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qubes update, pdf macro, last edited macro
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@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ tags = ["opsec", "easy"]
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[extra]
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blogimage="/images/X230.jpg"
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toc=true
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dateedit=2023-05-10
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If police can ever have [physical access](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/techniques/targeted-digital-surveillance/physical-access.html) to an electronic device like a laptop, even [for five minutes](https://www.vice.com/en/article/a3q374/hacker-bios-firmware-backdoor-evil-maid-attack-laptop-5-minutes), they can install hardware keyloggers, create images of the storage media, or otherwise trivially compromise it on the hardware, firmware, or software level. One way to minimize this risk is to make it tamper-evident. As the CSRC Threat Library [notes](https://www.csrc.link/threat-library/mitigations/tamper-evident-preparation.html), "Tamper-evident preparation will make it possible to discern when something has been [physically accessed](/glossary/#physical-attacks) - it's not possible to prevent a powerful enemy from obtaining physical access to your computer when you are away, but it should be possible to be able to detect when they do."
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