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content/posts/tails-best/index.md

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ You can mitigate this second issue by what's called **"compartmentalization"**:
 
 * [Compartmentalization](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/compartmentalization.html) means keeping different activities or projects separate. If you use Tails sessions for more than one purpose at a time, an adversary could link your different activities together. For example, if you log into different accounts on the same website in a single Tails session, the website could determine that the accounts are being used by the same person. This is because websites can tell when two accounts are using the same Tor circuit.
 * To prevent an adversary from linking your activities while using Tails, restart Tails between different activities. For example, restart Tails between checking different project emails.
-* Tails is amnesiac by default, so to save any data from a Tails session, you must save it to a USB. If the files you save could be used to link your activities together, use a different encrypted ([LUKS](/glossary#luks)) USB stick for each activity. For example, use one Tails USB stick for moderating a website and another for researching actions. Tails has a feature called Persistent Storage, but we do not recommend using it for data storage, explained [below](#using-a-write-protect-switch).  
+* Tails is amnesiac by default, so to save any data from a Tails session, you must save it to a USB. If the files you save could be used to link your activities together, use a different encrypted ([LUKS](/glossary#luks)) USB stick for each activity. For example, use one Tails USB stick for moderating a website and another for researching actions. Tails has a feature called Persistent Storage, but we do not recommend using it for data storage, explained [below](/posts/tails-best/#using-a-write-protect-switch).  
 
 # Limitations of the [Tor network](/glossary#tor-network)
 
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ To mitigate the risk of "targeted" correlation attacks:
 
 * If you only need to use the Internet briefly to submit a communique, you can **do [surveillance detection](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/surveillance-detection.html) and [anti-surveillance](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/anti-surveillance.html) before going to a coffee shop**, just like you would prior to a direct action. 
 * For projects like moderating a website or hacking that require daily Internet access, it is not realistic to find a new Wi-Fi location every day. In that case, the ideal mitigation is to **use a Wi-Fi antenna from indoors** — a physical surveillance effort won't see you entering a cafe, and a digital surveillance effort won't see anything on your home Internet. 
-	* If a Wi-Fi antenna is too technical for you, you may even want to **use your home internet** for some projects that require frequent internet access. This contradicts the previous advice to not use your personal Wi-Fi. It's a trade-off: using Tor from home avoids creating a physical footprint that is so easy to observe, at the expense of creating a digital footprint which is more technical to observe, and may be harder to draw meaningful conclusions from (especially if you intentionally [make correlation attacks more difficult](/posts/tails/#make-correlation-attacks-more-difficult)). In our view, the main risk of using your home internet is not that the adversary is able to break Tor through a correlation attack, but that the adversary is able to hack your system, such as through [phishing](#phishing-awareness), which [enables them to bypass Tor](/posts/qubes/#when-to-use-tails-vs-qubes-os). 
+	* If a Wi-Fi antenna is too technical for you, you may even want to **use your home internet** for some projects that require frequent internet access. This contradicts the previous advice to not use your personal Wi-Fi. It's a trade-off: using Tor from home avoids creating a physical footprint that is so easy to observe, at the expense of creating a digital footprint which is more technical to observe, and may be harder to draw meaningful conclusions from (especially if you intentionally [make correlation attacks more difficult](/posts/tails/#make-correlation-attacks-more-difficult)). In our view, the main risk of using your home internet is not that the adversary is able to break Tor through a correlation attack, but that the adversary is able to hack your system, such as through [phishing](/posts/tails-best/#phishing-awareness), which [enables them to bypass Tor](/posts/qubes/#when-to-use-tails-vs-qubes-os). 
 * If you want to submit a report-back the morning after a riot, or a communique shortly after an action (times when there may be a higher risk of targeted surveillance), consider waiting and at least taking surveillance detection and anti-surveillance measures beforehand. In 2010, the morning after a bank arson in Canada, police surveilled a suspect as he traveled from his home to an Internet cafe, and watched him post the communique and then bury the laptop in the woods. More recently, investigators physically surveilling [an anarchist in France](https://www.notrace.how/resources/#quelques-premiers-elements-du-dossier-d-enquete-contre-ivan) installed a hidden camera to monitor access to an Internet cafe near the comrade's home and requested CCTV footage for the day an arson communique was sent.
 
