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Christopher Laprise
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README.md
12
README.md
@ -60,15 +60,16 @@ the /etc/defaults/vms folder is deleted from the running VM (this has no effect
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### Where to use: Basic examples
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After installing into a template, simply enable `vm-boot-protect-root` service without configuration. Recommended for the following types of VMs:
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o Service VMs: sys-usb and sys-net.
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o App VMs: untrusted, personal, banking, vault, etc. This assumes using regular Linux apps without tailored Qubes-specific settings in /rw such as *Firefox, Chromium, Thunderbird, KeePassX, office apps, media playback & editing*, etc. For these and many more, no configuration should be necessary.
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* Service VMs: sys-usb and sys-net.
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* App VMs: untrusted, personal, banking, vault, etc. This assumes using regular Linux apps without tailored Qubes-specific settings in /rw such as *Firefox, Chromium, Thunderbird, KeePassX, office apps, media playback & editing*, etc. For these and many more, no configuration should be necessary.
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Examples where `vm-boot-protect-root` requires configuration: sys-vpn (see Notes), Martus and Whonix (needs testing). Note that VMs sys-vpn and sys-firewall are fairly low-risk VMs so there may not be a compelling reason to use the service with them.
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Examples where -root should *not* be enabled:
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o DispVMs. Sensible option is to enable sudo security for DispVM templates; service can be installed into template and left unused.
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o Standalone VMs. Plain `vm-boot-protect` makes more sense for these.
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o Non-Linux VMs (currently unsupported for any mode)
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* DispVMs. Sensible option is to enable sudo security for DispVM templates; service can be installed into template and left unused.
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* Whonix VMs. Plain `vm-boot-protect` is best used until Whonix persistence files can be mapped.
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* Standalone VMs. Plain `vm-boot-protect` makes more sense for these.
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* Non-Linux VMs (currently unsupported for any mode)
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### Scope and Limitations
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@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ Examples where -root should *not* be enabled:
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* Currently the service cannot seamlessly handle 'first boot' when the private volume must be initialized. If you enabled the service on a VM before its first startup, on first start the shell will display a notice telling you to restart the VM. Subsequent starts will proceed normally.
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## Releases
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- v0.8.4 Add protection to /home/user/.config/systemd
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- v0.8.3 Fix for install script copying to /etc/default/vms
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- v0.8.2 Working rescue shell. Add sys-net whitelist, sudo config, fixes.
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- v0.8.0 Adds protection to /rw, file SHA checksums, whitelists, deployment
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@ -3,19 +3,27 @@
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set -e
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[ `id -u` -eq 0 ] || exit
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if [ ! -e /etc/debian_version ]; then
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echo "Debian-based template required for autoconfiguration.
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See qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo for manual instructions."
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if [ ! -e /etc/sudoers.d/qubes ]; then
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echo "The 'qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root' package does not appear"
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echo "to be present or configured; sudo autoconfiguration skipped."
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exit 0
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fi
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if [ ! -e /etc/debian_version ]; then
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echo "Debian-based template required for sudo autoconfiguration.
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See https://qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo for manual instructions."
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exit 1
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fi
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echo -e "\n--+ Enable yes/no authentication prompt for sudo +--
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Warning: Before opting for this change a backup or clone
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should me made of this template!"
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read -p "Configure sudo authentication prompt now? (y/n): " answer
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if [[ $answer == @(y|Y) ]]; then
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mv -fb /etc/pam.d/common-auth /etc/pam.d/common-auth.bak
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mv -fb /etc/pam.d/common-auth /etc/pam.d/common-auth~
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cat >/etc/pam.d/common-auth <<_EOF
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auth [success=1 default=ignore] pam_exec.so seteuid /usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-client-vm dom0 qubes.VMAuth /bin/grep -q ^1$
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auth requisite pam_deny.so
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@ -30,9 +38,9 @@ _EOF
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sed -ri 's/^(auth[[:space:]]sufficient[[:space:]]pam_permit.so)/#\1/' /etc/pam.d/su
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mv -f /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/00-qubes-allow-all.rules \
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/etc/polkit-1/rulesd_00-qubes-allow-all.rules.bak
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/etc/polkit-1/rulesd_00-qubes-allow-all.rules.bak || true
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mv -f /etc/polkit-1/localauthority/50-local.d/qubes-allow-all.pkla \
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/etc/polkit-1/localauthority_50-locald_qubes-allow-all.pkla.bak
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/etc/polkit-1/localauthority_50-locald_qubes-allow-all.pkla.bak || true
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echo "Done."
