landing bold

content/_index.md

@@ -6,15 +6,19 @@ title = "Tech Guides for Anarchists"
 <br>
 <br>
 
-You want a quick overview of our [advice for all anarchists?](/recommendations) 
+**You want a quick overview of our** **[advice for all anarchists?](/recommendations)**
 
-You need to [do action research or write an anonymous communique?](/posts/tails) 
+**You need to** **[do action research or write an anonymous communique?](/posts/tails)**
 
-You need [increased security against malware?](/posts/qubes) 
+**You need** **[increased security against malware?](/posts/qubes)**
 
-You want to [protect your digital devices from covert house visits by law enforcement?](/posts/tamper)
+**You want to** **[protect your digital devices from covert house visits by law enforcement?](/posts/tamper)**
 
-<p><a href="/series"><strong>See all guides</strong></a></p>
+<p><strong><a href="/series">See all guides
+              <span class="icon is-small">
+	        <img src="/images/arrow-color.png">
+              </span>
+</a></strong></p>
 
 <h3><b>Note: AnarSec is currently in a draft state, but will launch in the near future.</b></h3>
 

content/posts/e2ee/index.md

@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ If a project has multiple members, all of them should be able to access the same
 
 >**Note**
 >
->[**Briar**](https://briarproject.org) is another application that works in a similar way (with peer-to-peer and Tor), using the [Bramble Transport Protocol](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/A-Quick-Overview-of-the-Protocol-Stack) (BTP). Briar's main distinguishing feature is that it continues to work [even when the underlying network infrastructure is down](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/). It was [audited in 2017](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/FAQ#has-briar-been-independently-audited). Unfortunately, Briar Desktop does not yet work with Tails or Qubes-Whonix because it cannot [use the system Tor](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/issues/2095). Unlike Cwtch, to connect to a contact on Briar, you both have to add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. [Briar Mailbox](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-mailbox/) allows asynchronous communication. 
+>**[Briar](https://briarproject.org)** is another application that works in a similar way (with peer-to-peer and Tor), using the [Bramble Transport Protocol](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/A-Quick-Overview-of-the-Protocol-Stack) (BTP). Briar's main distinguishing feature is that it continues to work [even when the underlying network infrastructure is down](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/). It was [audited in 2017](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/FAQ#has-briar-been-independently-audited). Unfortunately, Briar Desktop does not yet work with Tails or Qubes-Whonix because it cannot [use the system Tor](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/issues/2095). Unlike Cwtch, to connect to a contact on Briar, you both have to add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby. [Briar Mailbox](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-mailbox/) allows asynchronous communication. 
 >
->[**OnionShare**](https://docs.onionshare.org/2.6/en/features.html#chat-anonymously) has a chat feature that creates an ephemeral peer-to-peer chat room that is routed over the Tor network. The metadata protection works in the same way as Cwtch; it uses the Tor network as a shield and stores everything (ephemerally) locally on the device running OnionShare. OnionShare doesn’t implement any chat encryption on its own — it relies on the Tor onion service’s encryption. Cwtch and Briar both have more features (including the additional Tapir and BTP encryption protocols). The only advantage of OnionShare is that it is installed on Tails by default. 
+>**[OnionShare](https://docs.onionshare.org/2.6/en/features.html#chat-anonymously)** has a chat feature that creates an ephemeral peer-to-peer chat room that is routed over the Tor network. The metadata protection works in the same way as Cwtch; it uses the Tor network as a shield and stores everything (ephemerally) locally on the device running OnionShare. OnionShare doesn’t implement any chat encryption on its own — it relies on the Tor onion service’s encryption. Cwtch and Briar both have more features (including the additional Tapir and BTP encryption protocols). The only advantage of OnionShare is that it is installed on Tails by default. 
 
 ## Installation
 

content/posts/tails-best/index.md

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ You can mitigate this second issue by what's called **"compartmentalization"**:
 
 ## 1. Hiding that you are using Tor and Tails
 
-You can mitigate this first issue by [**Tor bridges**](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/tor/index.en.html#bridges):
+You can mitigate this first issue by **[Tor bridges](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/tor/index.en.html#bridges)**:
 
 * Tor Bridges are secret Tor relays that hide your connection to the Tor network. However, this is only necessary where connections to Tor are blocked, such as in heavily censored countries, by some public networks, or by some parental control software. This is because Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any other Internet user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes impossible to tell who is who among them.
 