 To summarize: For sensitive and brief Internet activities, use Internet from a random cafe, preceeded by surveillance detection and anti-surveillance. For activities that require frequent internet access such that the random cafe model isn't sustainable, it's best to use a Wi-Fi antenna positioned behind a window to access from a few hundred metres away. If this is too technical for you, using your home Wi-Fi is an option, but requires putting faith in it being difficult to break Tor with a non-targeted correlation attack, and it being difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from your home's Tor traffic through a "targeted" correlation attack. 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ To summarize: For sensitive and brief Internet activities, use Internet from a r
 You can mitigate this first issue by **using a computer you trust to install Tails**:
 
 * According to our [recommendations](/recommendations/#your-computer), this would ideally be a [Qubes OS](/posts/qubes/) system, as it is much harder to infect than a normal Linux computer. If you have a trusted friend with a Tails USB stick that has been installed with Qubes OS (and who uses these best practices), you could [clone it](/posts/tails/#installation) instead of installing it yourself. 
-* Use the "Terminal" installation method ["Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and GnuPG"](https://tails.net/install/expert/index.en.html), as it more thoroughly verifies the integrity of the download using [GPG](/glossary/#gnupg-openpgp). If using the [command line](/glossary/#command-line-interface-cli) is over your head, ask a friend to walk you through it. Alternatively, learn the basics of the command line with [Linux Essentials](/posts/linux/) and see the [Appendix](#appendix-gpg-explanation).
+* Use the "Terminal" installation method ["Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and GnuPG"](https://tails.net/install/expert/index.en.html), as it more thoroughly verifies the integrity of the download using [GPG](/glossary/#gnupg-openpgp). If using the [command line](/glossary/#command-line-interface-cli) is over your head, ask a friend to walk you through it. Alternatively, learn the basics of the command line with [Linux Essentials](/posts/linux/) and see the [Appendix](/posts/tails-best/#appendix-gpg-explanation).
 * Once installed, do not plug your Tails USB stick (or any [LUKS](/glossary/#luks) USBs used during Tails sessions) into any other computer while it is running a non-Tails operating system; if the computer is infected, the infection can [spread to the USB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BadUSB). 
 
 ## 2. Running Tails on a computer with a compromised BIOS, firmware, or hardware
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ If you are using Persistent Storage, this is another passphrase that you will ha
 [LUKS](/glossary#luks) is great, but defense-in-depth can't hurt. If the police seize your USB in a house raid, they will try a [variety of tactics to bypass the authentication](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/authentication-bypass.html), so a second layer of defense with a different encryption implementation can be useful for highly sensitive data. 
 
 
-[Gocryptfs](https://nuetzlich.net/gocryptfs/) is an encrypted container program that is [available for Debian](https://packages.debian.org/bullseye/gocryptfs) and can be easily installed as [additional software](/posts/tails/#optional-create-and-configure-persistent-storage). If you don't want to reinstall it every session, you will need to [configure Additional Software in Persistent Storage](#using-a-write-protect-switch). 
+[Gocryptfs](https://nuetzlich.net/gocryptfs/) is an encrypted container program that is [available for Debian](https://packages.debian.org/bullseye/gocryptfs) and can be easily installed as [additional software](/posts/tails/#optional-create-and-configure-persistent-storage). If you don't want to reinstall it every session, you will need to [configure Additional Software in Persistent Storage](/posts/tails-best/#using-a-write-protect-switch). 
 
 To use gocryptfs, you will need to use Terminal (the [command line](/glossary#command-line-interface-cli)).