DivestOS/Patches/Linux_CVEs/LVT-2017-0001/3.0/0001.patch

From 37639228b9d0c6b7ae27f706c777305fd8c93b83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tom Marshall <tdm.code@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 22:46:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kernel: Only expose su when daemon is running

Note: this is for the 3.0 kernel and lacks the read-only mount point
logic due to the non-extensible readdir implementation.

It has been claimed that the PG implementation of 'su' has security
vulnerabilities even when disabled.  Unfortunately, the people that
find these vulnerabilities often like to keep them private so they
can profit from exploits while leaving users exposed to malicious
hackers.

In order to reduce the attack surface for vulnerabilites, it is
therefore necessary to make 'su' completely inaccessible when it
is not in use (except by the root and system users).

Change-Id: Ia7d50ba46c3d932c2b0ca5fc8e9ec69ec9045f85
---

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 21379c3..5188cea 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1538,6 +1538,11 @@
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && d_is_su(file->f_dentry)) {
+		current->flags |= PF_SU;
+		su_exec();
+	}
+
 	/* execve succeeded */
 	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
 	current->in_execve = 0;
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index c78d051..60e83a2 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1616,6 +1616,11 @@
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (!err) {
+		if (d_is_su(nd->path.dentry) && !su_visible())
+			err = -ENOENT;
+	}
+
 	if (base)
 		fput(base);
 
diff --git a/fs/readdir.c b/fs/readdir.c
index 356f715..0362f9e 100644
--- a/fs/readdir.c
+++ b/fs/readdir.c
@@ -47,6 +47,14 @@
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_readdir);
 
+static bool hide_name(const char *name, int namlen)
+{
+	if (namlen == 2 && !memcmp(name, "su", 2))
+		if (!su_visible())
+			return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * Traditional linux readdir() handling..
  *
@@ -84,6 +92,8 @@
 		buf->result = -EOVERFLOW;
 		return -EOVERFLOW;
 	}
+	if (hide_name(name, namlen))
+		return 0;
 	buf->result++;
 	dirent = buf->dirent;
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dirent,
@@ -163,6 +173,8 @@
 		buf->error = -EOVERFLOW;
 		return -EOVERFLOW;
 	}
+	if (hide_name(name, namlen))
+		return 0;
 	dirent = buf->previous;
 	if (dirent) {
 		if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
@@ -244,6 +256,8 @@
 	buf->error = -EINVAL;	/* only used if we fail.. */
 	if (reclen > buf->count)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (hide_name(name, namlen))
+		return 0;
 	dirent = buf->previous;
 	if (dirent) {
 		if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
diff --git a/include/linux/dcache.h b/include/linux/dcache.h
index 33cf6ce..81982da 100644
--- a/include/linux/dcache.h
+++ b/include/linux/dcache.h
@@ -427,6 +427,11 @@
 
 extern struct dentry *lookup_create(struct nameidata *nd, int is_dir);
 
+static inline bool d_is_su(const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return dentry && dentry->d_name.len == 2 && !memcmp(dentry->d_name.name, "su", 2);
+}
+
 extern int sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure;
 
 #endif	/* __LINUX_DCACHE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 18203a1..b6cf92f 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -93,6 +93,12 @@
 
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 
+int  su_instances(void);
+bool su_running(void);
+bool su_visible(void);
+void su_exec(void);
+void su_exit(void);
+
 struct exec_domain;
 struct futex_pi_state;
 struct robust_list_head;
@@ -1811,6 +1817,8 @@
 #define PF_FREEZER_SKIP	0x40000000	/* Freezer should not count it as freezable */
 #define PF_FREEZER_NOSIG 0x80000000	/* Freezer won't send signals to it */
 
+#define PF_SU		0x00001000      /* task is su */
+
 /*
  * Only the _current_ task can read/write to tsk->flags, but other
  * tasks can access tsk->flags in readonly mode for example
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 1e019f3..a0aca0c 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -956,6 +956,11 @@
 	exit_irq_thread();
 
 	exit_signals(tsk);  /* sets PF_EXITING */
+
+	if (tsk->flags & PF_SU) {
+		su_exit();
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * tsk->flags are checked in the futex code to protect against
 	 * an exiting task cleaning up the robust pi futexes.
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 3c26774..84cbf39 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -291,6 +291,8 @@
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
+	tsk->flags &= ~PF_SU;
+
 	tsk->stack = ti;
 
 	err = prop_local_init_single(&tsk->dirties);
diff --git a/kernel/sched.c b/kernel/sched.c
index cc6d028..1b64dac 100644
--- a/kernel/sched.c
+++ b/kernel/sched.c
@@ -84,6 +84,38 @@
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <trace/events/sched.h>
 
+static atomic_t __su_instances;
+
+int su_instances(void)
+{
+	return atomic_read(&__su_instances);
+}
+
+bool su_running(void)
+{
+	return su_instances() > 0;
+}
+
+bool su_visible(void)
+{
+	uid_t uid = current_uid();
+	if (su_running())
+		return true;
+	if (uid == 0 || uid == 1000)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+void su_exec(void)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&__su_instances);
+}
+
+void su_exit(void)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&__su_instances);
+}
+
 ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(migration_notifier_head);
 
 /*