RNMnetwork/Part 2 - The Catalan German crew/3 - when Catalans and Italians merged.md
2019-11-24 23:47:16 +01:00

5.3 KiB

The meeting in Arago, Barcelona

Guifi network

This is the network graph of guifi.net. A wireless routed layer three network. B.A.T.M.A.N. [1] routing protocol is active, but also OSPF [2] and BGP [3].

Like I've already said guifi is based upon Mikrotik. The stupid little purple bitch, a telecommunications entrepreneur in France, a daughter of military family in Italy, an hacker of systems and people in Spain and a terrorist in the world have used a public exploit to gain access in this free network. The problem is that this free network has got a BGP autonomous system number [4]. The primary exchange ASN is 49835 [5], the data center is the Catalunya neutral Internet exchange [6]. In the same IXP [7] there is others very important connections:

In the Orange network but also probably in the Telefonica one hackers gain access to the LTE towers and the passive scanning system for brain waves. The ones that are stimulated by the satellite in 3GHz. Like we've seen.

All the customers premise equipments of Telefonica in FTTH mount the CPE Wan Management Protocol TR-069 [37] soap [38] based message system with the data center to them. And there is a public vulnerability [39], simple to use to exploit the client hardware. Movistar equipment got three VLANS 2 voice 3 iptv and 6 data. PPPoE daemon in the FTTH movistar network serve dynamic public ips over an virtual encapsulation with a maximum transfer unit of 1500 - 8 bytes with vlan tag number 2. CWMP daemon it's opened by default over that vlan and got an access list with default permissions on deny and accept only a range of public ip from the same provider. Those people with BGP Hijacking have hoped from AS

  1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B.A.T.M.A.N.
  2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Shortest_Path_First
  3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Border_Gateway_Protocol
  4. https://www.inetdaemon.com/tutorials/internet/ip/routing/bgp/autonomous_system_number.shtml
  5. https://www.peeringdb.com/asn/49835
  6. https://www.catnix.net/
  7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_exchange_point
  8. http://www.adamo.es
  9. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/1989
  10. http://www.espanix.net
  11. https://www.andorratelecom.ad
  12. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/14854
  13. http://www.clara.net
  14. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/116
  15. https://www.cloudflare.com
  16. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/4224
  17. https://about.google/intl/en/
  18. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/433
  19. https://www.microsoft.com/nl-nl/
  20. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/694
  21. https://www.orange.es/
  22. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/11902
  23. http://www.rediris.es
  24. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/2813
  25. https://stat.ripe.net/widget/looking-glass
  26. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/621
  27. http://lg.he.net
  28. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/291
  29. https://www.isc.org
  30. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/1111
  31. https://www.t-systems.es
  32. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/10653
  33. www.telefonica.es
  34. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/12709
  35. http://www.verisign.com/rirs
  36. https://www.peeringdb.com/net/9897
  37. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TR-069
  38. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOAP
  39. https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Tal/DEFCON-22-Shahar-TaI-I-hunt-TR-069-admins-UPDATED.pdf