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https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build.git
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96 lines
3.5 KiB
Diff
96 lines
3.5 KiB
Diff
From d6dee0ccda11e6d9f8b47acd112b399d8afd34bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
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Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 20:51:00 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] UPSTREAM: x86/mm/32: Enable full randomization on i386 and
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X86_32
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Currently on i386 and on X86_64 when emulating X86_32 in legacy mode, only
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the stack and the executable are randomized but not other mmapped files
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libraries, vDSO and mmap requests on i386 and in X86_32 in legacy mode.
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By default on i386 there are 8 bits for the randomization of the libraries,
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vDSO and mmaps which only uses 1MB of VA.
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This patch preserves the original randomness, using 1MB of VA out of 3GB or
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4GB. We think that 1MB out of 3GB is not a big cost for having the ASLR.
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The first obvious security benefit is that all objects are randomized (not
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only the stack and the executable) in legacy mode which highly increases
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the ASLR effectiveness, otherwise the attackers may use these
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non-randomized areas. But also sensitive setuid/setgid applications are
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more secure because currently, attackers can disable the randomization of
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these applications by setting the ulimit stack to "unlimited". This is a
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very old and widely known trick to disable the ASLR in i386 which has been
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allowed for too long.
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Another trick used to disable the ASLR was to set the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE
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personality flag, but fortunately this doesn't work on setuid/setgid
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applications because there is security checks which clear Security-relevant
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flags.
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This patch always randomizes the mmap_legacy_base address, removing the
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possibility to disable the ASLR by setting the stack to "unlimited".
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Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
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Acked-by: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
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Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
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Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
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Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
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Cc: kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457639460-5242-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Bug: 28763575
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Change-Id: Icd128489c3c196ade64f79d4ea898d29f8471baf
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(cherry picked from commit 8b8addf891de8a00e4d39fc32f93f7c5eb8feceb)
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---
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arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 21 +++++++--------------
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
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index 084c36f6b4e3..47287ea3f080 100644
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--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
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+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
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@@ -95,30 +95,23 @@ static unsigned long mmap_base(void)
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}
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/*
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- * Bottom-up (legacy) layout on X86_32 did not support randomization, X86_64
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- * does, but not when emulating X86_32
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- */
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-static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(void)
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-{
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- if (mmap_is_ia32())
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- return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
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- else
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- return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + mmap_rnd();
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-}
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-
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-/*
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* This function, called very early during the creation of a new
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* process VM image, sets up which VM layout function to use:
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*/
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void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
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{
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- mm->mmap_legacy_base = mmap_legacy_base();
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- mm->mmap_base = mmap_base();
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+ unsigned long random_factor = 0UL;
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+
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+ if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
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+ random_factor = mmap_rnd();
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+
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+ mm->mmap_legacy_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + random_factor;
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if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
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mm->mmap_base = mm->mmap_legacy_base;
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mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
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} else {
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+ mm->mmap_base = mmap_base();
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mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
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}
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}
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