tails update

content/posts/tails-best/index.md

@@ -158,10 +158,11 @@ Our adversaries have two attack vectors to compromise BIOS, firmware, hardware,
 
 > What's a *write-protect* switch? When you insert a normal USB into a computer, the computer does *read* and *write* operations with it, and a *write* operation can change the data on the USB. Some special USBs developed for malware analysis have a physical switch that can lock the USB, so that data can be *read* from it, but no new data can be *written* to it.
 
-If your Tails USB stick has a write-protect switch like the [Kanguru FlashTrust](https://www.kanguru.com/products/kanguru-flashtrust-secure-firmware-usb-3-0-flash-drive), you are also from an attacker compromising the Tails software when the switch is locked. This is critical. To compromise your Tails USB stick, an attacker would need to be able to write to it. This means that even if a Tails session is infected with malware, Tails itself is immutable, so the compromise cannot carry over to subsequent Tails sessions. Note that HEADS firmware makes a write-protect switch redundant because it can be configured to [verify the integrity and authenticity of your Tails USB](https://osresearch.net/InstallingOS/#generic-os-installation) before booting. If you aren't using HEADS and you are unable to obtain such a USB, you have two options.
+If your Tails USB stick has a write-protect switch like the [Kanguru FlashTrust](https://www.kanguru.com/products/kanguru-flashtrust-secure-firmware-usb-3-0-flash-drive), you are also from an attacker compromising the Tails software when the switch is locked. This is critical. To compromise your Tails USB stick, an attacker would need to be able to write to it. This means that even if a Tails session is infected with malware, Tails itself is immutable, so the compromise cannot carry over to subsequent Tails sessions. Note that HEADS firmware makes a write-protect switch redundant because it can be configured to [verify the integrity and authenticity of your Tails USB](https://osresearch.net/InstallingOS/#generic-os-installation) before booting. If you aren't using HEADS and you are unable to obtain such a USB, you have three options.
 
-1) [Burn Tails to a new DVD-R/DVD+R](https://tails.net/install/dvd/index.en.html) (write once) for each new version of Tails. Don't use DVDs labeled "DVD+RW" or "DVD+RAM", which can be rewritten.
-2) Boot Tails with the `toram` option, which loads Tails completely into memory. Using the `toram` option depends on whether your Tails USB boots with [SYSLINUX or GRUB](https://tails.net/doc/advanced_topics/boot_options/index.en.html).
+1) Install Tails on a SD card, and use a USB 3.0 to SD card adapter, because SD cards have a write-protect switch. 
+2) [Burn Tails to a new DVD-R/DVD+R](https://tails.net/install/dvd/index.en.html) (write once) for each new version of Tails. Don't use DVDs labeled "DVD+RW" or "DVD+RAM", which can be rewritten.
+3) Boot Tails with the `toram` option, which loads Tails completely into memory. Using the `toram` option depends on whether your Tails USB boots with [SYSLINUX or GRUB](https://tails.net/doc/advanced_topics/boot_options/index.en.html).
 	* For SYSLINUX, when the boot screen appears, press Tab, and type a space. Type `toram` and press Enter. 
 	* For GRUB, when the boot screen appears, press `e` and use the keyboard arrows to move to the end of the line that starts with `linux`. The line is probably wrapped and displayed on multiple lines, but it is a single configuration line. Type `toram` and press F10 or Ctrl+X. 
 	* You can eject the Tails USB at the beginning of your session before you do anything else (whether it is connecting to the Internet or plugging in another USB) and then still use it like normal.
@@ -184,8 +185,6 @@ Finally, a note about email — if you already use Tails and encrypted email, yo
 
 Another reason to avoid using Persistent Storage features is that many of them persist user data to the Tails USB. If your Tails session is compromised, the data you access during that session can be used to tie your activities together. If there is user data on the Tails USB, such as an email inbox, compartmentalization of Tails sessions is no longer possible. To achieve compartmentalization with Persistent Storage enabled, you would need a dedicated Tails USB for each identity, and updating them all every month would be a lot of work. 
 
-If its not possible to find a USB with a write-protect switch, you can alternatively use a USB 3.0 to SD card adapter, because SD cards have a write-protect switch. 
-
 # Encryption  
 
 ## Passwords