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ For untrusted attachments, you would ideally **sanitize all files sent to you be
 With untrusted links, there are two things you must protect: your anonymity and your information. 
 
 * **It is best to open untrusted links in a dedicated Tails session without unlocked Persistent Storage or attached "personal data" USBs.** You can put the link on a Riseup Pad to access it. 
-* [**Use Tor Browser on the Safest security setting**](/posts/tails/#tor-browser-security-settings)! The vast majority of exploits against Tor Browser will not work with the Safest setting. 
+* **[Use Tor Browser on the Safest security setting](/posts/tails/#tor-browser-security-settings)**! The vast majority of exploits against Tor Browser will not work with the Safest setting. 
 * **Manually copy and paste the address into your browser, and retype the domain**. For example, after pasting the link `anarsec.guide/posts/tails`, retype `anarsec.guide` yourself. Do not click through a hyperlink (i.e. always copy and paste) because it can be used to mislead you about where you are going. Retyping the domain protects against "typo-squatting" (mailriseup.net instead of mail.riseup.net) as well as ["homograph attacks"](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/19/phishing-url-trick-hackers) (where Cyrillic letters are substituted for normal letters).
 * **Never follow a shortened link** (e.g. a site like bit.ly that takes long web addresses and makes a short one) because it cannot be verified before redirection. [Unshorten.me](https://unshorten.me/) can reveal shortened links. 
 * **If you don't recognize the domain, research it**. Search for the domain with the domain name in quotation marks using a privacy-preserving search engine (such as DuckDuckGo) to see if it’s a legitimate website. This isn’t a surefire solution, but it’s a good precaution to take.
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ With untrusted links, there are two things you must protect: your anonymity and
 
 An adversary can also compromise a "trusted" website — this allows them to install malware on the computers of anyone who visits the website, without needing to engage in phishing. This is called a ["watering hole attack" or a "drive-by compromise"](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/) because it attacks many people simultaneously. For example, the [FBI hacked a website then used a Tor Browser exploit](https://www.vice.com/en/article/53d4n8/fbi-hacked-over-8000-computers-in-120-countries-based-on-one-warrant) to hack 8,000 users who visited it. 
 
-This is why its important to [**use Tor Browser on the Safest security setting**](/posts/tails/#tor-browser-security-settings) by default, even for "trusted" websites, to greatly reduce the risk of a successful malware attack on Tor Browser. 
+This is why its important to **[use Tor Browser on the Safest security setting](/posts/tails/#tor-browser-security-settings)** by default, even for "trusted" websites, to greatly reduce the risk of a successful malware attack on Tor Browser. 
 
 # Encryption  
 

content/recommendations/_index.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ An anarchist threat model needs to protect against State-level adversaries that
 
 We agree with the conclusion of an overview of [targeted surveillance measures in France](https://actforfree.noblogs.org/post/2023/07/24/number-of-the-day-89502-preventive-surveillance-measures-france/): "So let’s be clear about our responsibilities: if we knowingly bring a networked device equipped with a microphone and/or a camera (cell phone, baby monitor, computer, car GPS, networked watch, etc.) close to a conversation in which “private or confidential words are spoken” and must remain so, even if it's switched off, we become a potential state informer…"
 
-We also recommend the Threat Library's ["Digital Best Practices"](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/digital-best-practices.html).
+You may also be interested in the Threat Library's ["Digital Best Practices"](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/digital-best-practices.html).
 
 ## Your Phone
 

themes/DeepThought/sass/deep-thought.sass

@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ body[theme="dark"] p
 body[theme="dark"] .published 
     color: #c9c7c9 !important
 
-body[theme="dark"] strong 
+body[theme="dark"] strong
     color: #c9c7c9 !important
 
 body[theme="dark"] ol 
@@ -677,6 +677,9 @@ body[theme="dark"] a.toc:hover
 body[theme="dark"] a:not(.toc,.navbar-item,.footer-text,.has-text-dark)
     color: #fa86d8 !important
 
+body[theme="dark"] a.has-text-dark
+    color: #c9c7c9 !important
+
 body[theme="dark"] code 
     color: #fa86d8 !important
     background-color: #090809 !important