-to-security-culture) takes us in the wrong direction. Their logic is that if you step out of the normal metadata patterns, those moments become suspicious, and if those moments coincide with when an action occurs, that could be used as evidence to link you to the crime or to investigate you more closely. While this is true, it makes far more sense to minimize the creation of normal metadata patterns in the first place.
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The normalization of constant connectivity within dominant society has led some anarchists to correctly note that phone [metadata](/glossary/#metadata) is useful to investigators. However, the conclusion that some draw from this insight, that we should ["never turn off the phone,"](https://web.archive.org/web/20210126183740/https://325.nostate.net/2018/11/09/never-turn-off-the-phone-a-new-approach-to-security-culture) takes us in the wrong direction. Their logic is that your interactions with technology form a baseline metadata pattern, and moments that deviate from this baseline become suspicious if they coincide with when an action occurs, which can be used by investigators to narrow down suspects. While this is true, the opposite conclusion makes far more sense: anarchists should minimize the creation of metadata patterns that investigators would have access to.
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Our connections to the infrastructures of domination must remain sporadic and unpredictable if we are to retain any semblance of freedom and ability to strike at the enemy. What if the reconnaissance required for an action requires an entire weekend away from electronic devices? Or let's start with the simple fact that phones must be left at home during an action — this only becomes the outlier to a pattern if phones otherwise accompany us wherever we go. In a normatively "always connected" life, either of these metadata changes would stick out like a sore thumb, but this is not the case if you refuse to always be plugged in. **This requires leaving your phone at home by default**.
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Our connections to the infrastructures of domination must remain opaque and unpredictable if we are to retain our ability to strike the enemy. What if the reconnaissance required for an action involves an entire weekend away from electronic devices? Or let's start with the simple fact that phones must be left at home during an action — this only becomes the outlier to a pattern if phones otherwise accompany us wherever we go. In a normatively "always connected" life, either of these metadata changes would stick out like a sore thumb, but this is not the case if you refuse to be constantly plugged in. **To minimize your metadata footprint, you must leave your phone at home by default**.
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# Do You Really Need a Phone?
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# Do You Really Need a Phone?
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Phones have colonized everyday life because people have been instilled with the belief that they need *synchronous* communication in every moment. [*Synchronous*](/glossary/#synchronous-communication) means that two or more parties communicate in real time, as opposed to something [*asynchronous*](/glossary/#asynchronous-communication) like email, where messages are sent at different times. This "need" has become normalized, but it is worth resisting within the anarchist space. [Anarchy can only be anti-industrial](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bismuto-beyond-the-moment#toc1), and this requires that we learn to live without the conveniences sold to us by the telecom companies: we must defend (or rekindle) our ability to live without being connected to the Internet at all times, without algorithmic real-time directions, and without the infinite flexibility that allows us to change plans at the last minute.
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Phones have colonized everyday life because people have been instilled with the belief that they need *synchronous* communication in every moment. [*Synchronous*](/glossary/#synchronous-communication) means that two or more parties communicate in real time, as opposed to something [*asynchronous*](/glossary/#asynchronous-communication) like email, where messages are sent at different times. This "need" has become normalized, but it is worth resisting within the anarchist space. [Anarchy can only be anti-industrial](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bismuto-beyond-the-moment#toc1). We must learn to live without the conveniences sold to us by the telecom companies, we must defend (or rekindle) our ability to live without being connected to the Internet at all times, without algorithmic real-time directions, and without the infinite flexibility to change plans at the last minute.
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If you decide to use a phone, in order to make it as difficult as possible for an adversary to geotrack, intercept messages, or hack, use [GrapheneOS](/posts/grapheneos/). If we can agree to **only use [encrypted communications](/posts/e2ee/) to communicate with other anarchists**, this rules out flip phones and landlines. GrapheneOS is the only smartphone operating system that provides reasonable privacy and security.
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If you decide to use a phone, in order to make it as difficult as possible for an adversary to geotrack it, intercept its messages, or hack it, use [GrapheneOS](/posts/grapheneos/). If we can agree to **only use [encrypted communications](/posts/e2ee/) to communicate with other anarchists**, this rules out flip phones and landlines. GrapheneOS is the only smartphone operating system that provides reasonable privacy and security.
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**To prevent your movements from being tracked, treat the smartphone like a landline and leave it at home when you are out of the house**. Even if you use an anonymously purchased SIM card, if it is linked to your identity in the future, the service provider can be retroactively queried for any geolocation data. If you use the phone as we recommend, as a [Wi-Fi only device](/posts/grapheneos/#what-is-grapheneos), and keep it in airplane mode at all times, cell towers won't be able to connect to the phone. It's not enough to only leave it at home when you're going to a demo or action, because that pattern of behavior will stand out as an outlier and serve as an indication that criminal activity is taking place in that window of time. Keep in mind that even if this "encrypted landline" cannot track your movements if you leave it at home, [malware](/glossary/#malware) could still turn it into an audio recording device.
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**To prevent your movements from being tracked, treat the smartphone like a landline and leave it at home when you are out of the house**. Even if you use an anonymously purchased SIM card, if it is linked to your identity in the future, the service provider can be retroactively queried for geolocation data. If you use the phone as we recommend (as a [Wi-Fi only device](/posts/grapheneos/#what-is-grapheneos) that is kept in airplane mode at all times), cell towers won't be able to connect to it. It's not sufficient to only leave the phone at home when you're going to a meeting, demo or action because that will be an outlier from your normal pattern of behaviour and serve as an indication that criminal activity is taking place in that time window.