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@ -1 +1,2 @@
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/rw/config/NM-system-connections/
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/rw/config/suspend-module-blacklist
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2
install
2
install
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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# From https://github.com/tasket/Qubes-VM-hardening
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# installer version 0.8.3
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# installer version 0.8.4
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set -e
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[ `id -u` -eq 0 ] || exit
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@ -3,9 +3,6 @@ Description=Protect Qubes VM execution environment at startup
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Documentation=https://github.com/tasket/Qubes-VM-hardening
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After=qubes-sysinit.service
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Before=qubes-mount-dirs.service
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ConditionPathExists=|/var/run/qubes-service/vm-boot-protect
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ConditionPathExists=|/var/run/qubes-service/vm-boot-protect-root
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ConditionPathExists=|/var/run/qubes-service/vm-boot-protect-cli
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DefaultDependencies=false
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#OnFailure=rescue.target
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#OnFailureJobMode=replace-irreversibly
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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## Protect startup of Qubes VMs from /rw content ##
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## https://github.com/tasket/Qubes-VM-hardening ##
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## Copyright 2017-2018 Christopher Laprise ##
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## Copyright 2017-2019 Christopher Laprise ##
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## tasket@protonmail.com ##
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# This file is part of Qubes-VM-hardening.
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@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
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chfiles=".bashrc .bash_profile .bash_login .bash_logout .profile \
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.xprofile .xinitrc .xserverrc .xsession"
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chdirs="bin .local/bin .config/autostart .config/plasma-workspace/env \
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.config/plasma-workspace/shutdown .config/autostart-scripts"
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.config/plasma-workspace/shutdown .config/autostart-scripts .config/systemd"
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vmname=`qubesdb-read /name`
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dev=/dev/xvdb
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ rw=/mnt/rwtmp
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rwbak=$rw/vm-boot-protect
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errlog=/var/run/vm-protect-error
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defdir=/etc/default/vms
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version="0.8.2"
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version="0.8.4"
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# Function: Make user scripts immutable.
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@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ if ! is_rwonly_persistent; then
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if qsvc vm-boot-protect; then
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make_immutable
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fi
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if ! is_template_vm; then
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# Keep configs invisible for standalone vms
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rm -rf "$defdir"
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fi
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exit 0
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# cannot use abort_startup() before this point
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fi
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@ -100,6 +104,7 @@ if qsvc vm-boot-protect-cli; then
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abort_startup RELOCATE "CLI requested."
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fi
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if qsvc vm-boot-protect || qsvc vm-boot-protect-root; then
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# Mount private volume in temp location
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mkdir -p $rw
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if [ -e $dev ] && mount -o ro $dev $rw ; then
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@ -115,7 +120,7 @@ else
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abort_startup RELOCATE "Mount failed; BAD private volume!"
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fi
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fi
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fi
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# Protection measures for /rw dirs:
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@ -215,14 +220,17 @@ if qsvc vm-boot-protect-root && is_rwonly_persistent; then
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echo "Copy files from $defdir/$vmset/rw"
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cp -af $defdir/$vmset/rw/* $rw
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fi
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done
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fi
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if qsvc vm-boot-protect || qsvc vm-boot-protect-root; then
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make_immutable
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umount $rw
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fi
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# Keep configs invisible at runtime...
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rm -rf "$defdir"
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fi
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make_immutable
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umount $rw
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exit 0
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