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graphene improvements + css
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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Since anonymous public-facing projects such as counter-info websites interact wi
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The following recommendations for encrypted messaging are listed in order of highest to lowest metadata protection.
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**TLDR:**
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* Cwtch for text messages
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* Cwtch for text communication
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* SimpleX Chat or Signal for voice or video calls
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* PGP Email for anonymously-run public projects
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@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ The following recommendations for encrypted messaging are listed in order of hig
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* **Peer-to-peer**: Yes
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* **Tor**: Yes
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Cwtch is our preference for text messages by a long shot. For an overview of how Cwtch works, watch the video below. Cwtch is designed with metadata protection in mind; it's peer-to-peer, uses the Tor network, and stores all data locally on the device, encrypted.
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Cwtch is our preference for text communication by a long shot. For an overview of how Cwtch works, watch the video below. Cwtch is designed with metadata protection in mind; it's peer-to-peer, uses the Tor network, and stores all data locally on the device, encrypted.
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<br>
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@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ These barriers to anonymous registration mean that Signal is rarely used anonymo
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In a recent [repressive operation in France against a riotous demonstration](https://www.notrace.how/resources/read/lafarge-case-the-investigation-methods-used.html#header-access-to-phone-contents-during-and-after-police-custody), the police did exactly that. Police seized suspects' phones during arrests and house raids, as well as targeting them through spyware, and then identified Signal contacts and group members. These identities were added to the list of suspects who were subsequently investigated.
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The risk of a compromised device aiding the police in network mapping is partly mitigated by the [username feature](https://signal.org/blog/phone-number-privacy-usernames/) - use it to prevent a Signal contact from being able to learn your phone number. In **Settings → Privacy → Phone Number**, set both **Who can see my number** and **Who can find me by number** to **Nobody**. For voice and video calls, Signal reveals the IP address of both parties by default, which could also be used to identify Signal contacts. If you aren't using Signal from behind a VPN or Tor, then in **Settings → Privacy → Advanced**, enable **Always relay calls** to prevent this.
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The risk of a compromised device aiding the police in network mapping is partly mitigated by the [username feature](https://signal.org/blog/phone-number-privacy-usernames/) - use it to prevent a Signal contact from being able to learn your phone number. In **Settings → Privacy → Phone Number**, set both **Who can see my number** and **Who can find me by number** to **Nobody**. We recommend that you select a username and profile photo that won't be useful for establishing your identity. For voice and video calls, Signal reveals the IP address of both parties by default, which could also be used to identify Signal contacts. If you aren't using Signal from behind a VPN or Tor, then in **Settings → Privacy → Advanced**, enable **Always relay calls** to prevent this.
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A private company that sells spyware to governments has a product called JASMINE that is [marketed to deanonymize Signal users](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2023/10/technical-deep-dive-into-intellexa-alliance-surveillance-products), based on the analysis of metadata.
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