diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index c3ee485..e8e6173 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,10 +1,26 @@
 # Qubes-VM-hardening
 Enhancing Qubes VM security and privacy
 
-## rc.local: Protect sh, bash and GUI init files
-
 ### Pre-requisites:
    Enabling authentication for sudo (see link below for Qubes doc).
+   
+---
+
+
+## vm-sudo-protect.service
+   * Protect /home script files
+   * Remove /rw scripts at VM start
+
+## Testing systemd version...
+Install the two files `vm-sudo-protect.sh` and `vm-sudo-protect.service` into template then use `systemctl` to enable the service.
+
+Activate by specifying as a Qubes service for each VM; There are two levels...
+   1. `vm-sudo-protect` - similar to the rc.local script. Protects scripts within /home and may be used with wide array of VMs including standalone, netVMs and Whonix.
+   2. `vm-sudo-protect-root` - new feature which **erases** /rw/config, /rw/usrlocal and /rw/bind-dirs. Use with caution! This feature can also replace files on a global or per-VM basis... see script for details. Not recommended for standalone or VMs that rely on /rw root dirs such as netVMs or Whonix.
+
+---
+
+## rc.local (old version)
 
 ### Description:
 Placed in /etc/rc.local (or equivalent) of a template VM, this makes the shell init files immutable so PATH and alias cannot be used to hijack commands like su and sudo, nor can impostor apps autostart whenever a VM starts. I combed the dash and bash docs -- as well as Gnome, KDE, Xfce and X11 docs -- to address all the user-writable startup files that apply. Feel free to comment or create an issue if you see an omission or other problem.
diff --git a/lib/systemd/system/vm-sudo-protect.service b/lib/systemd/system/vm-sudo-protect.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f632011
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/systemd/system/vm-sudo-protect.service
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Script protections to enhance VM security
+After=qubes-sysinit.service
+Before=qubes-mount-dirs.service
+ConditionPathExists=|/var/run/qubes-service/vm-sudo-protect
+ConditionPathExists=|/var/run/qubes-service/vm-sudo-protect-root
+ConditionPathExists=|/var/run/qubes-service/vm-sudo-protect-cli
+DefaultDependencies=false
+OnFailure=shutdown.target
+OnFailureJobMode=replace-irreversibly
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+RemainAfterExit=no
+#Environment="privdirs=/rw/config /rw/usrlocal /rw/bind-dirs"
+ExecStart=/usr/lib/qubes/init/vm-sudo-protect.sh
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sysinit.target 
diff --git a/rc.local b/rc.local
deleted file mode 100644
index beac2ae..0000000
--- a/rc.local
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh -e
-# Debian: /etc/rc.local
-
- #########################################################
-##  Protect sh, bash, X and desktop init scripts         ##
-##  to prevent privilege escalation attacks              ##
-##  and malware persistence - for Qubes Linux templates  ##
-chfiles=".bashrc .bash_profile .bash_login .bash_logout .profile \
-.xprofile .xinitrc .xserverrc .xsession"
-chdirs="bin .config/autostart .config/plasma-workspace/env \
-.config/plasma-workspace/shutdown .config/autostart-scripts"
-
-cd /home/user
-mkdir -p $chdirs ||true
-touch $chfiles || true
-chattr -R -f +i $chfiles $chdirs || true
-#touch /home/user/FIXED || true
-
-# end of script
-exit 0
diff --git a/usr/lib/qubes/init/vm-sudo-protect.sh b/usr/lib/qubes/init/vm-sudo-protect.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d895786
--- /dev/null
+++ b/usr/lib/qubes/init/vm-sudo-protect.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+## Protect startup of Qubes VMs from /rw scripts    ##
+## https://github.com/tasket/Qubes-VM-hardening     ##
+
+
+# Source Qubes library.
+. /usr/lib/qubes/init/functions
+
+# Define sh, bash, X and desktop init scripts in /home/user
+# to be protected
+chfiles=".bashrc .bash_profile .bash_login .bash_logout .profile \
+.xprofile .xinitrc .xserverrc .xsession"
+chdirs="bin .config/autostart .config/plasma-workspace/env \
+.config/plasma-workspace/shutdown .config/autostart-scripts"
+vmname=`qubesdb-read /name`
+rw=/mnt/rwtmp
+
+# Function: Make user scripts immutable.
