DivestOS/Patches/Linux_CVEs-New/CVE-2013-4312/3.2/0.patch

From a5a6cf8c405e826ff7ed1308dde72560c0ed4854 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 07:54:56 +0100
Subject: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets

commit 712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593 upstream.

It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.

This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.

Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[carnil: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
 include/linux/sched.h |  1 +
 net/unix/af_unix.c    | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 net/unix/garbage.c    | 14 ++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 9b9ac29..2bffa8a 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -709,6 +709,7 @@ struct user_struct {
 	unsigned long mq_bytes;	/* How many bytes can be allocated to mqueue? */
 #endif
 	unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */
+	unsigned long unix_inflight;	/* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 	struct key *uid_keyring;	/* UID specific keyring */
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 6cb363d..6798b3c 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1472,6 +1472,21 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	sock_wfree(skb);
 }
 
+/*
+ * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
+ * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
+ * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
+ * it across threads. Tough.
+ */
+static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	struct user_struct *user = current_user();
+
+	if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
+		return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+	return false;
+}
+
 #define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4
 
 static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1480,6 +1495,9 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	unsigned char max_level = 0;
 	int unix_sock_count = 0;
 
+	if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
+		return -ETOOMANYREFS;
+
 	for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 		struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
 
@@ -1501,10 +1519,8 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (unix_sock_count) {
-		for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-			unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
-	}
+	for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
 	return max_level;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index 00d3e56..fd1a840 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -125,9 +125,11 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
 void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
 {
 	struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+
+	spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+
 	if (s) {
 		struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
-		spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
 		if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
 			BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
 			list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
@@ -135,22 +137,26 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
 			BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
 		}
 		unix_tot_inflight++;
-		spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
 	}
+	fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
 }
 
 void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
 {
 	struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+
+	spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+
 	if (s) {
 		struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
-		spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
 		BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
 		if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
 			list_del_init(&u->link);
 		unix_tot_inflight--;
-		spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
 	}
+	fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
 }
 
 static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),
-- 
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