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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ a4="nophones-a4.pdf"
letter="nophones-letter.pdf"
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Effective [security culture and operational security](https://www.notrace.how/resources/read/csrc-bulletin-1-en.html#header-a-base-to-stand-on-distinguishing-opsec-and-security-culture) prevents the forces of repression from knowing about our specific criminal activities, but also about our lives, [relationships](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html), movement patterns, and so on. This knowledge is a huge advantage in narrowing down suspects and conducting targeted surveillance. Your phone's location is [tracked at all times](https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vqkv/how-fbi-gets-phone-data-att-tmobile-verizon), and this data is harvested by private companies, allowing police to bypass needing to obtain a warrant. The phone's [hardware identifiers and subscription information](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#your-imei-and-imsi-and-by-extension-your-phone-number) are logged by each and every cell tower your phone connects to. Hacking services like [Pegasus](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/) put total phone compromise within reach of even local law enforcement and are "zero-click," meaning they don't depend on you clicking a link or opening a fileto hack your phone.
Effective [security culture and operational security](https://notrace.how/resources/read/csrc-bulletin-1-en.html#header-a-base-to-stand-on-distinguishing-opsec-and-security-culture) prevents the forces of repression from knowing about our specific criminal activities, but also about our lives, [relationships](https://notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html), movement patterns, and so on. This knowledge is a huge advantage in narrowing down suspects and conducting targeted surveillance. Your phone's location is [tracked at all times](https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vqkv/how-fbi-gets-phone-data-att-tmobile-verizon), and this data is harvested by private companies, allowing police to bypass needing to obtain a warrant. The phone's [hardware identifiers and subscription information](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#your-imei-and-imsi-and-by-extension-your-phone-number) are logged by each and every cell tower your phone connects to. Hacking services like [Pegasus](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/) put total phone compromise within reach of even local law enforcement and are "zero-click," meaning they don't depend on you clicking a link or opening a fileto hack your phone.
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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ On the flip side, after more than 30 arsons in a small town in France went unsol
# Encryption and Geolocation
Some comrades respond to the issues that arise with smartphones by using flip phones or a landline to communicate with each other, but since these devices are not [encrypted](/glossary/#encryption), the State can see the content of your conversations, who you call and who calls you. For example, in a [recent repressive operation](https://www.notrace.how/resources/#quelques-premiers-elements-du-dossier-d-enquete-contre-ivan), the police tracked the geolocation of the suspect's flip phone phone in real time and made a list of everyone the suspect called.
Some comrades respond to the issues that arise with smartphones by using flip phones or a landline to communicate with each other, but since these devices are not [encrypted](/glossary/#encryption), the State can see the content of your conversations, who you call and who calls you. For example, in a [recent repressive operation](https://notrace.how/resources/#quelques-premiers-elements-du-dossier-d-enquete-contre-ivan), the police tracked the geolocation of the suspect's flip phone phone in real time and made a list of everyone the suspect called.
It has become quite common for comrades to carry cell phones around with them wherever they go, and, where people use flip phones, to make unencrypted calls to other anarchists. We think both of these practices should be avoided. Let's not make the job of the police and intelligence agencies so easy by providing them with our social networks and geolocation history on a silver platter.