+make_immutable() {
+    #initialize_home $rw/home ifneeded
+    cd $rw/home/user
+    mkdir -p $chdirs
+    touch $chfiles
+    chattr -R -f +i $chfiles $chdirs
+    cd /root
+    touch $rw/home/user/FIXED #debug
+}
+
+# Mount private volume in temp location
+mkdir -p $rw
+if [ -e /dev/xvdb ] && mount /dev/xvdb $rw ; then
+    echo Good rw mount.
+else
+    echo Mount failed!
+    xterm -hold -display :0 -title "VM PROTECTION: MOUNT FAILED!" \
+-e "bash -i"
+    exit 1
+fi
+if qsvc vm-sudo-protect-cli; then
+    xterm -hold -display :0 -title "VM PROTECTION: SERVICE PROMPT" \
+-e "echo Private volume is mounted at $rw; bash -i"
+fi
+
+
+# Protection measures for /rw dirs:
+# Activated by presence of vm-sudo-protect-root Qubes service.
+#   * Hashes in vms/vms.all.SHA and vms/$vmname.SHA files will be checked.
+#   * Remove /rw root startup files (config, usrlocal, bind-dirs).
+#   * Contents of vms/vms.all and vms/$vmname folders will be copied.
+defdir="/etc/default/vms"
+privdirs=${privdirs:-"$rw/config $rw/usrlocal $rw/bind-dirs"}
+
+if qsvc vm-sudo-protect-root && is_rwonly_persistent; then
+
+    # Check hashes
+    checkcode=0
+    echo "File hash checks:" >/tmp/vm-protect-sum-error
+    for vmset in vms.all $vmname; do
+        if [ -f $defdir/$vmset.SHA ]; then
+            sha256sum --strict -c $defdir/$vmset.SHA >>/tmp/vm-protect-sum-error 2>&1
+            checkcode=$((checkcode+$?))
+        fi
+    done
+    cat /tmp/vm-protect-sum-error # For logging
+
+    # Stop system startup on checksum mismatch:
+    if [ $checkcode != 0 ]; then
+        xterm -hold -display :0 -title "VM PROTECTION: CHECKSUM MISMATCH!" \
+-e "cat /tmp/vm-protect-sum-error; echo Private volume is mounted at $rw; bash -i"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
+    # Files mutable for del/copy operations
+    cd $rw/home/user
+    chattr -R -f -i $chfiles $chdirs $privdirs
+    cd /root
+
+    # Deactivate private.img config dirs
+    for dir in $privdirs; do
+        bakdir=`dirname $dir`/BAK-`basename $dir`
+        bak2dir=`dirname $dir`/BAK2-`basename $dir`
+        if [ -d $bakdir ] && [ ! -d $bak2dir ]; then
+            mv $bakdir $bak2dir
+        fi
+        rm -rf  $bakdir
+        mv $dir $bakdir
+    done
+    mkdir -p $privdirs
+
+    for vmset in vms.all $vmname; do
+
+        # Process whitelists...
+        cat $defdir/$vmset.whitelist \
+        | while read wlfile; do
+            # Must begin with '/rw/'
+            if echo $wlfile |grep -q "^\/rw\/"; then #Was [ $wlfile =~ ^\/rw\/ ];
+                srcfile="`echo $wlfile |sed -r \"s|^/rw/(.+)$|$rw/BAK-\1|\"`"
+                dstfile="`echo $wlfile |sed -r \"s|^/rw/(.+)$|$rw/\1|\"`"
+                dstdir="`dirname \"$dstfile\"`"
+                if [ ! -e "$srcfile" ]; then
+                    echo "Whitelist entry not present in filesystem."
+                    continue
+                # For very large dirs: mv whole dir when entry ends with '/'
+                elif echo $wlfile |grep -q "\/$"; then
+                    echo "Whitelist mv $srcfile"
+                    mkdir -p "$dstdir"
+                    mv "$srcfile" "$dstdir"
+                else
+                    echo "Whitelist cp $srcfile"
+                    cp -a --link "$srcfile" "$dstdir"
+                fi
+            elif [ -n "$wlfile" ]; then
+                echo "Whitelist path must begin with /rw/."
+            fi
+        done
+
+        # Copy default files...
+        if [ -d $defdir/$vmset/rw ]; then
+            cp -af "$defdir/$vmset/rw/*" $rw
+        fi
+
+    done
+
+fi
+
+make_immutable
+umount $rw
+exit 0