update descriptions

content/posts/metadata/index.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ letter="metadata-letter.pdf"
 +++
 
 
-[Metadata](/glossary/#metadata) is 'data about data' or 'information about information'. In the context of files, this can mean information that is automatically embedded in the file, and this information can be used to deanonymize you. For example, an image file will often have metadata about when it was taken, where it was taken, what camera it was taken with, and so on. A PDF file may have information about what program created it, what computer, etc. This can be used by investigators to link a photo to the camera on which it was taken, a video to the computer on which it was edited, and so on. To learn more about how metadata can be used to identify and reveal personal information, see [Behind the Data: Investigating metadata](https://exposingtheinvisible.org/en/guides/behind-the-data-metadata-investigations/). Before you put a sensitive file on the Internet, remove the metadata. 
+[Metadata](/glossary/#metadata) is *data about data* or *information about information*. In the context of files, this can mean information that is automatically embedded in the file, and this information can be used to deanonymize you. For example, an image file will often have metadata about when it was taken, where it was taken, what camera it was taken with, etc. A PDF file may have information about what program created it, what computer, etc. This can be used by investigators to link a photo to the camera on which it was taken, a video to the computer on which it was edited, and so on. Before you put a sensitive file on the Internet, remove the metadata. 
 
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@@ -51,4 +51,4 @@ All modern printers leave invisible watermarks to encode information such as the
 
 * [Anonymous File Sharing](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Surfing_Posting_Blogging#Anonymous_File_Sharing) from the Whonix documentation. 
 * [Redacting Documents/Pictures/Videos/Audio safely](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#redacting-documentspicturesvideosaudio-safely) for a table of recommended software for creating different types of files. 
-
+* [Behind the Data: Investigating metadata](https://exposingtheinvisible.org/en/guides/behind-the-data-metadata-investigations/) for how metadata can be used to identify and reveal personal information. 

content/posts/nophones/index.md

@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ a4="nophones-a4.pdf"
 letter="nophones-letter.pdf"
 +++
 
-Effective [security culture and operational security](https://notrace.how/resources/read/csrc-bulletin-1-en.html#header-a-base-to-stand-on-distinguishing-opsec-and-security-culture) prevents the forces of repression from knowing about our specific criminal activities, but also about our lives, [relationships](https://notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html), movement patterns, and so on. This knowledge is a huge advantage in narrowing down suspects and conducting targeted surveillance. Your phone's location is [tracked at all times](https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vqkv/how-fbi-gets-phone-data-att-tmobile-verizon), and this data is harvested by private companies, allowing police to bypass needing to obtain a warrant. The phone's [hardware identifiers and subscription information](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#your-imei-and-imsi-and-by-extension-your-phone-number) are logged by each and every cell tower your phone connects to. Hacking services like [Pegasus](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/) put total phone compromise within reach of even local law enforcement and are "zero-click," meaning they don't depend on you clicking a link or opening a fileto hack your phone. 
+Effective [security culture and operational security](https://notrace.how/resources/read/csrc-bulletin-1-en.html#header-a-base-to-stand-on-distinguishing-opsec-and-security-culture) prevents the forces of repression from knowing about our specific criminal activities, but also about our lives, [relationships](https://notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/network-mapping.html), movement patterns, and so on. This knowledge is a huge advantage in narrowing down suspects and conducting targeted surveillance. This article will outline some strategies for killing the cop in your pocket.
 
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-On the flip side, after more than 30 arsons in a small town in France went unsolved, [investigators complained](https://actforfree.noblogs.org/post/2022/04/17/grenoblefrance-these-saboteurs-of-the-ultra-left-have-been-elusive-for-five-years/) that "it is impossible to exploit phone or vehicle registration data because they operate without phones or cars!" This article will outline some strategies for killing the cop in your pocket.
+Your phone's location is [tracked at all times](https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vqkv/how-fbi-gets-phone-data-att-tmobile-verizon), and this data is harvested by private companies, allowing police to bypass needing to obtain a warrant. The phone's [hardware identifiers and subscription information](https://anonymousplanet.org/guide.html#your-imei-and-imsi-and-by-extension-your-phone-number) are logged by each and every cell tower your phone connects to. Hacking services like [Pegasus](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/) put total phone compromise within reach of even local law enforcement and are "zero-click," meaning they don't depend on you clicking a link or opening a file to hack your phone. On the flip side, after more than 30 arsons in a small town in France went unsolved, [investigators complained](https://actforfree.noblogs.org/post/2022/04/17/grenoblefrance-these-saboteurs-of-the-ultra-left-have-been-elusive-for-five-years/) that "it is impossible to make use of phone or vehicle registration data because they operate without phones or cars!" 
 
