Git-Mirrors/anarsec.guide
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://0xacab.org/anarsec/anarsec.guide.git synced 2025-07-24 15:15:29 -04:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

motioneye and css

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
anarsec 2024-04-21 20:23:26 +00:00
parent 1354ddb396
commit 6597d786ae
No known key found for this signature in database
4 changed files with 13 additions and 5 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

2
content/posts/tails-best/index.md
View file

@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ When using Wi-Fi in a public space, keep the following operational security cons
If you need to regularly use the Internet for projects like moderating a website or hacking, going to a new Wi-Fi location after doing surveillance countermeasures might not be realistic on a daily basis. Additionally, a main police priority will be to seize the computer while it is unencrypted, and this is much easier for them to achieve in a public space, especially if you are alone. In this scenario, the ideal mitigation is to **use a Wi-Fi antenna positioned behind a window in a private space to access from a few hundred metres away** — a physical surveillance effort won't observe you entering a cafe or be able to easily seize your powered-on laptop, and a digital surveillance effort won't observe anything on your home Internet. To protect against [hidden cameras](https://www.notrace.how/earsandeyes), you should still be careful about where you position your screen.
If a Wi-Fi antenna is too technical for you, you may even want to **use your home internet** for some projects that require frequent internet access. This contradicts the previous advice to not use an Internet connection that is tied to your identity. It's a trade-off: using Tor from home avoids creating a physical footprint that is so easy to observe, at the expense of creating a digital footprint which is more technical to observe, and may be harder to draw meaningful conclusions from (especially if you intentionally [make correlation attacks more difficult](/posts/tails/#make-correlation-attacks-more-difficult)). In our view, the main risk of using your home internet is not that the adversary deanonymizes you through a correlation attack, but rather through hacking your system (such as through [phishing](/posts/tails-best/#phishing-awareness)), which [enables them to bypass Tor](/posts/qubes/#when-to-use-tails-vs-qubes-os).
If a Wi-Fi antenna is too technical for you, you may even want to **use your home internet** for some projects that require frequent internet access. This contradicts the previous advice to not use an Internet connection that is tied to your identity. It's a trade-off: using Tor from home avoids creating a physical footprint that is so easy to observe, at the expense of creating a digital footprint which is more technical to observe, and may be harder to draw meaningful conclusions from (especially if you intentionally [make correlation attacks more difficult](/posts/tails/#make-correlation-attacks-more-difficult)). There are two main deanonymization risks to consider when using your home internet: that the adversary deanonymizes you through a targeted correlation attack, or that they deanonymize you by hacking your system (such as through [phishing](/posts/tails-best/#phishing-awareness)) which [enables them to bypass Tor](/posts/qubes/#when-to-use-tails-vs-qubes-os).
#### To summarize