haven unmaintained

content/posts/e2ee/index.md

@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ Some of the [Signal Configuration and Hardening Guide](https://blog.privacyguide
 
 * Go to **Applications menu → Qubes Tools → Qube Manager**
 * Clone whonix-ws-16 and name it something like whonix-ws-16-signal. 
-	* We do this so as not to add attack surface to the base Whonix Workstation template. If you also install other messaging applications like SimpleX Chat, they could share a cloned template with a name like whonix-ws-16-e2ee 
+	* We do this so as not to add attack surface to the base Whonix Workstation template. If you also install other messaging applications, they could share a cloned template with a name like whonix-ws-16-e2ee 
 * Open a Terminal in the new Template: **Applications menu → Template: whonix-ws-16-signal: Xfce Terminal**
 * Run the commands in the [Signal installation guide](https://www.signal.org/download/linux/) to install Signal Desktop in the Template. 
 	* Note that the layout of the Signal installation guide is a bit confusing for users unfamiliar with the command line; `wget` and `cat` are separate commands, but `echo` in #2 is a command so long that it takes two lines (which is why the second line is indented). 

content/posts/grapheneos/index.md

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ To install and configure Sandboxed Google Play:
 * Automatic updates are enabled by default on the Google Play Store: **Google Play Store Settings → Network Preferences → Auto-update apps**.   
 * Notifications for Google Play Store and Google Play Services must be enabled for auto-updates to work: **Settings → Apps → Google Play Store / Google Play Services → Notifications**. If you get notifications from the Play Store that it wants to update itself, [accept them](https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4191-what-were-your-less-than-ideal-experiences-with-grapheneos/18).
 
-You are now ready to install applications from the Google Play Store. The first application we will install is a [VPN](/glossary/#vpn-virtual-private-network). If you want to use a free VPN, RiseupVPN is recommended. If you want to pay for a VPN anonymously, both [Mullvad](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#mullvad) and [IVPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#ivpn) are also recommended. VPNs are per profile, so must be installed in each user profile separately. All standard GrapheneOS connections will be forced through the VPN (expect for [connectivity checks](https://grapheneos.org/faq#default-connections), which can be optionally [disabled](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/android-tips/#connectivity-check)). We recommended using a VPN in every profile, for reasons that are well-summarized by the [Security Lab](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2023/10/technical-deep-dive-into-intellexa-alliance-surveillance-products/):
+You are now ready to install applications from the Google Play Store. The first application we will install is a [VPN](/glossary/#vpn-virtual-private-network). If you want to use a free VPN, RiseupVPN is recommended. If you want to pay for a VPN anonymously, both [Mullvad](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#mullvad) and [IVPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#ivpn) are also recommended. VPNs are per profile, so must be installed in each user profile separately. All standard GrapheneOS connections will be forced through the VPN (except for [connectivity checks](https://grapheneos.org/faq#default-connections), which can be optionally [disabled](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/android-tips/#connectivity-check)). We recommended using a VPN in every profile, for reasons that are well-summarized by the [Security Lab](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2023/10/technical-deep-dive-into-intellexa-alliance-surveillance-products/):
 
 >Using a reputable VPN provider can provide more privacy against surveillance from your ISP or government and prevent network injection attacks from those entities. A VPN will also make traffic correlation attacks – especially those targeting messaging apps – more difficult to perform and less effective.
 

content/posts/tamper/index.md

@@ -104,7 +104,9 @@ This excerpt assumes that we take the cell phone with us, but [as discussed else
 
 "Defense in depth" means that there are multiple layers of security that must be bypassed for an adversary to succeed. [Physical intrusion detection](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/mitigations/physical-intrusion-detection.html) should be in addition to tamper-evident laptops and storage. That way, even if a covert house search doesn't interact with the tamper-evident storage (for example, because the goal is to install [covert surveillance devices](https://www.notrace.how/threat-library/techniques/covert-surveillance-devices.html)), you can still find out about it. 
 
-Haven is an Android app developed by the Freedom of Press Foundation that uses the smartphone’s many sensors — microphone, motion detector, light detector, and cameras — to monitor the room for changes, and it logs everything it notices. The version on [Github](https://github.com/guardianproject/haven) is newer than the Google Play store, so [use Obtanium](/posts/grapheneos/#software-that-isn-t-on-the-play-store) to install it. Haven should be used on a dedicated cheap Android device that is otherwise empty - an older [Pixel](https://www.privacyguides.org/android/#google-pixel) is a good choice because it is cheap but has good cameras. Make sure [full disk encryption](/glossary/#full-disk-encryption-fde) is enabled. If you have a smartphone in addition to the dedicated Haven phone, it should be turned off in the tamper-evident storage - if Haven was running on it instead and was discovered by the intruder, they would now have physical access to it while it was turned on. 
+Haven is an Android app developed by the Freedom of Press Foundation that uses the smartphone’s many sensors — microphone, motion detector, light detector, and cameras — to monitor the room for changes, and it logs everything it notices. Unfortunately Haven is currently unmaintained and unreliable on many devices. Until [a good alternative is developed](https://github.com/guardianproject/haven/issues/465), make sure to test the functionality of Haven on your device before relying on it. We don't recommend using home surveillance cameras without privacy features, because then the police can have easy knowledge of your comings and goings without needing to set up their own surveillance cameras. 
+
+Haven should be used on a dedicated cheap Android device that is otherwise empty - an older [Pixel](https://www.privacyguides.org/android/#google-pixel) is a good choice because it is cheap but has good cameras. Make sure [full disk encryption](/glossary/#full-disk-encryption-fde) is enabled. If you have a smartphone in addition to the dedicated Haven phone, it should be turned off in the tamper-evident storage - if Haven was running on it instead and was discovered by the intruder, they would now have physical access to it while it was turned on. 
 
 * Place the Haven smartphone in a location that has a line of sight to where an intruder would have to pass, such as a hallway that must be used to move between rooms or to access where the tamper-evident storage is located. It should be plugged in so the battery doesn't die; fairly long microUSB cables are available for this purpose. 
 * Set a countdown to turn Haven on before you leave the house. The Haven app will log everything locally on the Android device. Sending remote notifications is currently [broken](https://github.com/guardianproject/haven/issues/454).