 # Encryption and Geolocation
 

content/posts/qubes/index.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ dateedit=2024-04-07
 a4="qubes-a4.pdf"
 letter="qubes-letter.pdf"
 +++
-Qubes OS is a security-oriented [operating system](/glossary#operating-system-os) (OS), which means it is an operating system designed from the ground up to be more difficult to hack. This is achieved through [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#how-does-qubes-os-provide-security), where the base system is divided into compartments called "qubes" (using "virtual machines" — more on that below). All other Linux systems like [Tails](/tags/tails/) are *monolithic*, which means that if a hack succeeds anywhere on the system, it can more easily take over. In Qubes OS, if one qube is compromised, the others remain safe. You can think of using Qubes OS as having many different computers on your desk, each for a different activity, but with the convenience of a single physical machine, a single unified desktop environment, and a set of tools for securely using them all together as parts of a unified system.
+Qubes OS is a security-oriented [operating system](/glossary#operating-system-os) (OS), which means it is an operating system designed from the ground up to be more difficult to hack. This is achieved through [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#how-does-qubes-os-provide-security), where the base system is divided into compartments called "qubes". All other Linux systems like [Tails](/tags/tails/) are *monolithic*, which means that if a hack succeeds anywhere on the system, it can more easily take over. In Qubes OS, if one qube is compromised, the others remain safe. You can think of using Qubes OS as having many different computers on your desk, each for a different activity, but with the convenience of a single physical machine and a set of tools for securely using them all together as a unified system.
 
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content/posts/tails-best/index.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ a4="tails-best-a4.pdf"
 letter="tails-best-letter.pdf"
 +++
 
-This text describes some additional precautions you can take that are relevant to an anarchist [threat model](/glossary/#threat-model) — operational security for Tails. Not all anarchist threat models are the same, and only you can decide which mitigations are worth putting into practice for your activities, but we aim to provide advice that is appropriate for high-risk activities like [claiming an action](https://notrace.how/resources/#how-to-submit-an-anonymous-communique). The [No Trace Project Threat Library](https://notrace.how/threat-library/) is another great resource for thinking through your threat model and appropriate mitigations. If you are new to Tails, start with [Tails for Anarchists](/posts/tails/). 
+All anarchists should know how to use Tails — this text describes some additional precautions you can take that are relevant to an anarchist [threat model](/glossary/#threat-model). Not all anarchist threat models are the same, and only you can decide which mitigations are worth putting into practice for your activities, but we aim to provide advice that is appropriate for high-risk activities like [claiming an action](https://notrace.how/resources/#how-to-submit-an-anonymous-communique). If you are new to Tails, start with [Tails for Anarchists](/posts/tails/). 
 
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content/posts/tamper/index.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ a4="tamper-a4.pdf"
 letter="tamper-letter.pdf"
 +++
 
-If the police ever have [physical access](/glossary/#physical-attacks) to an electronic device like a laptop, even [for five minutes](https://www.vice.com/en/article/a3q374/hacker-bios-firmware-backdoor-evil-maid-attack-laptop-5-minutes), they can install hardware keyloggers, create images of the storage media, or otherwise trivially compromise it at the hardware, firmware, or software level. One way to minimize this risk is to make devices tamper-evident. As the No Trace Project Threat Library [notes](https://notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/tamper-evident-preparation.html), "Tamper-evident preparation will make it possible to discern when something has been [physically accessed](/glossary/#physical-attacks) — it's not possible to prevent a powerful enemy from obtaining physical access to your computer when you are away, but it should be possible to detect when they do."
+If the police ever have [physical access](/glossary/#physical-attacks) to an electronic device like a laptop, even [for five minutes](https://www.vice.com/en/article/a3q374/hacker-bios-firmware-backdoor-evil-maid-attack-laptop-5-minutes), they can install hardware keyloggers, create images of the storage media, or otherwise trivially compromise it at the hardware, firmware, or software level. One way to minimize this risk is to make devices tamper-evident. As the No Trace Project [notes](https://notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/tamper-evident-preparation.html), "Tamper-evident preparation is the process of taking precautionary measures to make it possible to detect when something has been physically accessed by an adversary."
 
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 ['Evil maid' attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) work like this: An attacker gains temporary access to your [encrypted](/glossary/#encryption) laptop or phone. Although they can’t decrypt your data, they can tamper with your laptop for a few minutes and then leave it exactly where they found it. When you return and enter your credentials, you have been hacked. The attacker may have [modified data on your hard drive](https://media.ccc.de/v/gpn20-32-poc-implementing-evil-maid-attack-on-encrypted-boot), replaced the firmware, or installed a hardware component such as a keylogger.