diff --git a/.vm-boot-protect.sh.kate-swp b/.vm-boot-protect.sh.kate-swp
deleted file mode 100644
index 1b6a07c..0000000
Binary files a/.vm-boot-protect.sh.kate-swp and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index af3ee73..549b8d9 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -84,8 +84,9 @@ Some useful configurations have been supplied in /etc/default/vms:
   * vm-boot-tag-qhome: Quarantines /home in addition to the /rw system dirs. Useful for 'sys-usb' and DispVM-like functionality.
   * vm-boot-tag-noqbackup: Deletes all quarantined files that are not whitelisted.
   * vm-boot-tag-ibrowse: Preserves Firefox bookmarks while quarantining the /home folder. [Currently](https://github.com/tasket/Qubes-VM-hardening/issues/39) works with Firefox ESR. See Notes below.
+  * vm-boot-wiperw: Completely wipe and reformat the /rw partition.
 
-
+  
 ### Scope and Limitations
 
    The *vm-boot-protect* concept enhances the guest operating system's own defenses by using the *root volume non-persistence* provided by the Qubes template system; thus a relatively pristine startup state may be achieved if the *private* volume is brought online in a controlled manner. Protecting the init/autostart files should result in Qubes template-based VMs that boot 'cleanly' with much less chance of being affected by malware initially. Even if malware persists in a VM, it should be possible to run other apps and terminals without interference if the malware has not escalated to root (admittedly, a big 'if').
@@ -118,6 +119,7 @@ Some useful configurations have been supplied in /etc/default/vms:
    * The service can be removed from the system with `cd Qubes-VM-hardening; sudo bash install --uninstall`
 
 ## Releases
+   - v0.9.1  Optimized, fix rc order, new "wiperw" tag
    - v0.9.0  Add tags and rc files, protect more home scripts, reinitialize home
    - v0.8.5  Fix template detection, /etc/default/vms erasure
    - v0.8.4  Add protection to /home/user/.config/systemd
diff --git a/default/vms/@tags/wiperw.rc b/default/vms/@tags/wiperw.rc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3879af7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/default/vms/@tags/wiperw.rc
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Completely wipes private volume contents
+
+blkdiscard $dev
+mkfs.ext4 $dev
diff --git a/vm-boot-protect.sh b/vm-boot-protect.sh
index 586f3a6..d19772a 100755
--- a/vm-boot-protect.sh
+++ b/vm-boot-protect.sh
@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ privdirs=${privdirs:-"/rw/config /rw/usrlocal /rw/bind-dirs"}
 privdirs_add=${privdirs_add:-""}
 save_backup=${save_backup:-1}
 
+if is_rwonly_persistent; then
+    rwonly_pers=1
+else
+    rwonly_pers=0
+fi
+
 
 # Placeholder function: Runs at end
 vm_boot_finish() { return; }
@@ -117,7 +123,7 @@ fi
 
 
 # Run rc file commands if they exist
-if qsvc vm-boot-protect-root && is_rwonly_persistent; then
+if qsvc vm-boot-protect-root && [ $rwonly_pers = 1 ]; then
     # Get list of enabled tags from Qubes services
     tags=`find $servicedir -name 'vm-boot-tag-*' -type f -printf '%f\n' \
           | sort | sed -E 's|^vm-boot-tag-|\@tags/|'`
@@ -148,14 +154,14 @@ if qsvc vm-boot-protect || qsvc vm-boot-protect-root; then
     fi
 
     # Begin exit if in template or standalone
-    if ! is_rwonly_persistent; then
+    if [ $rwonly_pers = 0 ]; then
         make_immutable
         umount $rw
     fi
 
 fi
 # Exit if in template or standalone
-if ! is_rwonly_persistent; then
+if [ $rwonly_pers = 0 ]; then
     exit 0
 fi
 
@@ -166,7 +172,7 @@ fi
 #   * Remove /rw root startup files (config, usrlocal, bind-dirs).
 #   * Contents of vms/vms.all and vms/$vmname folders will be copied.
 
-if qsvc vm-boot-protect-root && is_rwonly_persistent; then
+if qsvc vm-boot-protect-root && [ $rwonly_pers = 1 ]; then
 
     # Check hashes
     checkcode=0