mirror of
https://github.com/RetroShare/RetroShare.git
synced 2024-10-01 02:35:48 -04:00
changed #ifs into #ifdefs because it us more robust, and moved the definition of variables to retroshare.pri
This commit is contained in:
csoler
parent
ef1a61374c
commit
9367aa0d84
@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@ ops_secret_key_t *secret_key = NULL ;
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// then do the signature.
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ops_boolean_t not_raw = !use_raw_signature ;
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#if V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002
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#ifdef V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002
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ops_memory_t *memres = ops_sign_buf(data,len,OPS_SIG_BINARY,OPS_HASH_SHA256,secret_key,ops_false,ops_false,not_raw,not_raw) ;
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#else
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ops_memory_t *memres = ops_sign_buf(data,len,OPS_SIG_BINARY,OPS_HASH_SHA1,secret_key,ops_false,ops_false,not_raw,not_raw) ;
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@ -43,7 +43,6 @@
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#include "pgp/pgpkeyutil.h"
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#include "retroshare/rspeers.h" // for RsPeerDetails structure
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#include "retroshare/rsdefines.h"
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#include "retroshare/rsids.h" // for RsPeerDetails structure
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#include "rsserver/p3face.h"
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@ -822,7 +821,7 @@ X509 *AuthSSLimpl::SignX509ReqWithGPG(X509_REQ *req, long /*days*/)
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature = const_cast<ASN1_BIT_STRING*>(tmp_signature);
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#endif
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//EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
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#if V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002
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#ifdef V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002
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const EVP_MD *type = EVP_sha256();
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#else
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const EVP_MD *type = EVP_sha1();
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@ -872,7 +871,7 @@ X509 *AuthSSLimpl::SignX509ReqWithGPG(X509_REQ *req, long /*days*/)
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inl=i2d_re_X509_tbs(x509,&buf_in) ; // this does the i2d over x509->cert_info
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#endif
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#if V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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#ifdef V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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sigoutl=2048; // hashoutl; //EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
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unsigned char *buf_sigout=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)sigoutl);
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@ -966,7 +965,7 @@ X509 *AuthSSLimpl::SignX509ReqWithGPG(X509_REQ *req, long /*days*/)
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/* cleanup */
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if(buf_in != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(buf_in) ;
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#if !V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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#ifndef V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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if(buf_hashout != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(buf_hashout) ;
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#endif
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@ -1028,7 +1027,7 @@ bool AuthSSLimpl::AuthX509WithGPG(X509 *x509,uint32_t& diagnostic)
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#endif
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#if V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002
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#ifdef V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002
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const EVP_MD *type = EVP_sha256();
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#else
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const EVP_MD *type = EVP_sha1();
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@ -1078,7 +1077,7 @@ bool AuthSSLimpl::AuthX509WithGPG(X509 *x509,uint32_t& diagnostic)
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i2d(data,&p);
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#endif
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#if !V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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#ifndef V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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/* data in buf_in, ready to be hashed */
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EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx,type, NULL);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
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@ -1111,7 +1110,7 @@ bool AuthSSLimpl::AuthX509WithGPG(X509 *x509,uint32_t& diagnostic)
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std::cerr << "AuthSSLimpl::AuthX509() verifying the gpg sig with keyprint : " << pd.fpr << std::endl;
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std::cerr << "Sigoutl = " << sigoutl << std::endl ;
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std::cerr << "pd.fpr = " << pd.fpr << std::endl ;
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#if !V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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#ifndef V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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std::cerr << "hashoutl = " << hashoutl << std::endl ;
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#endif
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#endif
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@ -1176,7 +1175,7 @@ bool AuthSSLimpl::AuthX509WithGPG(X509 *x509,uint32_t& diagnostic)
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// passed, verify the signature itself
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#if V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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#ifdef V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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if (!AuthGPG::getAuthGPG()->VerifySignBin(buf_in, inl, buf_sigout, (unsigned int) sigoutl, pd.fpr)) {
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#else
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if (!AuthGPG::getAuthGPG()->VerifySignBin(buf_hashout, hashoutl, buf_sigout, (unsigned int) sigoutl, pd.fpr)) {
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@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ bool getX509id(X509 *x509, RsPeerId& xid)
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X509_get0_signature(&signature,&algor,x509);
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#endif
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#if V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_001
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#ifdef V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_001
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// What: Computes the node id by performing a sha256 hash of the certificate's PGP signature, instead of simply picking up the last 20 bytes of it.