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You may choose to live without phones entirely, if you don't feel that you need an "encrypted landline". The strategies for minimizing the need for phones that follow rely on computers, where synchronous communication is also possible but more limited.
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You may choose to live without phones entirely, if you don't feel that you need an "encrypted landline". The strategies for minimizing the need for phones that follow rely on computers, where synchronous communication is also possible but more limited.
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## Bureaucracy
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## Bureaucracy
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Many bureaucratic institutions that we are forced to deal with make it difficult to live without a phone: health care, banking, etc. Since these communications do not need to be encrypted, you can use a [Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)](/glossary#voip-voice-over-internet-protocol) application (which allows you to make phone calls over the Internet rather than through cell towers).
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Many bureaucratic institutions that we are forced to deal with make it difficult to live without a phone: health care, banking, etc. Communicating with bureaucracies doesn't need to be encrypted, so you can use a [Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)](/glossary#voip-voice-over-internet-protocol) application. This allows you to make phone calls over the Internet rather than through cell towers.
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Any VoIP application option on a computer is asynchronous because it doesn't ring when the computer is off — you rely on the voicemail feature to return missed calls. For example, a service like [jmp.chat](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Mobile_Phone_Security#Phone_Number_Registration_Unlinked_to_SIM_Card) gives you a VoIP number, which you can pay for in cryptocurrency, and you make calls using an XMPP application — [Cheogram](https://cheogram.com/) works well.
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Any VoIP application that is available on a computer is asynchronous because it doesn't ring when the computer is off — you rely on the voicemail feature to return missed calls. For example, a service like [jmp.chat](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Mobile_Phone_Security#Phone_Number_Registration_Unlinked_to_SIM_Card) gives you a VoIP number, which you can pay for in cryptocurrency, and you make calls using an XMPP application — [Cheogram](https://cheogram.com/) works well.
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If you use an "encrypted landline", you can use a [VoIP app](/posts/grapheneos/#voip).
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Though usually more expensive than VoIP, a flip phone or landline also works well for making and receiving 'bureaucratic' calls from home, like those mentioned above.
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Though usually more expensive than VoIP, a flip phone or landline also works well for making and receiving 'bureaucratic' calls from home, like those mentioned above.
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VoIP usually works for any [two-factor authentication](/glossary/#two-factor-authentication-2fa) (2FA) you need (if a service requires you to receive a random number to log in). [Online phone numbers](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#online-phone-number) are another option.
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VoIP usually works for any [two-factor authentication](/glossary/#two-factor-authentication-2fa) (2FA) you need (when a service requires you to receive a random number to log in). [Online phone numbers](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#online-phone-number) are another option.
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## Communication
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## Communication
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It would do us all good to take a hard look at the monoculture of Signal group chats that have replaced face-to-face encounters in some parts of the anarchist space. This capture of organizing relationships by smartphone culture forces us into a never-ending meeting that is relatively easy to surveil.
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It would do us all good to take a hard look at the monoculture of Signal group chats that have replaced face-to-face encounters in some parts of the anarchist space. This capture of organizing relationships by smartphone culture forces us into a never-ending meeting that is relatively easy to surveil.
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That said, encrypted communication can be useful for setting up real-life meetings where life and organizing actually take place, or for projects shared across distances. See [Encrypted Messaging for Anarchists](/posts/e2ee/) for various options appropriate to an anarchist [threat model](/glossary/#threat-model).
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That said, encrypted communication can be useful to set a date and time to meet, or for projects shared across distances. See [Encrypted Messaging for Anarchists](/posts/e2ee/) for various options appropriate to an anarchist [threat model](/glossary/#threat-model).
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## Emergency Calls
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## Emergency Calls
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A passerby on the street will often lend you their phone to make an urgent call if you tell them that yours is out of battery. To receive emergency calls, if you cannot be reached from a computer as described above, we can stop by each other's houses or arrange encrypted messaging check-ins in advance. What scenarios actually require you to be available to receive a call at any moment? If these actually exist in your life, you can organize around them without projecting that urgency into all other areas and moments.
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A passerby on the street will often lend you their phone to make an urgent call if you tell them that yours is out of battery. To receive emergency calls, if you cannot be reached as described above, we can stop by each other's houses or arrange encrypted messaging check-ins in advance. What scenarios actually require you to be available to receive a call at any moment? If these actually exist in your life, you can organize around them without projecting that urgency into all other areas and moments.
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## Directions
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## Directions
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## Music and Podcasts
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## Music and Podcasts
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They still make MP3 players! For a much lower price, you can play music and podcasts, but the device has no GPS or radio hardware. However, that doesn't mean you can't be geolocated by an MP3 player. If your Wi-Fi is turned on, your MP3 player's approximate location can be determined from its IP address.
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They still make MP3 players! For a much lower price, you can play music and podcasts, but the device has no GPS or radio hardware. However, that doesn't mean you can't be geolocated by an MP3 player. If it connects to Wi-Fi, your MP3 player's approximate location can be determined from its IP address.
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# Appendix: Against the Smartphone
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# Appendix: Against the Smartphone
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