Git-Mirrors/RetroShare
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/RetroShare/RetroShare.git synced 2025-08-03 11:54:30 -04:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 2

changed #ifs into #ifdefs because it us more robust, and moved the definition of variables to retroshare.pri

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
csoler 2017-11-19 20:15:36 +01:00
parent ef1a61374c
commit 9367aa0d84
5 changed files with 49 additions and 47 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

37
libretroshare/src/retroshare/rsdefines.h
View file

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
/**************************************************************************************************************************************************
*
* V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_001:
*
* What: Computes the node id by performing a sha256 hash of the certificate's PGP signature, instead of simply picking up the last 20 bytes of it.
*
* Why: There is no real risk in forging a certificate with the same ID as the authentication is performed over the PGP signature of the certificate
* which hashes the full SSL certificate (i.e. the full serialized CERT_INFO structure). However the possibility to
* create two certificates with the same IDs is a problem, as it can be used to cause disturbance in the software.
*
* Backward compat: makes connexions impossible with non patched peers, probably because the SSL id that is computed is not the same on both side,
* and in particular unpatched peers see a cerficate with ID different (because computed with the old method) than the ID that was
* submitted when making friends.
*
* Note: the advantage of basing the ID on the signature rather than the public key is not very clear, given that the signature is based on a hash
* of the public key (and the rest of the certificate info).
*
* V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002:
*
* What: Use RSA+SHA256 instead of RSA+SHA1 for PGP certificate signatures
*
* Why: Sha1 is likely to be prone to primary collisions anytime soon, so it is urgent to turn to a more secure solution.
*
* Backward compat: unpatched peers are able to verify signatures since openpgp-sdk already handle it.
*
* V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003:
*
* What: Do not hash PGP certificate twice when signing
*
* Why: hasing twice is not per se a security issue, but it makes it harder to change the settings for hashing.
*
* Backward compat: patched peers cannot connect to non patched peers.
***************************************************************************************************************************************************/
#define V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_001 False
#define V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002 False
#define V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003 False