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//
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// Why: There is no real risk in forging a certificate with the same ID as the authentication is performed over the PGP signature of the certificate
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@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
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/**************************************************************************************************************************************************
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*
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* V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_001:
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*
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* What: Computes the node id by performing a sha256 hash of the certificate's PGP signature, instead of simply picking up the last 20 bytes of it.
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*
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* Why: There is no real risk in forging a certificate with the same ID as the authentication is performed over the PGP signature of the certificate
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* which hashes the full SSL certificate (i.e. the full serialized CERT_INFO structure). However the possibility to
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* create two certificates with the same IDs is a problem, as it can be used to cause disturbance in the software.
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*
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* Backward compat: makes connexions impossible with non patched peers, probably because the SSL id that is computed is not the same on both side,
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* and in particular unpatched peers see a cerficate with ID different (because computed with the old method) than the ID that was
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* submitted when making friends.
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*
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* Note: the advantage of basing the ID on the signature rather than the public key is not very clear, given that the signature is based on a hash
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* of the public key (and the rest of the certificate info).
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*
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* V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002:
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*
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* What: Use RSA+SHA256 instead of RSA+SHA1 for PGP certificate signatures
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*
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* Why: Sha1 is likely to be prone to primary collisions anytime soon, so it is urgent to turn to a more secure solution.
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*
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* Backward compat: unpatched peers are able to verify signatures since openpgp-sdk already handle it.
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*
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* V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003:
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*
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* What: Do not hash PGP certificate twice when signing
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*
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* Why: hasing twice is not per se a security issue, but it makes it harder to change the settings for hashing.
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*
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* Backward compat: patched peers cannot connect to non patched peers.
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***************************************************************************************************************************************************/
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#define V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_001 False
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#define V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002 False
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#define V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003 False
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@ -262,3 +262,43 @@ rs_async_chat {
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rs_chatserver {
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DEFINES *= RS_CHATSERVER
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}
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###########################################################################################################################################################
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#
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# V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_001:
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#
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# What: Computes the node id by performing a sha256 hash of the certificate's PGP signature, instead of simply picking up the last 20 bytes of it.
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#
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# Why: There is no real risk in forging a certificate with the same ID as the authentication is performed over the PGP signature of the certificate
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# which hashes the full SSL certificate (i.e. the full serialized CERT_INFO structure). However the possibility to
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# create two certificates with the same IDs is a problem, as it can be used to cause disturbance in the software.
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#
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# Backward compat: makes connexions impossible with non patched peers, probably because the SSL id that is computed is not the same on both side,
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# and in particular unpatched peers see a cerficate with ID different (because computed with the old method) than the ID that was
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# submitted when making friends.
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#
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# Note: the advantage of basing the ID on the signature rather than the public key is not very clear, given that the signature is based on a hash
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# of the public key (and the rest of the certificate info).
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#
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# V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002:
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#
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# What: Use RSA+SHA256 instead of RSA+SHA1 for PGP certificate signatures
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#
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# Why: Sha1 is likely to be prone to primary collisions anytime soon, so it is urgent to turn to a more secure solution.
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#
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# Backward compat: unpatched peers are able to verify signatures since openpgp-sdk already handle it.
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#
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# V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003:
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#
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# What: Do not hash PGP certificate twice when signing
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#
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# Why: hasing twice is not per se a security issue, but it makes it harder to change the settings for hashing.
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#
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# Backward compat: patched peers cannot connect to non patched peers.
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###########################################################################################################################################################
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rs_v07_changes {
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DEFINES += V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_001
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DEFINES += V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_002
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DEFINES += V07_NON_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_CHANGE_003
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}
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